Unsaturatedness: Wittgenstein's challenge, Frege's answer

Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 109 (1pt1):61-82 (2009)
Frege holds the distinction between complete (saturated) and incomplete (unsaturated) things to be a basic distinction of logic. Many disagree. In this paper I will argue that one can defend Frege's distinction against criticism if one takes, inspired by Frege, a wh -question to be the paradigm incomplete expression.
Keywords Frege  Unsaturatedness
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Nuel Belnap (1990). Declaratives Are Not Enough. Philosophical Studies 59 (1):1 - 30.

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