David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Acta Analytica 20 (2):3-25 (2005)
Two of the main forms of anti-scepticism in the contemporary literature—namely, neo-Mooreanism and attributer contextualism—share a common claim, which is that we are, contra the sceptic, able to know the denials of sceptical hypotheses. This paper begins by surveying the relative merits of these views when it comes to dealing with the standard closure-based formulation of the sceptical problem that is focussed on the possession of knowledge. It is argued, however, that it is not enough to simply deal with this version of the sceptical challenge, since there is a more fundamental sceptical problem underlying the standard closure-based sceptical argument that can be expressed in terms of the evidential basis of our beliefs. Whilst it is argued that neo-Mooreanism has a slight edge over attributer contextualism when it comes to dealing with the closure-based formulation of the sceptical problem, it is claimed that this view is in an ever stronger dialectical position when it comes to the more pressing evidential formulation of the sceptical problem. It is shown that this is so even if one adapts the attributer contextualist thesis along the lines suggested by Michael Williams and Ram Neta so that it is explicitly designed to deal with the evidential variant of the sceptical problem.
|Keywords||contextualism epistemology evidence neo-mooreanism scepticism|
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References found in this work BETA
Timothy Williamson (2000). Knowledge and its Limits. Oxford University Press.
Robert Nozick (1981). Philosophical Explanations. Harvard University Press.
Bernard Williams (2002). Truth and Truthfulness: An Essay in Genealogy. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
John McDowell (1994). Mind and World. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Duncan Pritchard (2005). Epistemic Luck. Clarendon Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Nathan Cockram (forthcoming). Pritchard, Revisionism and Warranted Assertability. Acta Analytica:1-16.
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