What Williamson's anti-luminosity argument really is

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89 (4):536-543 (2008)
Abstract:  Williamson argues that when one feels cold, one may not be in a position to know that one feels cold. He thinks this argument can be generalized to show that no mental states are such that when we are in them we are in a position to know that we are in them. I argue that his argument is a sorites argument in disguise because it relies on the implicit premise that warming up is gradual. Williamson claims that his argument is not a sorites argument; I explain why he has not given us any reason to accept the claim.
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DOI 10.1111/j.1468-0114.2008.00335.x
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References found in this work BETA
Ram Neta & Guy Rohrbaugh (2004). Luminosity and the Safety of Knowledge. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 85 (4):396–406.

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Citations of this work BETA
Amia Srinivasan (2015). Are We Luminous? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 90 (2):294-319.
Jonathan Vogel (2010). Luminosity and Indiscriminability. Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):547-572.

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