Bayesian epistemologists support the norms of probabilism and conditionalization using Dutch book and accuracy arguments. These arguments assume that rationality requires agents to maximize practical or epistemic value in every doxastic state, which is evaluated from a subjective point of view (e.g., the agent’s expectancy of value). The accuracy arguments also presuppose that agents are opinionated. The goal of this paper is to discuss the assumptions of these arguments, including the measure of epistemic value. I have designed AI agents based (...) on the Bayesian model and a nonmonotonic framework and tested how they achieve practical and epistemic value in conditions in which an alternative set of assumptions holds. In one of the tested conditions, the nonmonotonic agent, which is not opinionated and fulfills neither probabilism nor conditionalization, outperforms the Bayesian in the measure of epistemic value that I argue for in the paper (α-value). I discuss the consequences of these results for the epistemology of rationality. (shrink)

The most widespread models of rational reasoners (the model based on modal epistemic logic and the model based on probability theory) exhibit the problem of logical omniscience. The most common strategy for avoiding this problem is to interpret the models as describing the explicit beliefs of an ideal reasoner, but only the implicit beliefs of a real reasoner. I argue that this strategy faces serious normative issues. In this paper, I present the more fundamental problem of logical omnipotence, which highlights (...) the normative content of the problem of logical omniscience. I introduce two developments of the notion of implicit belief (accessible and stable belief ) and use them in two versions of the most common strategy applied to the problem of logical omnipotence. (shrink)

Este artigo discute o uso de simulações de computador em Epistemologia(Epistemologia Computacional). O objetivo o artigo é fundamentar e discu-tir a ideia de uma Epistemologia Computacional, além de apresentar umexemplo de estudo nesse campo. Na Introdução, discuto as objeções maiscomuns aos métodos da Epistemologia Tradicional e à proposta de Quine deuma Epistemologia Naturalizada. Argumento que a Epistemologia Compu-tacional não está sujeita a nenhuma destas objeções. Na Seção 1, apresentouma revisão bibliográfica dos estudos em Epistemologia Computacional(tanto em Epistemologia individualista quanto em (...) Epistemologia Social) ediscuto a estrutura geral destes estudos. Na Seção 2, apresento alguns resul-tados de um estudo em Epistemologia Computacional que realizei em minha tese de doutorado. -/- ENGLISH: This paper is about the use of computer simulations in Epistemology (Com- putational Epistemology). The goal of the paper is to ground and discuss theidea of a Computational Epistemology, and to present an example of studyin this field. In the Introduction, I discuss the most common objections tothe methods of Traditional Epistemology and to Quine’s Naturalized Episte-mology. I argue that Computation Epistemology is not subject to any of the-se objections. In Section 1, I review the literature on Computational Episte-mology (both in individualistic Epistemology and in Social Epistemology)and discuss the general structure of these studies. In Section 2, I presentsome results of my PhD dissertation on Computational Epistemology. (shrink)

This paper is about the alethic aspect of epistemic rationality. The most common approaches to this aspect are either normative (what a reasoner ought to/may believe?) or evaluative (how rational is a reasoner?), where the evaluative approaches are usually comparative (one reasoner is assessed compared to another). These approaches often present problems with blindspots. For example, ought a reasoner to believe a currently true blindspot? Is she permitted to? Consequently, these approaches often fail in describing a situation of alethic maximality, (...) where a reasoner fulfills all the alethic norms and could be used as a standard of rationality (as they are, in fact, used in some of these approaches). I propose a function α, which accepts a set of beliefs as inputand returns a numeric alethic value. Then I use this function to define a notion of alethic maximality that is satisfiable by finite reasoners (reasoners with cognitive limitations) and does not present problems with blindspots. Function α may also be used in alethic norms and evaluation methods (comparative and non-comparative) that may be applied to finite reasoners and do not present problems with blindspots. A result of this investigation isthat the project of providing purely alethic norms is defective. The use of function α also sheds light on important epistemological issues, such as the lottery and the preface paradoxes, and the principles of clutter avoidance and reflection. (shrink)

