Motivating objective bayesianism: From empirical constraints to objective probabilities
| Abstract | Kyburg goes half-way towards objective Bayesianism. He accepts that frequencies constrain rational belief to an interval but stops short of isolating an optimal degree of belief within this interval. I examine the case for going the whole hog. | |||||||||
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