Change in the Decision Sciences

Lato Sensu: Revue de la Société de Philosophie des Sciences 5 (1):13-19 (2018)
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Abstract

A common type of change in science occurs as theorists generalize a model of a phenomenon by removing some idealizations of the model. This type of change occurs in the decision sciences and also in the normative branch of the decision sciences that treats rational choice. After presenting a general ac-count of model generalization, the paper illustrates generalization of models in normative decision theory. The principal illustration generalizes a standard model of rational choice by removing the idealization that deliberation has no cost.

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Paul Weirich
University of Missouri, Columbia

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References found in this work

Counterfactuals and Two Kinds of Expected Utility.Allan Gibbard & William L. Harper - 1978 - In A. Hooker, J. J. Leach & E. F. McClennen (eds.), Foundations and Applications of Decision Theory. D. Reidel. pp. 125-162.
The Foundations of Causal Decision Theory.Isaac Levi & James M. Joyce - 2000 - Journal of Philosophy 97 (7):387.
An introduction to decision theory.Martin Peterson - 2009 - Cambridge University Press.

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