All reasoners described in the most widespread models of a rational reasoner exhibit logical omniscience, which is impossible for finite reasoners (real reasoners). The most common strategy for dealing with the problem of logical omniscience is to interpret the models using a notion of beliefs different from explicit beliefs. For example, the models could be interpreted as describing the beliefs that the reasoner would hold if the reasoner were able reason indefinitely (stable beliefs). Then the models would describe maximum rationality, (...) which a finite reasoner can only approach in the limit of a reasoning sequence. This strategy has important consequences for epistemology. If a finite reasoner can only approach maximum rationality in the limit of a reasoning sequence, then the efficiency of reasoning is epistemically (and not only pragmatically) relevant. In this paper, I present an argument to this conclusion and discuss its consequences, as, for example, the vindication of the principle 'no rationality through brute-force'. (shrink)

I propose the notion of ‘epistemic sanity’, a property of parsimony between the holding of true but not false beliefs and the consideration of our cognitive limitations. Where ‘alethic value’ is the epistemic value of holding true but not false beliefs, the ‘alethic potential’ of an agent is the amount of extra alethic value that she is expected to achieve, given her current environment, beliefs, and reasoning skills. Epistemic sanity would be related to the holding of (true or false) beliefs (...) that increase the agent's alethic potential (relevant beliefs) but not of beliefs that decrease it (this is related to cognitive parsimony). Suspension of judgment, forgetting, and clutter avoidance are the main contributors to an agent's epistemic sanity, where this paper focuses on suspension. I argue that rational suspension favors the holding of true and relevant beliefs, which is not the case for the extremes of opinionation (no suspension) and skepticism (general suspension). In the absence of evidence, opinionated agents are often forced to rely on principles such as the principle of indifference, but suspension dominates indifference in terms of alethic value in some conditions. A rational agent would only find it beneficial to adopt skepticism if she considers herself to be an anti-expert about her entire agenda, but then ‘flipping’ beliefs maximizes expected alethic value in relation to skepticism. The study of epistemic sanity results in an ‘impure’ veritism, which can deal with some limitations of veritism (e.g., explaining the existence of false but relevant beliefs). (shrink)

The causal and simulation theories are often presented as very distinct views about declarative memory, their major difference lying on the causal condition. The causal theory states that remembering involves an accurate representation causally connected to an earlier experience. In the simulation theory, remembering involves an accurate representation generated by a reliable memory process. I investigate how to construe detailed versions of these theories that correctly classify memory errors as misremembering or confabulation. Neither causalists nor simulationists have paid attention to (...) memory-conjunction errors, which is unfortunate because both theories have problems with these cases. The source of the difficulty is the background assumption that an act of remembering has one target. I fix these theories for those cases. The resulting versions are closely related when implemented using tools of information theory, differing only on how memory transmits information about the past. The implementation provides us with insights about the distinction between confabulatory and non-confabulatory memory, where memory-conjunction errors have a privileged position. (shrink)

Backtracking counterfactuals are problem cases for the standard, similarity based, theories of counterfactuals e.g., Lewis. These theories usually need to employ extra-assumptions to deal with those cases. Hiddleston, 632–657, 2005) proposes a causal theory of counterfactuals that, supposedly, deals well with backtracking. The main advantage of the causal theory is that it provides a unified account for backtracking and non-backtracking counterfactuals. In this paper, I present a backtracking counterfactual that is a problem case for Hiddleston’s account. Then I propose an (...) informational theory of counterfactuals, which deals well with this problem case while maintaining the main advantage of Hiddleston’s account. In addition, the informational theory offers a general theory of backtracking that provides clues for the semantics and epistemology of counterfactuals. I propose that backtracking is reasonable when the state of affairs expressed in the antecedent of a counterfactual transmits less information about an event in the past than the actual state of affairs. (shrink)

