Berkeley's Assessment of Locke's Epistemology

In Stephen H. Daniel (ed.), Reexamining Berkeley's Philosophy (2007)
Abstract
In this essay, the author analyses Berkeley’s conformity and inference argument against Locke’s theory of percep tion. Both arguments are not as decisive as traditionally has been perceived and fail to engage in Locke’s actual position. The main reason for this is that Berkeley does not see that Locke’s position is compatible with the non-inferential nature of perceptual knowledge
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