An action is unratifiable when, on the assumption that one performs it, another option has higher expected utility. Unratifiable actions are often claimed to be somehow rationally defective. But in some cases where multiple options are unratifiable, one unratifiable option can still seem preferable to another. We should respond, I argue, by invoking a graded notion of ratifiability.

A natural view of testimony holds that a source's statements provide one with evidence about what the source believes, which in turn provides one with evidence about what is true. But some theorists have gone further and developed a broadly analogous view of memory. According to this view, which this essay calls the “diary model,” one's memory ordinarily serves as a means for one's present self to gain evidence about one's past judgments, and in turn about the truth. This essay (...) rejects the diary model's analogy between memory and testimony from one's former self, arguing first that memory and a diary differ with respect to their psychological roles, and second that this psychological difference underwrites important downstream epistemic differences. The resulting view stands opposed to prominent discussions of memory and testimony, which either, like the diary model, treat memory by analogy to what we naively wish to say about testimony, or which instead attempt to extend to testimony the epistemically preservative role of memory. (shrink)

This paper critically examines currently influential transparency accounts of our knowledge of our own beliefs that say that self-ascriptions of belief typically are arrived at by “looking outward” onto the world. For example, one version of the transparency account says that one self-ascribes beliefs via an inference from a premise to the conclusion that one believes that premise. This rule of inference reliably yields accurate self-ascriptions because you cannot infer a conclusion from a premise without believing the premise, and so (...) you cannot infer from a premise that you believe the premise unless you do believe it. I argue that this procedure cannot be a source of justification, however, because one can be justified in inferring from p that q only if p amounts to strong evidence that q is true. This is incompatible with the transparency account because p often is not very strong evidence that you believe that p. For example, unless you are a weather expert, the fact that it will rain is not very strong evidence that you believe it will rain. After showing how this intuitive problem can be made precise, I conclude with a broader lesson about the nature of inferential justification: that beliefs, when justified, must be underwritten by beliefs, when justified, must be underwritten by evidential relationships between the facts or propositions which those beliefs represent. (shrink)

If the reliability of a source of testimony is open to question, it seems epistemically illegitimate to verify the source’s reliability by appealing to that source’s own testimony. Is this because it is illegitimate to trust a questionable source’s testimony on any matter whatsoever? Or is there a distinctive problem with appealing to the source’s testimony on the matter of that source’s own reliability? After distinguishing between two kinds of epistemically illegitimate circularity—bootstrapping and self-verification—I argue for a qualified version of (...) the claim that there is nothing especially illegitimate about using a questionable source to evaluate its own reliability. Instead, it is illegitimate to appeal to a questionable source’s testimony on any matter whatsoever, with the matter of the source’s own reliability serving only as a special case. (shrink)

According to a traditional Cartesian epistemology of perception, perception does not provide one with direct knowledge of the external world. Instead, your immediate perceptual evidence is limited to facts about your own visual experience, from which conclusions about the external world must be inferred. Cartesianism faces well-known skeptical challenges. But this chapter argues that any anti-Cartesian view strong enough to avoid these challenges must license a way of updating one’s beliefs in response to anticipated experiences that seems diachronically irrational. To (...) avoid this result, the anti-Cartesian must either license an unacceptable epistemic chauvinism, or else claim that merely reflecting on one’s experiences defeats perceptual justification. This leaves us with a puzzle: Although Cartesianism faces problems, avoiding them brings a new set of problems. (shrink)

Self-verifying judgments like _I exist_ seem rational, and self-defeating ones like _It will rain, but I don’t believe it will rain_ seem irrational_._ But one’s evidence might support a self-defeating judgment, and fail to support a self-verifying one. This paper explains how it can be rational to defy one’s evidence if judgment is construed as a mental performance or act, akin to inner assertion. The explanation comes at significant cost, however. Instead of causing or constituting beliefs, judgments turn out to (...) be mere epiphenomena, and self-verification and self-defeat lack the broader philosophical import often claimed for them. (shrink)

An internalist slogan says that justification depends on internal factors. But which factors are those? This paper examines some common motivations favoring internalism over externalism, and says they are compatible with including dispositional and even past mental states in the internal.