O argumento zumbi negativo parte das premissas de que p ∧ ¬q é idealmente negativamente concebível, de que o que é idealmente negativamente concebível é possível e de que o fisicalismo é incompatível com a possibilidade de p ∧ ¬q para concluir que o fisicalismo é falso. No argumento, p é a conjunção das verdades e leis físicas fundamentais e q é uma verdade fenomenal qualquer. Uma sentença φ é idealmente negativamente concebível sse um raciocinador ideal não acredita que ¬φ (...) em reflexão priori. Uma versão da tese da escrutabilidade pressuposta pelo argumento afirma que, para todo φ que sobrevém em p, o raciocinador ideal acredita que p → φ em reflexão a priori. Nesse artigo, argumento que, dado algumas interpretações relevantes da noção de probabilidade (pr(.)), o raciocinador ideal acredita verdadeiramente, para todo φ, que p → pr(φ) = x em reflexão a priori. Mas então, dependendo do valor de pr(q) e das correlações entre q e outras sentenças, o raciocinador ideal também acredita (provavelmente, verdadeiramente) que p → q em reflexão a priori. Então, para alguns qs relevantes, p ∧ ¬q não é idealmente negativamente concebível e o argumento zumbi tem uma premissa falsa. A escolha de um q adequado dependeria de informação empírica, o que faria o argumento zumbi não ser nem conclusivo, nem a priori. ENGLISH: The negative zombie argument has as premises that p∧¬q is ideally negatively conceivable, that what is ideally negatively conceivable is possible, and that Physicalism is incompatible with p∧¬q being possible and as conclusion that Physicalism is false. In the argument, p is the conjunction of the fundamental physical truths and laws and q is an arbitrary phenomenal truth. A sentence φ is ideally negatively conceivable if and only if an ideal reasoner does not believe that ¬φ on a priori reflection. The argument presupposes a version of the scrutability thesis stating that, for all φ that supervene on p, the ideal reasoner believes that p → φ on a priori reflection. In this paper, I argue that, given relevant interpretation of probabilities, the ideal reasoner believes truly, for all φ, that p → pr(φ) = x on a priori reflection. But then, depending on the value of pr(q) and the correlations between q and other sentences, the ideal reasoner also believes (probably, truly) that p → q on a priori reflection. For some relevant qs, p∧¬q is not ideally negatively conceivable and the zombie argument has a false premise. The choice of an adequate q depends on empirical information, what makes the zombie argument neither conclusive nor a priori. (shrink)

Nesse artigo, investigo três casos de erros de memória obtidos em laboratório como forma de avaliar as principais teorias da memória : teoria causal e simulacionismo. De maneira geral, a teoria causal afirma que alguém lembra de algo somente se sua lembrança está numa relação causal adequada com uma experiência anterior daquilo que é lembrado. No simulacionismo, essa relação não é necessária. Os casos de erros de memória investigados são DRM, “perdido no shopping” e erro de conjunção de conteúdo. Esses (...) casos são difíceis para a teoria causal, especialmente em sua versão direta, mas não para o simulacionismo. Minha hipótese é a de que essa dificuldade se deve especificamente ao critério causal adotado. ENGLISH: I investigate three lab cases of memory error and test their consequences to the main theories of (declarative) memory: causal theory and simulationism. Roughly, the causal theory states that a subject remembers something only if her remembering is in a causal relation with a past experience of that thing. In simulationism, this relation is not necessary. The cases of memory error are DRM, “lost in the mall”, and memory -conjunction error. These are problem cases for the causal theory, but not for simulationism. My hypothesis is that this difficulty is because of the causal requirement. (shrink)

