»I can"t have your pains« First Person Statements and the Ambiguity of Meaning

In PI 246 Wittgenstein remarks: »In what sense are my sensations private?« This question is embedded in a broader context that deals with the possibility of a private language (cf. PI 243-315). Sensations can thereby be considered with respect to an epistemic as well as a possessive kind of privacy. In PI 246 Wittgenstein refers to statements of the form »Only I can know that I am pain whereas others can only surmise it«. He then argues that such expressions are in one sense false and in another nonsense. Although this remark refers to the epistemic aspect of privacy I shall argue that this semantic differentiation also holds for sentences stating the ownership of sensations
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index Translate to english
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 9,357
External links
  •   Try with proxy.
  •   Try with proxy.
  • Through your library Only published papers are available at libraries
    References found in this work BETA

    No references found.

    Citations of this work BETA

    No citations found.

    Similar books and articles
    Severin Schroeder (2013). Can I Have Your Pain? Philosophical Investigations 36 (1):201-209.
    William Cornwell, Making Sense of the Other: Husserl, Carnap, Heidegger, and Wittgenstein. Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy (Conference Proceedings).
    Duncan Richter (2010). Ethics and Private Language. Philosophical Topics 38 (1):181-203.
    Derek A. McDougall (2008). Pictures, Privacy, Augustine, and the Mind. Journal of Philosophical Research 33 (1):33-72.
    L. A. Garcia (1986). Two Concepts of Desert. Law and Philosophy 5 (2):219 - 235.
    Nicholas Maxwell (1968). Understanding Sensations. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 46 (August):127-146.

    Monthly downloads

    Sorry, there are not enough data points to plot this chart.

    Added to index


    Total downloads

    1 ( #306,128 of 1,088,404 )

    Recent downloads (6 months)

    1 ( #69,601 of 1,088,404 )

    How can I increase my downloads?

    My notes
    Sign in to use this feature

    Start a new thread
    There  are no threads in this forum
    Nothing in this forum yet.