International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 69 (1):1-15 (2011)
|Abstract||Intending to have a constructive dialogue with the combination of evolutionary theory (E) and metaphysical naturalism (N), Alvin Plantinga’s evolutionary argument against naturalism (EAAN) takes the reliability of human cognition (in normal environments) as a purported explanandum and E&N as a purported explanans. Then, he considers whether E&N can offer a good explanans for this explanandum, and his answer is negative (an answer employed by him to produce a defeater for N). But I will argue that the whole EAAN goes wrong by assuming that R is a qualified explanandum crying out for scientific explanations, since it cannot meet either of the two criteria for any scientifically qualified explanandum: Realizability Criterion and Informativeness Criterion. Hence, EAAN is simply setting a task that E&N, as a scientific theory, will not care at all. Therefore, EAAN cannot substantially shake E&N|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Brian Leahy (2013). Can Teleosemantics Deflect the EAAN? Philosophia 41 (1):221-238.
John Post, REVIEW of Beilby, James, Ed., Naturalism Defeated? For Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (2002). [REVIEW]
Rik Peels (forthcoming). Are Naturalism and Moral Realism Incompatible? Religious Studies:1-10.
N. M. L. Nathan (1997). Naturalism and Self-Defeat: Plantinga's Version. Religious Studies 33 (2):135-142.
Geoff Childers (2011). What's Wrong with the Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism? International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 69 (3):193-204.
Branden Fitelson & Elliott Sober (1998). Plantinga's Probability Arguments Against Evolutionary Naturalism. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 79 (2):115–129.
Timothy O'Connor (2001). A House Divided Against Itself Cannot Stand: Plantinga on the Self-Defeat of Evolutionary Naturalism. In James Beilby (ed.), Naturalism Defeated? Essays on Plantinga's Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism. Cornell.
David Reiter (2000). Plantinga on the Epistemic Implications of Naturalism. Journal of Philosophical Research 25:141-147.
James K. Beilby (ed.) (2002). Naturalism Defeated?: Essays on Plantinga's Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism. Cornell University Press.
Peter Gardenfors (1980). A Pragmatic Approach to Explanations. Philosophy of Science 47 (3):404-423.
Omar Mirza (2008). A User's Guide to the Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism. Philosophical Studies 141 (2):125 - 146.
Feng Ye (2011). Naturalized Truth and Plantinga's Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 70 (1):27-46.
Michael Thune (2006). Naturalism, Hope, and Alethic Rationality. Philo 9 (1):5-11.
Aaron Segal & Alvin Plantinga (2010). Response to Churchland. Philo 13 (2):201-207.
Timothy O'Connor (1994). An Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism? Canadian Journal of Philosophy 24 (4):527-540.
Added to index2010-11-18
Total downloads33 ( #41,931 of 722,783 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #60,541 of 722,783 )
How can I increase my downloads?