Is self-knowledge a requirement of rationality, like consistency, or means-ends coherence? Many claim so, citing the evident impropriety of asserting, and the alleged irrationality of believing, Moore-paradoxical propositions of the form < p, but I don't believe that p>. If there were nothing irrational about failing to know one's own beliefs, they claim, then there would be nothing irrational about Moore-paradoxical assertions or beliefs. This article considers a few ways the data surrounding Moore's paradox might be marshaled to support rational (...) requirements to know one's beliefs, and finds that none succeed. (shrink)

One of the most prominent objections to skeptical theism in recent literature is that the skeptical theist is forced to deny our competency in making judgments about the all-things-considered value of any natural event. Some skeptical theists accept that their view has this implication, but argue that it is not problematic. I think that there is reason to question the implication itself. I begin by explaining the objection to skeptical theism and the standard response to it. I then identify an (...) assumption that is prevalent in much of the literature concerning the problem of evil, and show that it is a factor in motivating commitment to the implication I mean to question. I argue that the assumption is false, and that once it is rejected there is room to endorse the skeptical theist's strategy in responding to some arguments from evil without endorsing the putative implication that objectors find unacceptable. (shrink)

Kierkegaard's Theology of Encounter provides a theoretical framework that brings the unity of Kierkegaard's 'middle period' into relief. David Lappano analyses Kierkegaard's writings between 1846 and 1852 when the socially constructive dimension of his thought comes to prominence, involving two dialectical aspects of religiousness identified by Kierkegaard: they are the edifying and the polemical. How these come together and get worked out in the lives of individuals form the basis of what can be called a Kierkegaardian 'social praxis'. Lappano (...) argues that the tension between the edifying and the polemical can be coherently maintained in a communicative life that is also characteristic of a militant faith. This militant faith and life is presented as a critical guard against absolutisms, fundamentalisms, and intellectual aloofness; but the 'militant' individual is also utterly dependent, in need of edification and critique, and therefore chooses the risk of encountering others, seeking relationships out of a commitment to the development of people and communities in co-operation. Therefore, not only does this dialectic provide readers with an important theoretical framework for understanding Kierkegaard's 'middle period', it is also a valuable resource for a constructive analysis of active social living suitable for theology in the twenty-first century. (shrink)

The author constructs a new concept of music education, one designed to stimulate, guide, and support the efforts of pre-service and practicing music teachers as they tackle the many theoretical and practical issues involved in music education. He provides rigorous reflections on the "why, what, and how" of music teaching and learning that serve as catalysts for critical thinking and individual-philosophy building.

According to Richard Gelwick, one of the fundamental implications of Polanyi’s epistemology is that all intellectual disciplines are inherently heuristic. This article draws out the implications of a heuristic vision of theology latent in Polanyi’s thought by placing contemporary theologian David Brown’s dynamic understanding of tradition, imagination, and revelation in the context of a Polanyian-inspired vision of reality. Consequently, such a theology will follow the example of science, reimagining its task as one of discovery rather than mere reflection on (...) a timeless body of divine revelation. The ongoing development of a theological tradition thus involves the attempt to bring one’s understanding of the question of God to bear on the whole of the human experience. The pursuit of theology as a heuristic endeavor is a bold attempt to construct an integrated vision of nothing less than the entirety of all that is, without absolutizing one’s vision, and without giving up on the question of truth. (shrink)

Much philosophical effort has been exerted over problems having to do with the correct analysis and application of the concept of epistemic justification. While I do not wish to dispute the central place of this problem in contemporary epistemology, it seems to me that there is a general neglect of the belief condition for knowledge. In this paper I offer an analysis of 'degrees of belief' in terms of a quality I label 'conviction', go on to argue that one requires (...) more conviction in a proposition in order to know it than to merely believe it, and conclude by suggesting that some current epistemological issues admit of new insight when we begin taking conviction seriously. (shrink)

We suggest that innatism and constructivism may differ only in their time scale.

