Abstract

Hornsby and Langton (H&L), put forward the idea of silencing as an “illocutionary disablement”. Appealing to Austin’s speech act theory, they situate silencing as opposite to speech act and argue that when there is silencing, people’s illocutionary act fails and their right to free speech is violated. This paper presents a defence of H&L’s account of silencing, against objections raised by Ishani Maitra (2009). Maitra questions the model of illocutionary silencing by arguing that Austin’s illocutionary model is inaccurate and vague hence, not useful for the discussions of silencing. In response, I argue that Maitra’s understanding of the perlocutionary act is misguided and requires a critical examination. Maitra discusses the notion of the perlocutionary act as the goals that the speaker achieves by securing the uptake. I oppose such a view by arguing that securing the uptake does not ensure the performance of a perlocutionary act.