Search results for 'modus_ponens' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Susanne Bobzien (2002). The Development of Modus Ponens in Antiquity: From Aristotle to the 2nd Century AD. Phronesis 47 (4):359-394.score: 90.0
    ABSTRACT: ‘Aristotelian logic’, as it was taught from late antiquity until the 20th century, commonly included a short presentation of the argument forms modus (ponendo) ponens, modus (tollendo) tollens, modus ponendo tollens, and modus tollendo ponens. In late antiquity, arguments of these forms were generally classified as ‘hypothetical syllogisms’. However, Aristotle did not discuss such arguments, nor did he call any arguments ‘hypothetical syllogisms’. The Stoic indemonstrables resemble the modus ponens/tollens arguments. But the Stoics never called them ‘hypothetical syllogisms’; nor (...)
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  2. Huajie Liu (2006). Instability, Modus Ponens and Uncertainty of Deduction. Frontiers of Philosophy in China 1 (4):658-674.score: 90.0
    Considering the instability of nonlinear dynamics, the deductive inference rule Modus ponens itself is not enough to guarantee the validity of reasoning sequences in the real physical world, and similar results cannot necessarily be obtained from similar causes. Some kind of stability hypothesis should be added in order to draw meaningful conclusions. Hence, the uncertainty of deductive inference appears to be like that of inductive inference, and the asymmetry between deduction and induction becomes unrecognizable such as to undermine the basis (...)
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  3. Gemma Robles & José M. Méndez (2014). Curry's Paradox, Generalized Modus Ponens Axiom and Depth Relevance. Studia Logica 102 (1):185-217.score: 90.0
    “Weak relevant model structures” (wr-ms) are defined on “weak relevant matrices” by generalizing Brady’s model structure ${\mathcal{M}_{\rm CL}}$ built upon Meyer’s Crystal matrix CL. It is shown how to falsify in any wr-ms the Generalized Modus Ponens axiom and similar schemes used to derive Curry’s Paradox. In the last section of the paper we discuss how to extend this method of falsification to more general schemes that could also be used in deriving Curry’s Paradox.
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  4. Elia Zardini (2013). Naive Modus Ponens. Journal of Philosophical Logic 42 (4):575-593.score: 90.0
    The paper is concerned with a logical difficulty which Lionel Shapiro’s deflationist theory of logical consequence (as well as the author’s favoured, non-deflationist theory) gives rise to. It is argued that Shapiro’s non-contractive approach to solving the difficulty, although correct in its broad outlines, is nevertheless extremely problematic in some of its specifics, in particular in its failure to validate certain intuitive rules and laws associated with the principle of modus ponens. An alternative non-contractive theory is offered which does not (...)
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  5. Douglas Walton (2001). Are Some Modus Ponens Arguments Deductively Invalid? Informal Logic 22 (1).score: 90.0
    This article concerns the structure of defeasible arguments like: 'If Bob has red spots, Bob has the measles; Bob has red spots; therefore Bob has the measles.' The issue is whether such arguments have the form of modus ponens or not. Either way there is a problem. If they don't have the form of modus ponens, the common opinion to the contrary taught in leading logic textbooks is wrong. But if they do have the form of modus ponens, doubts are (...)
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  6. Félix Bou, Josep Maria Font & José Luis García Lapresta (2004). On Weakening the Deduction Theorem and Strengthening Modus Ponens. Mathematical Logic Quarterly 50 (3):303-324.score: 75.0
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  7. Liu Huajie (2006). Instability, Modus Ponens and Uncertainty of Deduction. Frontiers of Philosophy in China 1 (4):658-674.score: 75.0
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  8. Joshua Schechter & David Enoch (2006). Meaning and Justification: The Case of Modus Ponens. Noûs 40 (4):687 - 715.score: 60.0
    In virtue of what are we justified in employing the rule of inference Modus Ponens? One tempting approach to answering this question is to claim that we are justified in employing Modus Ponens purely in virtue of facts concerning meaning or concept-possession. In this paper, we argue that such meaning-based accounts cannot be accepted as the fundamental account of our justification.
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  9. Jordan Howard Sobel (2009). Modus Ponens and Modus Tollens for Conditional Probabilities, and Updating on Uncertain Evidence. Theory and Decision 66 (2):103 - 148.score: 60.0
    There are narrowest bounds for P(h) when P(e) = y and P(h/e) = x, which bounds collapse to x as y goes to 1. A theorem for these bounds -- bounds for probable modus ponens -- entails a principle for updating on possibly uncertain evidence subject to these bounds that is a generalization of the principle for updating by conditioning on certain evidence. This way of updating on possibly uncertain evidence is appropriate when updating by ’probability kinematics’ or ’Jeffrey-conditioning’ is, (...)
