Kripke, Wittgenstein and the private language argument
Grazer Philosophische Studien 11:61-74 (1980)
| Abstract | "Agreement" is the key notion in Wittgenstein's explanation of the possibility of public language. Agreement in judgements constitutes the justification for asserting agreement in definitions. The determinates of rules are empirical; rules as determinables are transcendental. Rules are on the limit of public language, and not within it. Wittgenstein's skeptical solutions to skepticism about language and about the given are transcendentalistic. His skeptical solutions in other areas are conventionalistic. Skepticism about mental phenomena is not solved because of a systematic rule-gap for the application of non-dispositional psychological concepts | |||||||||
| Keywords | Language Private Language Scepticism Kripke, S Wittgenstein | |||||||||
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Michael E. Levin (1975). Kripke's Argument Against the Identity Thesis. Journal of Philosophy 72 (March):149-67.
Alex Byrne (1996). On Misinterpreting Kripke's Wittgenstein. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (2):339-343.
Paul A. Boghossian (1989). The Rule-Following Considerations. Mind 98 (392):507-49.
M. McGinn (1984). Kripke on Wittgenstein's Sceptical Problem. Ratio 26 (June):19-32.
Crispin Wright (1984). Kripke's Account of the Argument Against Private Language. Journal of Philosophy 81 (12):759-78.
George Rudebusch (1986). Hoffman on Kripke's Wittgenstein. Philosophical Research Archives 12:177-182.
John A. Humphrey (1996). Kripke's Wittgenstein and the Impossibility of Private Language: The Same Old Story? Journal of Philosophical Research 21 (January):197-207.
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