With his 1951 publication of “Two Dogmas of Empiricism”, W.V.O. Quine launched a series of arguments against the idea that analyticity – “truth in virtue of meaning alone” – could be a philosophically explanatory notion. While his rejection represents a significant philosophical stride in its own right, to which many in the contemporary philosophical scene pay verbal respects, the revolutionary consequences of this insight often go ignored today. Much of current professional philosophy in virtually every sub-discipline carries on as though (...) analyticity were a viable notion, because much of it aims at conceptual analysis – the “discovery” of the meanings of philosophical concepts, such as ‘mind’, ‘truth’, ‘meaning’, ‘person’, and ‘right’. Rejecting analyticity as a viable philosophical notion undermines such efforts insofar as they aim at conceptual analysis. If philosophers give up the notion of analyticity, as they should, they are left with the questions of what goals and methods are viable for the analysis of concepts. One option is to concentrate effort on explication of familiar concepts; explication is an alternative to conceptual analysis in that it does not aim to dig out analytic truths about given concepts. Rather, it identifies what is interesting about a certain vague concept, and generates a new, more rigorous and precise concept to replace the old one. The justification for the replacement, in the most appealing cases, is in the possibilities for understanding that are introduced by the new explication. Examples of explication in my sense are the replacement of ordinary grammatical terms by the operators of first order logic, replacement of ‘game’ with a decision theoretic notion of games in game theory, and replacement of ‘true’ with ‘true-in-L’ in Tarskian semantics. Advances of this sort depart consciously in some ways from ordinary usage of the terms they focus on, but in so departing, they develop new possibilities and perspectives for rigorously understanding the world. In the dissertation that follows, I not only recommend explication as a method, I also put it into practice. I develop an explication of the sameness and difference relations that relies solely on the relation of denotation between a predicate and objects of which it is true. Two things are the same with respect to R just in case there is at least one R-predicate that denotes them in common. I used this explication to develop related explications of similarity and analogy. These latter explications, I use to critique the current fashion of research on similarity and analogy in cognitive psychology. These studies have produced an immense body of interesting and promising work in the past several decades; however, much of the research design and data interpretation harbors philosophical errors and so often imports unjustified prejudices from the researchers themselves. My explication offers alternative formulations of the most salient aspects of these research traditions, formulations that avoid the errors of past research and, more importantly, suggest new research questions and possibilities that would not occur under the previous, philosophically muddled paradigm. The project closes with an application of my explication of analogy to a discussion and critique of the philosophical literature on analogical arguments. While philosophers and logicians have developed workable theories for deductive and inductive reasoning, very little work of promise has been done on analogical arguments. My explication of analogy is used to diagnose the problems of past attempts by philosophers to develop logics for analogical arguments and suggest, in light of the psychological research on analogy and the use of analogies in scientific thought, that philosophers should focus on analogical arguments as creative, heuristic devices, rather than as truth-preserving inference structures. (shrink)

This editorial introduces the Journal of Consciousness Studies special issue on "Animal Consciousness". The 15 contributors and co-editors answer the question "How should we study animal consciousness scientifically?" in 500 words or fewer.

This is the Second Edition of a well-received book that reflects a fresh, integrated coverage of the concepts and scientific measurement of stress and welfare of animals including humans. This book explains the basic biological principles of coping with many forms of adversity. The major part of this work is devoted to explaining scientifically usable concepts in stress and welfare. A wide range of welfare indicators are highlighted in detail with examples being drawn from man and other species. The necessity (...) for combining information from disciplines is emphasized with a one-health, one-welfare approach. This information forms the basis for a synthesis of new ideas. Among the issues covered are: - How brain and body systems regulate using feelings, physiological responses, behaviour and responses to pathology - Limits to adaptation - Assessing positive and negative welfare during both short-term and long-term situations - Ethical problems and suggested solutions A proper assessment of animal welfare is essential to take informed decisions about what is morally acceptable in terms of practice and in the development of a more effective legislation. This work encapsulates a very wide body of literature on scientific aspects of animal welfare and will thus prove a valuable asset for animal welfare scientists, psychologists, students and teachers of all forms of biology, behaviour, medicine, veterinary medicine and animal usage. (shrink)

Human attitudes to animals have changed as non-humans have become more widely incorporated in the category of moral agents who deserve some respect. Parallels between the functioning of humans and non-humans have been made for thousands of years but the idea that the animals that we keep can suffer has spread recently. An improved understanding of motivation, cognition and the complexity of social behaviour in animals has led in the last 30 years to the rapid development of animal welfare science. (...) Early attempts to define welfare referred to individuals being in harmony with nature but the first usable definition incorporated feelings and health as part of attempts to cope with the environment. Others considered that welfare is only about feelings but it is argued that as feelings are mechanisms that have evolved they are a part of welfare rather than all of it. Most reviews of welfare now start with listing the needs of the animal, including needs to show certain behaviours. This approach has used sophisticated studies of what is important to animals and has replaced the earlier general guidelines described as freedoms. Many measures of welfare are now used and indicate how good or how poor the welfare is. Naturalness is not a part of the definition of welfare but explains why some needs exist. In recent years, welfare has become established as one of various criteria used to decide on whether a system is sustainable because members of the public will not accept systems that cause poor welfare. The study of welfare has become part of the scientific basis upon which important political decisions are made. (shrink)