This thesis seeks to understand the nature of and relation between science and philosophy articulated in the early work of the French philosopher Gilles Deleuze. It seeks to challenge the view that Deleuze’s metaphysical and metaphilosophical position is in important part an attempt to respond to twentieth century developments in the natural sciences, claiming that this is not a plausible interpretation of Deleuze’s early thought. The central problem identified with such readings is that they provide an insufficient explanation of the (...) nature of philosophy’s contribution to the encounter between philosophy and science that they discern in Deleuze’s work. The philosophical, as opposed to scientific, dimension of the position attributed to Deleuze remains obscure. In chapter 1, it is demonstrated that this question of philosophy’s contribution to intellectual life and of how to differentiate philosophy from the sciences is a live one in Deleuze’s early thought. An alternative, less anachronistic interpretation of the parameters of Deleuze’s early project is offered. The remaining chapters of the thesis examine the early Deleuze’s understanding of the divergence between philosophy and science. Chapter 2 gives an account of Deleuze’s metaphilosophy, alongside a reconstruction of his largely implicit early understanding of science. The divergent intellectual processes and motivating concerns that account for Deleuze’s understanding of the differentiation of science and philosophy are thus clarified. In chapter 3, Deleuze’s use of mathematical and physical concepts is examined. It is argued that these concepts are used metaphorically. In chapter 4, the association between modern science and the Deleuzian concept of immanence that has been proposed by some Deleuze scholars is examined and ultimately challenged. The thesis concludes with some reflections on the significance of Deleuze’s early work for contemporary debates concerning the future of continental philosophy and the nature of philosophy more generally. (shrink)

The central argument of the present work consists of an attempt to show that within Husserl's phenomenology, the phenomenon of human communication is impossible. The argument is developed in terms of the centrality and tenacity of Husserl's assumption that there exists a radical separation of the conceptual and corporeal components of meaningful or sense-informed behavior. ;As the context for such a separation, the presumption of immanence that historically has attended the notion of intentionality is taken over by Husserl and is (...) instantiated methodologically by means of the phenomenological reductions. Secured methodologically, this presumption is re-affirmed in Husserl's specification of the content of the tripartite complex of relations by means of which the character of meaningful behavior is parsed. The consequence of this specification--radical separation of the conceptual and corporeal components of meaningful behavior--is that the phenomenon of human communication is rendered impossible. ;The possibility of the phenomenon of communication, once this radical separation is presumed, involves two necessary correlations: the correlation of a conceptual with a corporeal act; and, the correlation of a conceptual with a conceptual act. As a result of the use of transcendence and immanence as the basis by which the separation of the corporeal and the conceptual act is made, the corporeal act is allowed to traverse the distance separating the Other. This traversing, however, is forbidden the conceptual act. Consequently the correlation between conceptual and conceptual act must be accomplished by means of the correlation between corporeal and conceptual act. ;The dilemma that results from these stipulations is that the first correlation can never insure the second. This is the case because the correlation of conceptual with corporeal act can only guarantee one side of the presumed interaction. A correlation of conceptual with corporeal act is required on the part of the Other. But for these concurrent correlations to take place, there already must be a correlation of conceptual with conceptual act. So that what is supposed to accomplish the correlation of conceptual with conceptual act surreptitiously presupposes, as accomplished, what it has yet to accomplish. (shrink)

Introduction In September of 1973, I defended my doctoral thesis in the field of European cultural history. I was two months shy of my twenty-seventh ...

Jacoby's exceptionally well written essay is a study of psychoanalysis and political engagement. The central figure in his research is Otto Fenichel (1897-1946) and a circle of friends who first clustered around him in Berlin, who were then dispersed by the rise of Fascism and the coming of WWII. Several in the circle arrived in America. These seven colleagues (Annie Reich, Edith Jacobson, Kate Friedlander, Georg Gero, Barbara Lantos, Edith Gyomroi, and possibly Berta Bornstein) shared a number of things in (...) common besides the cohort experience of being born around 1900; they represented the second generation of European psychoanalysis. (shrink)

The development of a robust, holistic theological anthropology will require that theology and biblical studies alike enter into genuine interdisciplinary conversations. Depth psychology in particular has the capacity to be an exceedingly fruitful conversation partner for theology because of its commitment to the totality of the human experience (both the conscious and unconscious aspects) as well as its unique ability to interpret archetypal symbols and mythological thinking. By arguing for a psycho-theological hermeneutic that accounts for depth psychology's conviction that myths (...) about the origin of the world are always simultaneously myths about the origin and emergence of human consciousness, I demonstrate that the presence of numerous Jungian archetypes in Genesis 1–3 suggests that the narrative can be read from a psychological perspective without diminishing or marginalizing the dominant theological themes of exile and return. Furthermore, such a reading fundamentally suggests that the narrative is not about how sin entered into creation, but rather how consciousness emerged in human community. (shrink)

