Is collective intentionality really primitive?

Abstract

This paper offers a critical discussion of Searle's account of collective intentionality. It argues Bratman's alternative account avoids some of the shortcomings of Searle's account, over-intellectualizes collective intentionality and imposes an excessive cognitive burden on participating agents.Tthe capacities needed to sustain collective intentionality are examined in an attempt to show that we can preserve the gist of Bratman's account in a cognitively more parsimonious way.

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2007

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Elisabeth Pacherie
Institut Jean Nicod

Citations of this work

Shared Agency Without Shared Intention.Samuel Asarnow - 2020 - Philosophical Quarterly 70 (281):665-688.
Socially Extended Intentions-in-Action.Olle Blomberg - 2011 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2 (2):335-353.
Shared Agency.Abraham Sesshu Roth - 2011 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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References found in this work

Intentionality.J. Searle - 1983 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 49 (3):530-531.
Collective Intentions and Actions.John Searle - 1990 - In Philip R. Cohen Jerry Morgan & Martha Pollack (eds.), Intentions in Communication. MIT Press. pp. 401-415.

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