Graduate studies at Western
Economics and Philosophy 18 (1):157-182 (2002)
|Abstract||Irrational people create problems not only for themselves and those around them, but also for those who study them. They cause trouble for social scientists because their actions are inexplicable, at least according to generally accepted models of explanation. Explanations in the social sciences normally assume the form of rationalizations: actions are explained by showing that, relative to what the subjects believe and desire, the actions were done for good reasons. Conversely, when good reasons cannot be found for why someone acted as they did, their behavior remains inscrutable. Irrational people, therefore, stymie social scientists because their actions do not reveal the rationality needed to produce adequate explanations.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Rosalind Hursthouse (1991). Arational Actions. Journal of Philosophy 88 (2):57-68.
Tsjalling Swierstra & Katinka Waelbers (2012). Designing a Good Life: A Matrix for the Technological Mediation of Morality. [REVIEW] Science and Engineering Ethics 18 (1):157-172.
Clare R. Walsh & Ruth M. J. Byrne (2007). How People Think “If Only …” About Reasons for Actions. Thinking and Reasoning 13 (4):461 – 483.
Rob Vanderbeeken (2006). Can Intentional and Functional Explanations of Actions Coexist? The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy 9:143-147.
Kalle Grill (2007). The Normative Core of Paternalism. Res Publica 13 (4):441-458.
Kalle Grill (2010). Anti-Paternalism and Invalidation of Reasons. Public Reason 2 (2):3-20.
Theodore Mischel (1966). Pragmatic Aspects of Explanation. Philosophy of Science 33 (1/2):40-60.
Paul A. Roth (2005). Three Grades of Normative Involvement: Risjord, Stueber, and Henderson on Norms and Explanation. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 35 (3):339-352.
Tom Walker (2012). Ulysses Contracts in Medicine. Law and Philosophy 31 (1):77-98.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads20 ( #68,490 of 750,737 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #62,995 of 750,737 )
How can I increase my downloads?