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Pollock on defeasible reasons
Philosophical Studies 169 (1):105-118 (2014)
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Citations of this work
Modal Security.Justin Clarke-Doane & Dan Baras - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 102 (1):162-183.
Are humans the only rational animals?Giacomo Melis & Susana Monsó - 2023 - The Philosophical Quarterly.
Problems for Credulism.James Pryor - 2013 - In Chris Tucker (ed.), Seemings and Justification: New Essays on Dogmatism and Phenomenal Conservatism. New York: Oxford University Press USA. pp. 89–131.
Defeaters in current epistemology: introduction to the special issue.Luca Moretti & Tommaso Piazza - 2018 - Synthese 195 (7):2845-2854.
References found in this work
Criteria and our knowledge of the material world.John L. Pollock - 1967 - Philosophical Review 76 (1):28-60.
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