Towards a Balanced Account of Expertise

Social Epistemology 32 (6):397-418 (2018)
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Abstract

The interdisciplinary debate about the nature of expertise often conflates having expertise with either the individual possession of competences or a certain role ascription. In contrast to this, the paper attempts to demonstrate how different dimensions of expertise ascription are inextricably interwoven. As a result, a balanced account of expertise will be proposed that more accurately determines the closer relationship between the expert’s dispositions, their manifestations and the expert’s function. This finally results in an advanced understanding of expertise that views someone as an expert only if she is undefeatedly disposed to fulfill a contextually salient service function adequately at the moment of assessment.

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Christian Quast
University of Münster

Citations of this work

African Epistemology.Paul Irikefe - forthcoming - The Blackwell Companion to Epistemology, Third Edition, Kurt Sylvan, Matthias Steup, Ernest Sosa and Jonathan Dancy (Eds.).
Objective Expertise and Functionalist Constraints.Michel Croce - 2019 - Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 8 (5):25-35.
Balancing the Normativity of Expertise.Markus Seidel - 2019 - Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 8 (7):34-40.
We should redefine scientific expertise: an extended virtue account.Duygu Uygun Tunç - 2022 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 12 (4):1–30.

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References found in this work

Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind.John R. Searle - 1983 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
Relevance.D. Sperber & Deirdre Wilson - 1986 - Communication and Cognition: An Interdisciplinary Quarterly Journal 2.
Thought in Action: Expertise and the Conscious Mind.Barbara Montero - 2016 - Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press UK.
Achievement.Gwen Bradford - 2015 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
On Clear and Confused Ideas: An Essay About Substance Concepts.Ruth Garrett Millikan - 2000 - Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press.

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