Guilt Without Perceived Wrongdoing

Philosophy and Public Affairs 48 (3):285-314 (2020)
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Abstract

According to the received account of guilt in the philosophical literature, one cannot feel guilt unless one takes oneself to have done something morally wrong. But ordinary people feel guilt in many cases in which they do not take themselves to have done anything morally wrong. In this paper, I focus on one kind of guilt without perceived wrongdoing, guilt about being merely causally responsible for a bad state-of-affairs. I go on to present a novel account of guilt that explains guilt about mere causal responsibility, according to which guilt represents part of the self as bound up with what is bad.

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Michael Zhao
University of Notre Dame

Citations of this work

Conceptual limitations, puzzlement, and epistemic dilemmas.Deigan Michael - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (9):2771-2796.
Guilty Confessions.Hannah Tierney - 2021 - In Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 182-204.
In defense of guilt‐tripping.Rachel Achs - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.

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References found in this work

Moral Luck.B. A. O. Williams & T. Nagel - 1976 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 50 (1):115-152.
What an emotion is: A sketch.Robert C. Roberts - 1988 - Philosophical Review 97 (April):183-209.
Identification and externality.Harry Frankfurt - 1977 - In Amelie Rorty (ed.), The Identities of Persons. University of California Press.
Is Agent-Regret Rational?David Sussman - 2018 - Ethics 128 (4):788-808.
Guilt, shame, and morality.R. E. Lamb - 1983 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 43 (3):329-346.

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