David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 69 (3):193-204 (2011)
Alvin Plantinga has argued that evolutionary naturalism (the idea that God does not tinker with evolution) undermines its own rationality. Natural selection is concerned with survival and reproduction, and false beliefs conjoined with complementary motivational drives could serve the same aims as true beliefs. Thus, argues Plantinga, if we believe we evolved naturally, we should not think our beliefs are, on average, likely to be true, including our beliefs in evolution and naturalism. I argue herein that our cognitive faculties are less reliable than we often take them to be, that it is theism which has difficulty explaining the nature of our cognition, that much of our knowledge is not passed through biological evolution but learned and transferred through culture, and that the unreliability of our cognition helps explain the usefulness of science
|Keywords||evolution naturalism evolutionary argument against naturalism plantinga cognition bias|
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References found in this work BETA
Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic & Amos Tversky (eds.) (1982). Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases. Cambridge University Press.
Alvin Plantinga (1993). Warrant and Proper Function. Oxford University Press.
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David Hume (1977). Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding. Clarendon Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Maarten Boudry & Michael Vlerick (2014). Natural Selection Does Care About Truth. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 28 (1):65-77.
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