The negative zombie argument concludes that physicalism is false from the premises that p ∧¬q is ideally negatively conceivable and that what is ideally negatively conceivable is possible, where p is the conjunction of the fundamental physical truths and laws and q is a phenomenal truth (Chalmers 2002; 2010). A sentence φ is ideally negatively conceivable iff φ is not ruled out a priori on ideal rational reflection. In this paper, I argue that the negative zombie argument is neither a (...) priori nor conclusive. First, I argue that the premises of the argument are true only if there exists an adequate finite ideal reasoner R that believes ◊(p ∧ ¬q) on the basis of not believing p→q on a priori basis. Roughly, a finite reasoner is a reasoner with cognitive limitations (e.g. finite memory). I argue that R is finite only if R reasons nonmonotonically and only approach ideal reflection at the limit of a reasoning sequence. This would render the argument nonconclusive. Finally, I argue that, for some q, R does not believe ◊(p ∧ ¬q) on the basis of not believing p→q on a priori basis (e.g. for q =‘something is conscious’). This would render the choice of an adequate q dependent on empirical information (and the argument a posteriori). I conclude that the negative zombie argument (and, maybe, all zombie arguments) is neither a priori nor conclusive. (shrink)

Um argumento recorrente contra a liberalização do aborto parte do pressuposto de que, desde o momento da fertilização, seres humanos são indivíduos (no sentido de serem algo que necessariamente ocorre em uma entidade apenas). Nesse artigo, argumento que esse não é um caso a partir da possibilidade de geminação monozigótica e do fato de identidades serem necessárias. Defendo as premissas do argumento e discuto as possíveis interpretações de sua conclusão. Argumento que a interpretação completa da conclusão desse argumento está em (...) concordância com a conclusão de um argumento semelhante, que parte de noção de organismo. -/- ENGLISH: A common pro-life argument assumes that humans are individuals (in the sense that they necessarily occur in one entity only) from the moment of fertilization. In this paper, argue that this is not the case because of the possibility of monozygotic twinning and the necessity of identities. I will defend the premises of the argument and discuss the possible interpretations of its conclusion. I argue that the correct interpretation of the conclusion of this argument is in agreement with the conclusion of a similar arguments from the notion of organism. (shrink)

A teoria minimalista da verdade consiste em todas as instâncias do esquema 'φ é verdadeira sse φ' e na afirmação de que nossa aceitação (primitiva) dessas instâncias é suficiente para explicar nossas atitudes em relação a todas sentenças envolvendo ‘verdade’. Filósofos têm apontado que o minimalismo tem dificuldades em explicar nossas atitudes em relação a generalizações envolvendo ‘verdade’ bem como em lidar com instanciações contraditórias do esquema para sentenças paradoxais (ex. paradoxo do mentiroso). Proponentes do minimalismo apresentam soluções para esses (...) problemas. Nesse artigo, argumento que essas soluções entram em conflito, analiso algumas estratégias para resolver esse conflito e concluo que o minimalismo não pode evitar conflitos desse tipo mantendo seu caráter minimalista. ENGLISH: The minimalist theory of truth consists in all the instances of the schema 'φ is true iff φ' and in the claim that our primitive acceptance of these instances explains our attitudes in relation to propositions involving truth. Philosophers point that minimalism has difficulties in explaining our attitudes in relation to generalizations involving truth and with the contradictory instances of the schema for paradoxal sentences (e.g. the liar). Minimalists present solutions to these problems. In this paper, I argue that these solutions conflict with each other. I analyze some strategies to resolve this conflict. I conclude that minimalism cannot avoid the conflict maintaining it minimalist character. (shrink)

There is a thesis that assure the computability between externalize about mental content and self-knowledge (BURGE, 1988). However, this theses, that explore the auto-verification property of claims of the type “I think that p”, works only for assertive claims that are express in the simple present tense. Among the problematic cases are the claims in the past tense and claims about specific propositional attitude. This fails about the thesis of the compatibility is pointed by Boghossian (1992) as a prove of (...) the incompatibility between externalism and self-knowledge. There is a wide bibliography that try to manage the claims in past tense. In these articles (BURGE, 1995), It's argued that the preservative function of memory assure the veracity of the claims in past tense (at last in normal situations). However, there isn't a lot of work about the problem of the claims about specific propositional attitude. This article propose a expanse the preservative memory theory, with the purpose that It manages the self-knowledge of past propositional attitudes. We propose some criteria that define when a claim of this type is true, mainly in the cases that the content of the attitude of the past thought is not identical with the actual thought. The criterion about the similarity of content is the Bernecker's one (2009). The criterion about similarity of attitudes is new: the attitude that S thinks in t1 as if he have had in t2 is similar with the attitude that he had in t 1 iff the actual attitude is entailed by the former. (shrink)

