Abstract

From Plato to G. E. Moore, moral theorists commonly and confidently embraced moral realism: they simply assumed that at least some moral claims were true. Until this century, their shared assumption was relatively unproblematic. Recently, however, moral realism has come under severe attack, and along the way moral theory itself has become suspect. Against moral realism anti-realists have maintained that all moral claims are cognitively empty , or that all moral claims are false . These positions are bolstered by arguments grounded in epistemology--some charging moral theory with untestability, others charging it with explanatory impotence. I defend moral realism against these epistemological attacks. Both attacks underestimate realism's resources, and both may be successfully met. Despite the historical enmity between scientific and moral realism, considerations marshalled in defense of scientific realism have surprising and powerful applications in moral theory. I use these arguments in developing a model for moral theorizing and a version of moral realism that each fits comfortably within a naturalistic world view without robbing moral theory of its claim to significance