The development of a robust, holistic theological anthropology will require that theology and biblical studies alike enter into genuine interdisciplinary conversations. Depth psychology in particular has the capacity to be an exceedingly fruitful conversation partner for theology because of its commitment to the totality of the human experience as well as its unique ability to interpret archetypal symbols and mythological thinking. By arguing for a psycho‐theological hermeneutic that accounts for depth psychology's conviction that myths about the origin of the world (...) are always simultaneously myths about the origin and emergence of human consciousness, I demonstrate that the presence of numerous Jungian archetypes in Genesis 1–3 suggests that the narrative can be read from a psychological perspective without diminishing or marginalizing the dominant theological themes of exile and return. Furthermore, such a reading fundamentally suggests that the narrative is not about how sin entered into creation, but rather how consciousness emerged in human community. (shrink)

Defensive harm is subject to both a proportionality and necessity constraint. In what follows I precisify, explain, and unify these two constraints. I argue that they express the very same moral demand, only at different levels of generality—specifically, the demand that an attacker not be made to bear more cost to avert their attack than they would be required to take on themselves.

This is the long-awaited publication of a set of writings by the British philosopher, historian, and archaeologist R.G. Collingwood on critical, anthropological, and cultural themes only hinted at in his previously available work. At the core are six essays on folktale and magic in which Collingwood applies the principles of his philosophy of history to problems in the long-term evolution of human society and culture. The volume opens with three substantial introductory essays by the editors, authorities in their various fields, (...) who provide their explanatory and contextual notes to guide the reader through the texts. The Philosophy of Enchantment highlights the broad range of Collingwood's intellectual engagements, their integration, and their relevance to current areas of debate in the fields of philosophy, cultural studies, social and literary history, and anthropology. (shrink)

Many studies in comparative philosophy have noted that Chinese philosophy did not concern itself with abstractions to the same extent as did the Greek tradition. While Plato and Aristotle dealt extensively with definitions of abstract terms and theories of abstract universals, the contemporaneous pre-Qin Chinese thinkers showed a general indifference to such questions. The Chinese language, with its lack of morphological features, had no way of marking abstract nouns, and many sinologists have speculated that this aspect of the language may (...) have hindered abstract thinking in China. This study examines the way in which abstractions are handled in both ancient Greek and classical Chinese, and surveys theories of language in the ancient Greek and Chinese texts in order to explore how aspects of the two languages may have had an effect on their approaches to abstraction. It is shown that differences in the way information is handled in the early Chinese and Greek languages may have had an effect on the degree of meta-linguistic awareness of the Chinese thinkers; specifically, the highly-inflected nature of Greek may have served to focus cognitive attention to the semantic domain of abstractions, whereas for the Chinese the existence of such a class of abstractions was less salient. Evidence from discussions of language in Plato and Aristotle are compared with the theory of language expounded in the pre-Qin Neo-Mohist Canon to study differences in the way the two philosophical traditions treated abstract entities. It is concluded that, while the two different language typologies represented by Greek and Chinese do not effect thinking , differences in the degree of meta-linguistic awareness they afford speakers can have significant effects on thought. (shrink)

The article examines the claim made by earlier interpreters of Fichte's political thought, such as Marianne Weber and Xavier Léon, that it contains a number of striking parallels with some of the main ideas associated with the French revolutionary communist Gracchus Babeuf. It is argued that once we understand what it means for Fichte to 'apply' the concept of right (Recht), and how this application relates in particular to his views on property, there appears to be some substance to Weber's (...) and Léon's claims. This in turn speaks against a more recent tendency to locate Fichte's political thought in the liberal tradition; a tendency which the author shows does not pay sufficient attention to Fichte's ideas concerning the need to apply the concept of right and how this leads him to develop the economic proposals found in The Closed Commercial State, which contain a number of parallels with some of the doctrines attributed to Babeuf. The author does, however, point to some fundamental differences between Fichte's social and political thought and some of the main ideas associated with the revolutionary movement known as Babouvism. Yet these differences again speak against a liberal interpretation of Fichte's social and political thought. (shrink)

An understanding of cause--effect relationships is fundamental to the study of cognition. In this book, outstanding specialists from comparative psychology, social psychology, developmental psychology, anthropology, and philosophy present the newest developments in the study of causal cognition and discuss their different perspectives. They reflect on the role and forms of causal knowledge, both in animal and human cognition, on the development of human causal cognition from infancy, and on the relationship between individual and cultural aspects of causal understanding. The result (...) is a state-of-the-art, informative, insightful, and interdisciplinary debate aimed at the non-specialist. (shrink)