The notion of an ideal reasoner has several uses in epistemology. Often, ideal reasoners are used as a parameter of (maximum) rationality for finite reasoners (e.g. humans). However, the notion of an ideal reasoner is normally construed in such a high degree of idealization (e.g. infinite/unbounded memory) that this use is unadvised. In this dissertation, I investigate the conditions under which an ideal reasoner may be used as a parameter of rationality for finite reasoners. In addition, I present and justify (...) the research program of computational epistemology, which investigates the parameter of maximum rationality for finite reasoners using computer simulations. (shrink)

A teoria minimalista da verdade consiste em todas as instâncias do esquema ‘‘φ’ é verdadeira sse φ’ e na afirmação de que nossa aceitação (primitiva) dessas instâncias é suficiente para explicar nossas atitudes em relação a todas sentenças envolvendo ‘verdade’. Filósofos têm apontado que o minimalismo tem dificuldades em explicar nossas atitudes em relação a generalizações envolvendo ‘verdade’ e em lidar com instanciações contraditórias do esquema para sentenças paradoxais (ex. paradoxo do mentiroso). Proponentes do minimalismo apresentam soluções para esses problemas. (...) Nesse artigo, argumento que essas soluções entram em conflito, analiso algumas estratégias para resolver esse conflito e concluo que o minimalismo não pode evitar conflitos desse tipo mantendo seu caráter minimalista. Abstract:The minimalist theory of truth (minimalism) consists in all instances of the T schema (‘‘φ’ is true iff φ’) along with the claim that our (primitive) acceptance of these instances is sufficient for explaining our attitudes (e.g. acceptance) in relation to all sentences involving ‘truth’ (‘true’, etc). Philosophers argue that minimalism can neither explain our atittudes in relation to truth-generalizations (generalizations involving ‘truth’) nor deal with the fact that instantiations of T to sentences alike the liar paradox entail a contradiction. Paul Horwich proposes solutions to the two problems, but these solutions conflict with each other. In this paper, I show demonstrate this conflict and analise some strategies to solve it. I argue that Horwich’s solution to the liar problem has important limitations. I conclude that the minimalism cannot avoid conflicts of this sort maintaining its minimalistic character. (shrink)

Este livro marca o início da Série Investigação Filosófica. Uma série de livros de traduções de textos de plataformas internacionalmente reconhecidas, que possa servir tanto como material didático para os professores das diferentes subáreas e níveis da Filosofia quanto como material de estudo para o desenvolvimento pesquisas relevantes na área. Nós, professores, sabemos o quão difícil é encontrar bons materiais em português para indicarmos. E há uma certa deficiência na graduação brasileira de filosofia, principalmente em localizações menos favorecidas, com relação (...) ao conhecimento de outras línguas, como o inglês e o francês. Tentamos, então, suprir essa deficiência, ao introduzirmos traduções de textos importantes ao público de língua portuguesa, sem nenhuma finalidade comercial e meramente pela glória da filosofia. O presente volume é constituído de três traduções de verbetes importantes sobre lógica, da Enciclopédia de Filosofia da Stanford: (1) A Lógica de Aristóteles, (2) Lógica Clássica, (3) Lógica Modal. (shrink)

