The troublesome explanandum in Plantinga's argument against naturalism

Abstract
Intending to have a constructive dialogue with the combination of evolutionary theory (E) and metaphysical naturalism (N), Alvin Plantinga’s evolutionary argument against naturalism (EAAN) takes the reliability of human cognition (in normal environments) as a purported explanandum and E&N as a purported explanans. Then, he considers whether E&N can offer a good explanans for this explanandum, and his answer is negative (an answer employed by him to produce a defeater for N). But I will argue that the whole EAAN goes wrong by assuming that R is a qualified explanandum crying out for scientific explanations, since it cannot meet either of the two criteria for any scientifically qualified explanandum: Realizability Criterion and Informativeness Criterion. Hence, EAAN is simply setting a task that E&N, as a scientific theory, will not care at all. Therefore, EAAN cannot substantially shake E&N
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References found in this work BETA
Alvin I. Goldman (1979/2000). What is Justified Belief? In Ernest Sosa & Jaegwon Kim (eds.), Epistemology. An Anthology. Blackwell. 340-353.

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Citations of this work BETA
Feng Ye (2011). Naturalized Truth and Plantinga's Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 70 (1):27-46.
Similar books and articles
Geoff Childers (2011). What's Wrong with the Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism? International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 69 (3):193-204.
Feng Ye (2011). Naturalized Truth and Plantinga's Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 70 (1):27-46.
Timothy O'Connor (1994). An Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism? Canadian Journal of Philosophy 24 (4):527-540.
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