Methodological conservatism and social epistemology

International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 8 (3):247 – 264 (1994)
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Abstract

This paper defends two principles of methodological conservatism on the grounds that they help to promote an effective social structure for a knowledge‐seeking community. Conservatism has some prima facie justification because it provides for an effective division of cognitive labor, it promotes the effective use of scientific resources, and it provides for a certain amount of stability. However, the principles I defend in this paper should not be treated as absolute or unconditional criteria of theory‐choice, since they can be overridden by other rules or maxims. Since the decision to override a principle of conservatism depends on various contextual factors, the appropriateness of conservatism can vary from context to context.

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Citations of this work

Is the precautionary principle unscientific?David B. Resnik - 2003 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 34 (2):329-344.

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References found in this work

Word and Object.Willard Van Orman Quine - 1960 - Les Etudes Philosophiques 17 (2):278-279.
Conjectures and Refutations.Karl Popper - 1963 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 19 (2):159-168.
Against Method.P. Feyerabend - 1975 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 26 (4):331-342.
Philosophy of Natural Science.Carl G. Hempel - 1967 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 18 (1):70-72.

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