Recent philosophical and psychological researches show that memory, not only stores information but also process it. It's possible one to have a meta-representational memory despite the propositional content and attitude of the present meta-representation being different from the propositional content and attitude of the thought that the meta-representation is causally derived. So, the question is: if we take for granted that this kind of memory doesn't require content or attitude identity, what is the permissible range of aberration between the original (...) content and the memory content? This paper proposes some conditions to define when a present meta-representation has the status of memory of a past thought, despite the difference of content or attitude. The condition for diachronic content similarity is the same proposed by Sven Bernerker. The attitude condition is a new one: the attitude that S thinks (at t2) himself having taken (at t1) towards p and the attitude that S took at t1 towards p* are sufficiently similar if and only if they are the same or the attitude of the present thought is entailed by the past attitude. (shrink)

Il libro scava nel profondo dell' umanitā per mostrare la pericolositā della paura, i notevoli rischi e le sofferenze che la paura individuale e la paura collettiva comportano, senza dimenticare il rapporto fra potere e paura.

A REALIDADE DAS SERRAS CENTRAIS POTIGUARES E A QUESTÃO DO DESENVOLVIMENTO REGIONAL SOB A PERSPECTIVA DO DIREITO, DESENVOLVIMENTO E SUSTENTABILIDADE.

This article analyzes necropolitics as background of military action in peripheral regions of Brazil. With this, we propose a conceptual deepening about the term necropolitics and an analysis of its performance in The Brazilian territory, exemplified from news published by electronic newspapers between the years 2017 and 2020. For this, the figure of the sovereign will be taken in the light of the articulation between life and language, because with the expectation of pacifying society, a series of discourses are produced (...) with the intention of basing the image of the enemy and justifying the production of territories of deaths. (shrink)

This paper aims to elucidate the emphatic demand of the Listening Pastoral inside the Catholic Church. The Supreme Pontiff, Pope Francis, dreams with a clergy with a greater capacity to handle the Christian community in its most relevant urgencies, such as youth accompaniment, specially an active listening made with attentive ears. From this base the article proposes a new method for accompaniment: a pastoral of listening according to the Humanistic Integrative Counseling model. However, the Listening Pastoral doesn’t have agents with (...) the required formation, therefore, beyond the technique, it is important the attitudes of the professional, who welcomes the marginalized and weakened. At the end of the article a list of attitudes will be presented having in mind a pastoral accompaniment. (shrink)

I raise some questions about differentiations between methods, checking methods, and appropriate methods in terms of their modal profiles. Melchior argues that there can be sensitive checking methods which are not safe. I try to show that such methods are epistemically deficient. I introduce restricted sensitivity (RS) and investigate its checking profile. RS with respect to a proposition _p_ requires that we consider more non-p worlds (not just the closest ones) but not those which are irrelevant (outside a sphere of (...) seriously possible worlds). Restrictedly sensitive methods (vacuously sensitive and strongly safe) based on the appropriate type of Bayesian reasoning might be sufficient for some kind of “modest” checking. Melchior defends a uniform account of checking based on insensitivity even in the case of necessary true propositions and he introduces the apparatus of impossible worlds. I argue that an unsatisfactory method for checking a necessary true proposition is a way of reaching a belief in the target proposition (different from the original one) which might easily not have delivered a true one. I also indicate some limitations of the idea that checking (and knowing) is essentially modal in character. (shrink)

This book is a highly original and provocative contribution to democratic theory.