Donald Broom argues that morality and the central components of religion are of great value, and presents two central ideas. He asserts that morality has a biological foundation and has evolved as a consequence of natural selection, and that religions are essentially the structures supporting morality. Many philosophers and theologians write about morality and its origins without reference to biological processes such as evolution. Likewise, biologists discuss phenomena of importance to human morality and religion without taking account of the thoughts (...) of others on these subjects. (shrink)

This chapter surveys some of the issues that arise in policy making when the wellbeing of future generations must be taken into account. It analyses the discounting of future wellbeing, and considers whether it is permissible. It argues that the effects of policy on the number of future people should not be ignored, and it considers what is an appropriate basis for setting a value on these effects. It considers the implications of the non-identity effect for intergenerational justice and for (...) the Pareto principle. (shrink)

Concept definitions applicable to human and non-human animals should be usable for both. Awareness is a state during which concepts of environment, self, and self in relation to environment result from complex brain analysis of sensory stimuli or constructs based on memory. There are several proposed categories of awareness. The widespread usage of the term conscious is 'not unconscious' so a conscious individual is an individual that has the capability to perceive and respond to sensory stimuli. It is confusing and (...) scientifically undesirable if conscious is also used to mean aware. Hence it is proposed that conscious should be used only as above. Fully functioning and adequately developed humans and members of many other animal species are sentient. Sentience means having the capacity, the level of awareness and cognitive ability, necessary to have feelings. The welfare of an individual is its state as regards its attempts to cope with its environment. This includes feelings, which are important coping mechanisms, and health. Since feelings involve awareness, there is overlap between welfare assessment and awareness assessment. Methods for assessing awareness, consciousness, sentience, and welfare and links to morality are briefly discussed. (shrink)

This study investigated the differences in responses of undergraduate business students to an ethical dilemma. Demographic characteristics were collected on the respondents and profiled as a means of examining common bases for decision. The authors found that certain demographic characteristics appear to be predictors of ethical decision behavior of future businessmen.

This text demonstrates that modern materialistic science remains powerless to explain the phenomenon of life itself. It shows how the qualities of purpose, intentionality and mind, suffuse almost every aspect of the living realm, yet these same qualities remain unaccounted for by science itself.

Neil Broom, a biomechanics scientist, boldly challenges the scientific establishment's commitment to what he labels as the flimsily crafted but persuasively packaged myth of scientific materialism.

This volume engages with questions of justice and equality, and how these can be achieved in modern society. It explores how theory and research can inform policy and practice to bring about real change in people's lives, helping readers understand and interrogate patterns and causes of inequality, while investigating how these might be remedied. Chapters outline ways in which theories of justice inform and are factored into effective actions, programmes and interventions. The book includes an international selection of case studies. (...) These range from global inequalities in development and health to cross-border conflict; from gender justice to disability violence; from child protection to disability-inclusive research; from illicit drug use to torture prevention; and from prison wellbeing to sexual and reproductive health and rights. Together, contributors explore: how social science and humanities scholarship can lead to a better understanding of, and capacity to respond to, key social issues and problems the importance of normative reflection and a concern for principles of justice in pursuit of social change the importance of community voice and grassroots action in the pursuit of justice, equity and equality. Envisioning a better world - in which concern for the just treatment of all trumps the pursuit of privilege and inequality - Practical Justice: Principles, Practice and Social Change will appeal to students and academics in disciplines as diverse as philosophy, political science, sociology, anthropology, geography and education, and in fields such as policy studies, criminology, healthcare, social work and social welfare. er understanding of, and capacity to respond to, key social issues and problems the importance of normative reflection and a concern for principles of justice in pursuit of social change the importance of community voice and grassroots action in the pursuit of justice, equity and equality. Envisioning a better world - in which concern for the just treatment of all trumps the pursuit of privilege and inequality - Practical Justice: Principles, Practice and Social Change will appeal to students and academics in disciplines as diverse as philosophy, political science, sociology, anthropology, geography and education, and in fields such as policy studies, criminology, healthcare, social work and social welfare. (shrink)

Families play important roles in transitions to end-of-life care, yet we know little about the social relations between doctors and families at the point of referral to specialist palliative care. In this study, we explore how medical specialists negotiated the transition to specialist palliative care with families. Drawing on data from 20 qualitative interviews, we examine data accounts about the roles of family members in discussions with clinical specialists about palliative care, and how families shape interpersonal dynamics. Our results indicate (...) that families fulfil important ‘functions’ and ‘roles’in these delicate and emotionally laden conversations. Specialists’ accounts articulated referral processes as distinctly relational moments, with families viewed as potential ‘resources’ but also as ‘complications’, in attempts to encourage the ‘smooth’transition to end-of-life care. On the basis of these results, we argue that further attention should be paid to the centrality of families in key moments in care and how they may be utilised, managed and experienced by a range of health professionals. (shrink)

John Broome argues that when all claims cannot be perfectly fairly satisfied in outcome, the contribution to fairness from entering claims into a lottery, and so providing them some surrogate satisfaction, ought to be weighed against, and can outweigh, what fairness can be achieved directly in outcome. I argue that this is a mistake. Instead, I suggest that any contribution to fairness from entering claims into a lottery is lexically posterior to fairness in outcome.