Abstract
Ian Carter has recently argued in a series of articles that a certain form of respect, called ‘opacity respect’, gives a moral grounding to people’s equality. This type of respect involves abstaining from making or acting on judgements about others. Aside from arguing for its justificatory role, Carter also argues that, in this role, it has a series of implications for our thinking about liberal politics. I argue, first, that the theoretical implications of the view that opacity respect grounds equality are narrower than they first appear. This is because, in order to put the view into action, one must make a certain kind of empirical claim. Second, I show that this point reveals an important structural aspect of Carter’s view, concerning the way that principles can be limited in practice. Third, I argue that the practical implications of the view are potentially much broader than they first appear, threatening absurdity. This is because the position’s repercussions naturally extend into day-to-day transactions.