David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 21 (2):157 – 170 (2007)
We argue that the health sciences make causal claims on the basis of evidence both of physical mechanisms, and of probabilistic dependencies. Consequently, an analysis of causality solely in terms of physical mechanisms or solely in terms of probabilistic relationships, does not do justice to the causal claims of these sciences. Yet there seems to be a single relation of cause in these sciences - pluralism about causality will not do either. Instead, we maintain, the health sciences require a theory of causality that unifies its mechanistic and probabilistic aspects. We argue that the epistemic theory of causality provides the required unification.
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Citations of this work BETA
Jeremy Howick (2011). Exposing the Vanities—and a Qualified Defense—of Mechanistic Reasoning in Health Care Decision Making. Philosophy of Science 78 (5):926-940.
George Darby & Jon Williamson (2011). Imaging Technology and the Philosophy of Causality. Philosophy and Technology 24 (2):115-136.
Holly Andersen (2012). Mechanisms: What Are They Evidence for in Evidence-Based Medicine. Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice 18 (5):992-999.
Stefan Dragulinescu (2010). Diseases as Natural Kinds. Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 31 (5):347-369.
Phyllis McKay Illari (2011). Mechanistic Evidence: Disambiguating the Russo–Williamson Thesis. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 25 (2):139 - 157.
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