Meaning and Justification: The Case of Modus Ponens

Noûs 40 (4):687 - 715 (2006)
Abstract
In virtue of what are we justified in employing the rule of inference Modus Ponens? One tempting approach to answering this question is to claim that we are justified in employing Modus Ponens purely in virtue of facts concerning meaning or concept-possession. In this paper, we argue that such meaning-based accounts cannot be accepted as the fundamental account of our justification.
Keywords Analyticity  Justification  Internalism and Externalism
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References found in this work BETA
Paul Boghossian (2003). Blind Reasoning. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 77 (1):225–248.

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Citations of this work BETA
Elijah Chudnoff (2013). Is Intuition Based On Understanding? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (1):42-67.
Sinan Dogramaci (2013). Intuitions for Inferences. Philosophical Studies 165 (2):371-399.
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