I argue that, if God exists, moral facts ontologically depend on him. After distinguishing a variety of ways in which moral facts might ontologically depend on God, I focus my attention on the most prominent and most well-developed account of the relationship between God and morality viz., the account developed by Robert Adams in his Finite and Infinite Goods. Adams’ account consists of two parts—an account of deontic moral properties and an account of axiological moral properties. Adams’ account of deontic (...) moral properties is a version of divine command theory according to which the property of being morally right and the property of being morally wrong are identical to the property of being commanded by God and the property of being forbidden by God, respectively. I argue that although Adams’ divine command theory is not vulnerable to many prominent objections that afflict other versions of divine command theory, his view is, nevertheless, both unmotivated and implausible. Next, I explain Adams’ account of axiological properties, which is a particular version of what I call “theistic valuational particularism.” According to Adams’ theistic valuational particularism, the property of being intrinsically good or excellent is identical to the property of faithfully and holistically resembling God. I argue that because Adams’ conception of excellence is so broad, there are some things that have the property of being excellent but fail to resemble God. I argue that the same problem afflicts other, modified versions of theistic valuational particularism, including one that is defended by Scott Hill and another that is championed by Mark Murphy. Nevertheless, I argue that this problem does not afflict what I call “theistic moral valuational particularism,” the view that moral goodness is identical to the property of resembling God in certain, specified ways. Furthermore, I argue that, if God exists, theistic moral valuational particularism is not only well motivated theologically, but it can withstand the two most prominent objections that have been lodged against it, viz., the arbitrariness objection and the divine ascription problem. (shrink)

The view prevails today that John Locke's political teaching is unintelligible unless certain Biblical or semi-Biblical premises are assumed. John Locke's Critique of the Bible challenges this view by demonstrating that the first of Locke's Two Treatises of Government contains a radical critique of the Bible. ;Chapter one demonstrates that, in Locke's view, criticism of established political or religious opinion can not be presented openly if it is to be effective. The possibility that Locke himself veiled or obscured part of (...) the argument of the First Treatise becomes strong when it is seen that in attacking Sir Robert Filmer, Locke intends also to attack the Bible. ;Chapters two through seven detail Locke's critique of the Biblical teaching on creation, donation, the Fall, marriage, fatherly authority, and the history of mankind or God's Providence. In each case, it is argued, Locke attempts to show by exegesis of the crucial Scriptures that it is impossible to answer the decisive questions of politics on the basis of Scripture, and that it is dangerous to try. ;The core of the dissertation is a detailed account of Locke's critique both of the patriarchal Biblical family, and of donation, or the conception of the world as a gift of God to mankind. Locke is shown to argue that, correctly understood, such phenomena as fatherly authority, the inequality of the sexes, and man's need for and use of the beasts do not reflect or point to the existence of divine order in the world. Nor, in his view, do they help us to answer such political questions as concern forms of government, the right to rule, and the obligation to obey. ;By showing that Locke defines his views on reason, the natural freedom of mankind, government by consent, property, and the family in opposition to the Bible, the dissertation establishes that a critique of the Bible is a necessary and integral part of Locke's political philosophy. (shrink)

Much like contemporary philosophers of science, Poincare attempts to develop a philosophy of science that is able to account for genuine historical change in science but also allows science to be seen as progressive. Poincare is famous for his thesis that there is no true metric of space. He claims that we may choose either Euclidean or non-Euclidean geometry in mechanics and the choice is not objectively right or wrong. However, his conventionalism is not total, as some have charged. He (...) holds that only geometry is conventional and he argues that science does discover truth, despite a conventional element in our theories. I review Poincare's general philosophy of science, clarify the burden of proof required to establish his thesis of the conventionality of metric, and provide an interpretation of his arguments for the conventionality of metric which is consistent with his general views. Poincare does not accept physical geometry in the ordinary sense, because he holds the purely relationalist view that space is a mere abstraction that we use to describe the world. Even inertial effects are to be described solely in terms of the relations of physical objects. Were such relationalism true, Poincare could defend his thesis of conventionality of metric without the introduction of ad hoc "universal forces" in physics. Relationalism is disconfirmed by currently accepted scientific theories of space, so we must admit that Poincare's defense of his conventionalist thesis is inadequate. ;The debate over conventionalism has often taken place with global arguments that purport to show that everything is conventional or that all conventions reduce to a trivial change in notation, or charges that conventionalism is a form of relativism. Both global support for conventionalism and global refutations of conventionalism are inadequate. Discussion of conventionalism should center on specific elements of physical theory rather than a priori objections that the view is inconsistent or trivial. I argue that Poincare does not depend on global arguments to defend his conventionalist thesis and that in this regard his philosophical method is quite correct. (shrink)