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  10. Colin Howson (2009). Sorites is No Threat to Modus Ponens: A Reply to Kochan. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 23 (2):209-212.score: 60.0
    A recent article by Jeff Kochan contains a discussion of modus ponens that among other thing alleges that the paradox of the heap is a counterexample to it. In this note I show that it is the conditional major premise of a modus ponens inference, rather than the rule itself, that is impugned. This premise is the contrapositive of the inductive step in the principle of mathematical induction, confirming the widely accepted view that it is the vagueness of natural language (...)
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  11. Benjamin Schnieder, Modus Ponens Revisited.score: 60.0
    The compositional structure of language might have led one to expect that a proper analysis of simple conditionals would have been adequate to determine the analysis of iterated conditionals. But McGee has presented an interesting group of examples that shows that this is not so for indicative conditionals. The examples are particularly arresting since they appear to show that modus ponens does not hold as a generally valid rule of inference for conditionals in natural language.
     
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  12. Jean-Francois Bonnefon & Denis J. Hilton (2002). The Suppression of Modus Ponens as a Case of Pragmatic Preconditional Reasoning. Thinking and Reasoning 8 (1):21 – 40.score: 60.0
    The suppression of the Modus Ponens inference is described as a loss of confidence in the conclusion C of an argument ''If A1 then C; If A2 then C; A1'' where A2 is a requirement for C to happen. It is hypothesised that this loss of confidence is due to the derivation of the conversational implicature ''there is a chance that A2 might not be satisfied'', and that different syntactic introductions of the requirement A2 (e.g., ''If C then A2'') will (...)
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  13. Constantin C. Brincus & Iulian D. Toader (2013). A Carnapian Approach to Counterexamples to Modus Ponens. Romanian Journal of Analytic Philosophy 7 (1):78-85.score: 60.0
    This paper proposes a Carnapian approach to known counterexamples to Modus Ponens (henceforth, MP). More specifically, it argues that instead of rejecting MP as invalid in certain interpretations, one should regard the interpretations themselves as non-normal, in Carnap’s sense.
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  14. Niki Pfeifer & G. D. Kleiter (2007). Human Reasoning with Imprecise Probabilities: Modus Ponens and Denying the Antecedent. In Proceedings of the 5 T H International Symposium on Imprecise Probability: Theories and Applications. 347--356.score: 60.0
    The modus ponens (A -> B, A :. B) is, along with modus tollens and the two logically not valid counterparts denying the antecedent (A -> B, ¬A :. ¬B) and affirming the consequent, the argument form that was most often investigated in the psychology of human reasoning. The present contribution reports the results of three experiments on the probabilistic versions of modus ponens and denying the antecedent. In probability logic these arguments lead to conclusions with imprecise probabilities. In the (...)
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  15. Joseph S. Fulda (2010). Vann McGee’s Counterexample to Modus Ponens: An Enthymeme. Journal of Pragmatics 42 (1):271-273.score: 60.0
    Solves Vann McGee's counterexample to Modus Ponens within classical logic by disclosing the suppressed premises and bringing them /within/ the argument.
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  16. Christian Straßer (2012). Adaptively Applying Modus Ponens in Conditional Logics of Normality. Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics 22 (1-2):125-148.score: 60.0
    This paper presents an adaptive logic enhancement of conditional logics of normality that allows for defeasible applications of Modus Ponens to conditionals. In addition to the possibilities these logics already offer in terms of reasoning about conditionals, this way they are enriched by the ability to perform default inferencing. The idea is to apply Modus Ponens defeasibly to a conditional and a fact on the condition that it is ?safe' to do so concerning the factual and conditional knowledge at hand. (...)
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  17. Vann McGee (1985). A Counterexample to Modus Ponens. Journal of Philosophy 82 (9):462-471.score: 45.0
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  18. Rachael Briggs (2012). Interventionist Counterfactuals. Philosophical Studies 160 (1):139-166.score: 45.0
    A number of recent authors (Galles and Pearl, Found Sci 3 (1):151–182, 1998; Hiddleston, Noûs 39 (4):232–257, 2005; Halpern, J Artif Intell Res 12:317–337, 2000) advocate a causal modeling semantics for counterfactuals. But the precise logical significance of the causal modeling semantics remains murky. Particularly important, yet particularly under-explored, is its relationship to the similarity-based semantics for counterfactuals developed by Lewis (Counterfactuals. Harvard University Press, 1973b). The causal modeling semantics is both an account of the truth conditions of counterfactuals, and (...)