In gegenwärtigem sozialen Protest lässt sich, mit Eva von Redecker, eine „Revolution für das Leben“ ausmachen: eine neue Protestform, die sich durch einen Bezug auf bedrohtes Leben auszeichnet und die Vulnerabilität politisiert. Im vorliegenden Beitrag möchte ich mit John Dewey ein Verständnis von Politisierung durch sozialen Protest entwickeln und dieses in Bezug auf die „Revolution für das Leben“ erläutern. Dazu schlage ich vor, Politisierung als Problematisierung auf drei Ebenen zu begreifen. Sozialer Protest artikuliert, erstens, ausgehend von Erfahrungen, Sachverhalte als Probleme (...) von öffentlicher Bedeutung, die einer Lösung bzw. Bearbeitung bedürfen. Zweitens thematisiert er diese zugleich als Probleme zweiter Ordnung, d.i. als Probleme sozialer Institutionen und gesellschaftlicher (Selbst-) Gestaltung. Und schließlich stellt sozialer Protest die Grenzen politischer Gemeinschaft zur Disposition, indem er zugleich Probleme dritter Ordnung, d.i. politischer Teilhabe adressiert. In diesem Sinne ist auch die „Revolution für das Leben“ zu verstehen: sie artikuliert Vulnerabilität nicht nur als sachliches Problem des Schutzes von akut bedrohten Leben, sondern auch als soziales Problem gestaltbarer Praktiken der Sorge um verletzliche Leben sowie als politisches Problem des Ausschlusses aus der Gemeinschaft derjenigen, deren Leben als der Sorge und des Schutzes wert und würdig anerkannt werden. (shrink)

Nietzsche est mort et c'est à nous à le faire vivre. Cet usage du texte n'est pas un retour à ce que Deleuze professait superbement : pour ce dernier, faire un enfant dans le dos (de Kant, de Bergson, voire de Nietzsche, même si Deleuze affirmait qu'avec ce dernier c'était l'inverse), c'était à la fois utiliser l'auteur pour lui faire dire ce qu'il n'avait explicitement pas dit, mais qui pouvait présenter un intérêt spéculatif, et, en même temps, dissimuler cet écart. (...) De fait, Deleuze disait "nous" ou "on", amalgamant ainsi sous le même pronom le commenté et le commentateur. Danilo Bilate, au contraire, revendique l'écart et le souligne tout au long de sa démonstration, rappelant ainsi sans cesse au lecteur que, s'il veut faire un enfant à Nietzsche, et si l'on nous permet de filer scabreusement la métaphore, c'est par-devant! Du même coup, là où Deleuze méprisait ouvertement toute philologie (jusqu'à ne pas même préciser les traductions utilisées), Danilo Bilate accorde à la terminologie nietzschéenne la plus grande attention. On interroge les textes pour ce qu'ils disent – car ils disent tout de même quelque chose par eux-mêmes si on veut bien les écouter. L'enfant qu'il s'agit de faire à Nietzsche en les écoutant est une éthique. Bertrand Binoche. (shrink)

What kind of causality does the Aristotelian Prime Mover exert on the heaven? Who “loves” the Prime Mover? Renaissance peripatetic philosopher, Francesco Vimercato, a “royal” teacher of “Greek and Latin philosophy” in Paris during the forties and the fifties of the 16th century tried to resolve these traditional puzzles that resulted from the exegesis of the Metaphysics XII, 6–7. His solution appears to be innovative, if compared to the ancient and the medieval ones. It seems partially to prefigure the last (...) two decades’ interpretations of Aristotelian “theology”. (shrink)

Two issues in synapsid brain evolution are discussed: the presumed structure and function of the brain of the Synapsida/Diapsida common ancestral, and the enlargement of dorsal telencephalon. Ecological niches possibly occupied by some Carboniferous tetrapods are considered in order to speculate about evolution of major telencephalic sectors. An alternative interpretation of isocortical origins, based on differences in Pax-6 expression, is suggested for discussion.

Background: Research suggests that humans have the tendency to increase the valence of events when these are imagined to happen in the future, but to decrease the valence when the same events are imagined to happen in the past. This line of research, however, has mostly been conducted by asking participants to value imagined, yet probable, events. Our aim was to re-examine this time-valence asymmetry using real-life data: a Reuter’s news and a Facebook status updates corpus. Method: We organized the (...) Reuter news (120,000,000 words) and the Facebook status updates data (41,056,346 words) into contexts grouped in chronological order (i.e., past, present, and future) using verbs and years as time markers. These contexts were used to estimate the valence of each article and status update, respectively, in relation to the time markers using natural language processing tools (i.e., the Latent Semantic Analysis algorithm). Results: Our results using verbs, in both text corpus, showed that valence for the future was significantly higher compared to the past (future > past). Similarly, in the Reuter year condition, valence increased approximately linear from 1994 to 1999 for texts written 1996-7. In the Facebook year condition, the valence of the future was also significantly higher than past valence. Conclusion: Generally, the analyses of the Reuters data indicated that the past is devaluated relative to both the present and the future, while the analyses of the Facebook data indicated that both the past and the present are devaluated against the future. On this basis, we suggest that people strive to communicate the promotion of a bright future and the prevention of a dark future, which in turn leads to a temporal-valence asymmetrical phenomenon (valence = pastshrink)

