Defining disability: metaphysical not political

Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 16 (3):377-384 (2013)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Recent discussions surrounding the conceptualising of disability has resulted in a stalemate between British sociologists and philosophers. The stagnation of theorizing that has occurred threatens not only academic pursuits and the advancement of theoretical interpretations within the Disability Studies community, but also how we educate and advocate politically, legally, and socially. More pointedly, many activists and theorists in the UK appear to believe the British social model is the only effective means of understanding and advocating on behalf of people with disabilities. This model, largely reliant upon materialist research traditions, contends that disability is a form of social oppression and hence, is a phenomenon that should be conceptualised in social terms. Individual properties such as impairments are disregarded as they are viewed to be unimportant in the analysis of the social causes of disability. Concurrently, many bioethicists and philosophers have embraced what Tom Shakespeare has classified as an ‘Interactional Approach’ to disability—that “the experience of a disabled person results from the relationship between factors intrinsic to the individual, and the extrinsic factors arising from the wider context in which she finds herself”. I intend to demonstrate that the benefits of the British social model are now outweighed by its burdens. I suggest, as Jerome Bickenbach has, that while it may be somewhat churlish to critique the social model in light of its political success, taken literally, it implies that people with disabilities require no additional health resources by virtue of their impairments. Despite the eloquent arguments that have preceded me by interactional theorists, none have been accepted as evidence of fallacious reasoning by British social model theorists. This article is an attempt to clarify why it is that the types of arguments British social model theorists have been offering are misguided. I suggest that the British social model, unlike an interactional approach, is unable to provide a realistic account of the experience of disability, and subsequently, unable to be properly utilized to ensure justice for people with disabilities

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,571

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Disability, respect and justice.Linda Barclay - 2010 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 27 (2):154-171.
(In) equality, (ab) normality, and the americans with disabilities act.Anita Silvers - 1996 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 21 (2):209-224.
Disability, bioethics, and rejected knowledge.Christopher Newell - 2006 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 31 (3):269 – 283.
Philosophical and Ethical Issues in Disability.Jeffrey Blustein - 2012 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 9 (4):573-587.
Depression in the context of disability and the “right to die”.Carol J. Gill - 2004 - Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 25 (3):171-198.
Disability in the Bioethics Curriculum.Anita Ho - 2007 - Teaching Philosophy 30 (4):403-420.

Analytics

Added to PP
2012-04-06

Downloads
75 (#219,167)

6 months
11 (#231,434)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

References found in this work

Philosophy and science: the axes of evil in disability studies?S. Vehmas - 2008 - Journal of Medical Ethics 34 (1):21-23.

Add more references