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  19. Assaf Sharon & Levi Spectre (2013). Epistemic Closure Under Deductive Inference: What is It and Can We Afford It? Synthese 190 (14):2731-2748.score: 45.0
    The idea that knowledge can be extended by inference from what is known seems highly plausible. Yet, as shown by familiar preface paradox and lottery-type cases, the possibility of aggregating uncertainty casts doubt on its tenability. We show that these considerations go much further than previously recognized and significantly restrict the kinds of closure ordinary theories of knowledge can endorse. Meeting the challenge of uncertainty aggregation requires either the restriction of knowledge-extending inferences to single premises, or eliminating epistemic uncertainty in (...)
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  20. Gilbert Plumer (2000). The Paradoxical Associated Conditional of Enthymemes. In Christopher W. Tindale, Hans V. Hansen & Elmar Sveda (eds.), Argumentation at the Century's Turn [CD-ROM]. Ontario Society for the Study of Argumentation.score: 45.0
    Expressing a widely-held view, David Hitchcock claims that "an enthymematic argument ... assumes at least the truth of the argument's associated conditional ... whose antecedent is the conjunction of the argument's explicit premises and whose consequent is the argument's conclusion." But even definitionally, this view is problematic, since an argument's being "enthymematic" or incomplete with respect to its explicit premises means that the conclusion is not implied by these premises alone. The paper attempts to specify the ways in which the (...)
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  21. G. F. Schueler (1988). Modus Ponens and Moral Realism. Ethics 98 (3):492-500.score: 45.0
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  22. Susanne Bobzien (2002). A Greek Parallel to Boethius' de Hypotheticis Syllogismis. Mnemosyne 55 (3):285-300.score: 45.0
    In this paper I present the text, a translation, and a commentary of a long anonymous scholium to Aristotle’s Analytics which is a Greek parallel to Boethius’ De Hypotheticis Syllogismis, but has so far not been recognized as such. The scholium discusses hypothetical syllogisms of the types modus ponens and modus tollens and hypothetical syllogisms constructed from three conditionals (‘wholly hypothetical syllogisms’). It is Peripatetic, and not Stoic, in its theoretical approach as well as its terminology. There are several elements (...)
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  23. Bernard D. Katz (1999). On a Supposed Counterexample to Modus Ponens. Journal of Philosophy 96 (8):404-415.score: 45.0
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  24. Christian Piller (1996). Vann McGee's Counterexample to Modus Ponens. Philosophical Studies 82 (1):27 - 54.score: 45.0
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  25. Jeff Kochan (2009). The Exception Makes the Rule: Reply to Howson. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 23 (2):213-216.score: 45.0
    Colin Howson argues that (1) my sociologistic reliabilism sheds no light on the objectivity of epistemic content, and that (2) sorites does not threaten the reliability of modus ponens . I reply that argument (1) misrepresents my position, and that argument (2) is beside the point.
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  26. Peter Marton (2004). Achilles Versus the Tortoise: The Battle Over Modus Ponens (an Aristotelian Argument). Philosophia 31 (3-4):383-400.score: 45.0
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  27. Malte Willer (2010). New Surprises for the Ramsey Test. Synthese 176 (2):291 - 309.score: 45.0
    In contemporary discussions of the Ramsey Test for conditionals, it is commonly held that (i) supposing the antecedent of a conditional is adopting a potential state of full belief, and (ii) Modus Ponens is a valid rule of inference. I argue on the basis of Thomason Conditionals (such as ' If Sally is deceiving, I do not believe it') and Moore's Paradox that both claims are wrong. I then develop a double-indexed Update Semantics for conditionals which takes these two results (...)
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  28. Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, James Moor & Robert Fogelin (1986). A Defense of Modus Ponens. Journal of Philosophy 83 (5):296-300.score: 45.0
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  29. E. J. Lowe (1987). Not a Counterexample to Modus Ponens. Analysis 47 (1):44 - 47.score: 45.0
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  30. Nick Zangwill (1992). Moral modus ponens. Ratio 5 (2):177-193.score: 45.0
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  31. Graham Priest (1980). Sense, Entailment and Modus Ponens. Journal of Philosophical Logic 9 (4):415 - 435.score: 45.0
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  32. Beihai Zhou & Yi Mao (2006). A Base Logic for Default Reasoning. Frontiers of Philosophy in China 1 (4):688-709.score: 45.0
    Based on a close study of benchmark examples in default reasoning, such as Nixon Diamond, Penguin Principle, etc., this paper provides an in depth analysis of the basic features of default reasoning. We formalize default inferences based on Modus Ponens for Default Implication, and mark the distinction between "local inferences"(to infer a conclusion from a subset of given premises) and "global inferences"(to infer a conclusion from the entire set of given premises). These conceptual analyses are captured by a formal semantics (...)
