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Normative realism and ontology: reply to Clarke-Doane, Rosen, and Enoch and McPherson
Canadian Journal of Philosophy 47 (6):877-897 (2017)
Abstract
In response to comments on my book, Being Realistic about Reasons, by Justin Clarke-Doane, David Enoch and Tristram McPherson, and Gideon Rosen, I try to clarify my domain-based view of ontology, my understanding of the epistemology of normative judgments, and my interpretation of the phenomenon of supervenience.Links
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Citations of this work
Nomic moral naturalness.Alexios Stamatiadis-Bréhier - 2022 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy:1-22.
Do formal objections to the error theory overgeneralize?Bart Streumer & Daniel Wodak - 2023 - Analysis 83 (4):732-741.
On the (in)significance of Hume’s Law.Samuele Chilovi & Daniel Wodak - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (2):633-653.
Meta-Ethical Quietism? Wittgenstein, Relaxed Realism, and Countercultures in Meta-Ethics.Farbod Akhlaghi - forthcoming - In Jonathan Beale & Richard Rowland (eds.), Wittgenstein and Contemporary Moral Philosophy.
Reason monolithism: A Darwinian dilemma for “relaxed” realism.Gloria Mähringer - 2023 - Theoria 89 (6):840-855.
References found in this work
A Darwinian dilemma for realist theories of value.Sharon Street - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 127 (1):109-166.
Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong.Fred Feldman & J. L. Mackie - 1979 - Philosophical Review 88 (1):134.
Does Evolutionary Psychology Show That Normativity Is Mind-Dependent?Selim Berker - 2014 - In Justin D'Arms Daniel Jacobson (ed.), Moral Psychology and Human Agency: Essays on the New Science of Ethics. pp. 215-252.
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