Nuestra tradición filosófica ha funcionando como un mito de la racionalidady no como un desarrollo de la racionalidad misma. Esta tradición muestratodas las características típicas de los sistemas mítico–mágicos. Sólo uncambio de condiciones sociales podría permitir el surgimiento de unaracionalidad genuina. De manera inversa, sólo el surgimiento de unaracionalidad genuina, podría producir el surgimiento de las condicionessociales apropiadas en las que la racionalidad pueda prosperar. No puedehaber un desarrollo filosófico genuino al margen de las condiciones socialesapropiadas. Se intenta aquí hacer (...) un bosquejo de esta situación. (shrink)

Al hablar sobre los actos de habla lo que Austin hacía o debía estar haciendo era tratando de articular una teoría de la eficacia de los actos de habla: ¿Cómo es que, por ejemplo, cuando digo a alguien en las circunstancias socialmente apropiadas ‘Lo nombro...’ la persona a quien me refiero queda nombrada? Esto es pura magia. Mis palabras funcionan como un hechizo. Constituyen un hechizo. Mis palabras son lo que son por el efecto social que producen. Oficiando como un (...) mago de su propia tribu filosófica, él es incapaz de romper el hechizo que lo mantiene cautivo. Su teoría de los actos de habla se encuentra condicionada por fuerzas sociales que él desconoce. Como resultado sus actos de habla sobre los actos de habla resultan fallidos. Este escrito es un intento de articular una perspectiva desde la que la situación social en la que Austin se encuentra, y la manera como ésta incide en la producción de su teoría pueda ser valorada. (shrink)

Com o objetivo de responder à questão sobre quais são as condições para que aconteça um filosófico ensino de filosofia, busca-se o diálogo com a obra _O ensino de filosofia como problema filosófico_, de Alejandro Cerletti. Critica-se o que ele denomina “pergunta filosófica” e valoriza-se sua proposta de ensino de filosofia como ensino da repetição criativa. Para construir esta proposta de um filosófico ensino de filosofia faz-se também a apropriação do conceito camusiano de embarcamento, utilizado por Albert Camus para descrever (...) o compromisso do artista com sua criação. É a partir do embarcamento que se pensa o compromisso docente com seu filosofar e com o filosofar de seus alunos. Enfim, defende-se que o filosofar deve ser compreendido como repetição criativa, como uma crítica à tradição filosófica, e, desse modo, o ensino de filosofia, acima de desafios pedagógicos ou uma questão de método, deve ser compreendido como uma problemática que deve ser tratada filosoficamente a partir do diálogo crítico e criativo com a história do pensamento filosófico, ou seja, a partir da noção de repetição criativa. (shrink)

God's character remains one of the big mysteries in Supernatural. We certainly see God's impact on the world, and occasionally, we're told he has miraculously interceded on behalf of the Winchesters or Castiel. Spinoza said, ”The knowledge of evil is an inadequate knowledge.“ But after concluding that God exists, Spinoza concludes that evil does not. Ironically, while many thought of Spinoza as the Devil, he denied the Devil's existence. As Supernatural illustrates, loving relationships don't need to be mutually beneficial; one (...) person may even risk his life to save another person he loves. Often philosophical, the ending scene may hold the key to understanding God in Supernatural. The Philosopher John Locke argued that the idea of redemption could be arrived at in principle by the same sort of reasoning that arrives at the idea of God. (shrink)