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  33. D. E. Over (1987). Assumptions and the Supposed Counterexamples to Modus Ponens. Analysis 47 (3):142 - 146.score: 45.0
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  34. Jordan Howard Sobel, Hosiasson-Lindenbaum/Kolmogorov Probability Theory: Solutions to Exercises in Appendix a of Extended Version of “Modus Ponens and Modus Tollens ….score: 45.0
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  35. Justin Khoo (2013). A Note on Gibbard's Proof. Philosophical Studies 166 (1):153-164.score: 45.0
    A proof by Allan Gibbard (Ifs: Conditionals, beliefs, decision, chance, time. Reidel, Dordrecht, 1981) seems to demonstrate that if indicative conditionals have truth conditions, they cannot be stronger than material implication. Angelika Kratzer's theory that conditionals do not denote two-place operators purports to escape this result [see Kratzer (Chic Linguist Soc 22(2):1–15, 1986, 2012)]. In this note, I raise some trouble for Kratzer’s proposed method of escape and then show that her semantics avoids this consequence of Gibbard’s proof by denying (...)
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  36. A. F. Bausch (1965). Modus Ponens Under Hypothesis. Journal of Symbolic Logic 30 (1):26.score: 45.0
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  37. Gilbert Harman (1979). If and Modus Ponens. Theory and Decision 11 (1):41-53.score: 45.0
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  38. Dale Miller (2004). One Meat-Eater's Modus Ponens. Southwest Philosophy Review 20 (2):175-177.score: 45.0
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  39. M. P. Aulisio (1997). One Person's Modus Ponens: Boyle, Absolutist Catholicism, and the Doctrine of Double Effect. Christian Bioethics 3 (2):142-157.score: 45.0
    The doctrine of double effect (DOE) has its origins in Roman Catholic thought and has been held to have widespread applications in bioethics. Its applications range over issues of maternal-fetal conflict, organ donation and transplant, euthanasia, and resource allocation, among other controversial issues. Recently, Joseph Boyle, the foremost proponent of the DOE over the past few decades, has argued that the DOE is required by the absolutist context of the Catholic tradition, and, further, that anyone who rejects this particular context (...)
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  40. J. F. Bonnefon & D. J. Hilton (forthcoming). The Suppression of Modus Ponens as a Case of Pragmatic Preconditional Reasoning. Accepted Subject to Revision. Thinking and Reasoning.score: 45.0
     
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  41. F. Bou, J. M. Font & J. L. G. Lapresta (2004). On Weakening the Deduction Theorem and Strengthening of Modus Ponens. Mathematical Logic Quarterly 50 (3):303.score: 45.0
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  42. Mike Oaksford & Chater & Nick (2008). Probability Logic and the 'Modus Ponens - Modus Tollens' Asymmetry. In Nick Chater & Mike Oaksford (eds.), The Probabilistic Mind: Prospects for Bayesian Cognitive Science. Oup Oxford.score: 45.0
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  43. William Craig (1967). Modus Ponens and Derivation From Horn Formulas. Zeitschrift für Mathematische Logik Und Grundlagen der Mathematik 13 (3‐5):33-54.score: 45.0
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  44. L. Lenka (2001). Accordance with the Rule Rk That Belongs to R. Then, S] Can Be Presented in the Following Modus Ponens. If Ck is in Accordance with Rk, Then Rk Determines Ck. Indian Philosophical Quarterly 28 (2).score: 45.0
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  45. Vann McGee (1985). ``A Counterexample to Modus Ponens&Quot. Journal of Philosophy 83:462-471.score: 45.0
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  46. Masaharu Mizumoto (2009). Bennett on Modus Ponens. Annals of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science 18:11-28.score: 45.0
  47. Masaharu Mizumoto (2009). On a Supposed Criticism of Counterexample to Modus Ponens. Annals of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science 18:1-10.score: 45.0
  48. Mike Oaksford & Nick Chater (2008). Probability Logic and the Modus Ponens-Modus Tollens Asymmetry in Conditional Inference. In Nick Chater & Mike Oaksford (eds.), The Probabilistic Mind: Prospects for Bayesian Cognitive Science. Oup Oxford. 97--120.score: 45.0
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