After defining dramatic prefiguration, I show how (1) the initial meeting between Polemarchus's party and the smaller group of Socrates and Glaucon prefigures the Republic's theme of how to install the philosophical element in its proper place as ruler in the soul; (2) the relay race of torches carried on horseback prefigures the theory of the soul as tripartite, containing reason, spirit, and appetite; and (3) the opening image of Socrates descending to the Piraeus prefigures the descent of the reasoning (...) element back from the forms to give birth to works of wisdom. (shrink)
In this study, George Rudebusch addresses whether Socrates was a hedonist--whether he believed pleasure to be the good. In attempting to locate Socrates' position on hedonism, Rudebusch examines the passages in Plato's early dialogues that are the most disputed on the topic. He maintains that Socrates identifies pleasant activity with virtuous activity, describing Socrates' hedonism as one of activity, not sensation. This analysis allows for Socrates to find both virtue and pleasure to be the good, thus solving the textual puzzle (...) and showing the power of Socratic argument in leading human beings toward the good. (shrink)
AUGUSTINE WISHED TO DEFEND AND MAKE AS INTELLIGIBLE AS POSSIBLE THE CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE OF THE TRINITY. I SHOW HOW AUGUSTINE WORKS WITH AN ARISTOTELIAN MODEL OF PREDICATION, DERIVES AN INCOMPLETENESS RESULT WITHIN THE STANDARD FORMS OF PREDICATION, AND ACCEPTS, WITH SOME QUALIFICATION, A NONSTANDARD FORM OF PREDICATION USED BY ARISTOTLE FOR PREDICATING PRIMARY SUBSTANCE OF MATTER.
Paul Hoffman (in “Kripke on Private Language”, Philosophical Studies 47, 1985, 23-28) argues that Kripke’s Wittgenstein fails in his solution to his own sceptical paradox. I argue that Hoffman fails to see the importance for Kripke’s Wittgenstein of the distinction between agreement in fact and judged agreement. Hoffman is right that no solution to the sceptical paradox can be based on agreement in fact, but the solution of Kripke’s Wittgenstein depends upon judged agreement. An interpretation is given: by ‘judged agreement’ (...) Kripke’s Wittgenstein does not mean understanding oneself to judge agreement but having a feeling of agreement. On this interpretation Hoffman’s argument fails. (shrink)
Plato's "theaetetus" (187-200) raises puzzles about false belief. Frege's explanation of how an identity statement can be informative is often seen as a solution to socrates' puzzles. The strategy of frege's solution is to explain a "mistake" as a "mismatch". But it turns out that socrates' argument, In fact, Is aware of and rejects this strategy.