Neutrality and the Relations between Different Possible Locations of the Good

Croatian Journal of Philosophy 19 (1):1-13 (2019)
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Abstract

This article explores and challenges several common assumptions regarding what neutrality requires of us in assessing outcomes. In particular, I consider whether we should be neutral between different possible locations of the good: space, time, and people. I suggest that from a normative perspective we should treat space differently than time, and people differently than space and time. I also argue that in some cases we should give priority to people over space and time, and to time over space, but that, controversially, in some cases we should give priority to time over people.

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Larry Temkin
Rutgers University - New Brunswick

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