This dissertation is a study of the effect predispositions have on interpretation generally and on our reckoning of what time is. It is specifically an examination of entailments accruing to the idea of immutability as a presupposition in thinking and in thinking about time. Thus, the essay is an exercise in hermeneutics, an appreciation of some of the forces which shape a sense of things. ;The first chapter is an inquiry into method--its contribution to meaning and understanding, and its function (...) in directing the course of thought. The impetus is from Ivo Andric's contention that the stories we tell might possibly embody the true history of mankind, that stories are translations, that learning the truth is a secretive operation, a ferreting out of what was already there. The objective is to suggest that our everyday encounters with the world--through the naive realism and common sense which most of us use to negotiate experience--employ methods possibly suitable in some contexts but deceptive if followed strictly. Through a discussion of habit, myth, metaphor, and logic, it becomes evident that method is an imposition and, in Nietzsche's term, a lie that seeks confirmation of its own presuppositions of nomothetic consistency. Method tends to perpetuate a metaphor or myth of immutability. ;Metaphors direct thought to confined areas of interpretation. Clocks as metaphors of time reinforce prior interpretations of time while they make their own contributions to a determination of what time is. The second chapter is an exercise in phenomenology, a reading of time through clocks. Trees, hourglasses, traditional clocks, and digital watches all reflect peculiar complexions of time. Each contributes to our personal and cultural attitudes about the constitution of time. For example, the traditional clock perpetuates notions of temporal endlessness and succession. The digital watch, however, is congruent with spatialized categories, and it reinforces an image of time that is atomistic and discontinuous. Digital time is an aggregtion of concrete, immutable moments. It is a postmodern metaphor reflecting the protracted desire for the immutable in thought and in time. (shrink)

As business and society is an inherently multi-disciplinary scholarly area, the book will draw from work in areas outside of business and management, such as psychology, sociology, philosophy, religious studies, economics and other related fields, as well as the natural sciences, education, and other professional areas of study.

My dissertation focuses on the Euthyphro question, from one of the Socratic dialogues, understood in terms of the following dilemma posed against theistic ethics: Either what is good/right is moral because God commands it, or it is not. If what is good/right is moral because God commands it, then the good/right is arbitrary and vacuous. If what is good/right is moral for reasons other than that God commands it, then God is superfluous from the standpoint of morality. So, either the (...) good/right is arbitrary and vacuous or God is superfluous to morality. ;The dilemma is really two-fold. In the axiological version I reject premise of this argument, because though I deny that the good is determined by divine command, I argue that there is an intimate connection between God and the necessary moral truths constitutive of the ultimate intrinsic good. Such truths are a reflection of his nature, and God probably best accounts for their existence in the first place. So even if God's commands typically are commands of what is good, that does not entail that goodness is independent of God. ;In the deontic version of the question I reject premise . If God commands, rendering obligatory, something that is morally good, then his command is not arbitrary, but predicated on what is morally good. God cannot make the violation of a necessary moral truth morally obligatory; these constraints are internal to God's perfect nature. This affirmation of God's impeccability is what enables me to reject the premise that God can sin, a premise shared by versions of both the arbitrariness and vacuity objections to divine command theory. I also reject premise . I do not interpret God's commands so expansively as to include every clear apprehension of a necessary moral truth, yet in those cases where obligations result by this alone without God's commands, there is still an apprehension of a truth rooted in God's nature. ;My conclusion is that the Euthyphro Dilemma has yet to be shown to pose the in-principle objection to theistic ethics for which it is often credited. (shrink)

Power and Responsibility are predominant themes in Heinrich Mann's works since "Geist und Tat" and Der Untertan. With the Weimar Republic, Mann's writings begin to reflect a turn from a relatively abstract denunciation of power and a call for individual responsibility to a more in-depth analysis of the complex realities of power and the new dimensions of collective responsibility in the modern industrial society. ;Many of Mann's essays from 1918-1925, along with the novel Der Kopf and the novella "Kobes,"criticize the (...) absence of an ethic of responsibility among society's leaders. Der Kopf portrays the failure of an over-zealous, idealistic concept of intellectual leadership, and exposes the increasingly powerful behind-the-scenes force of industrial leadership. "Kobes" continues this analysis in its satirical portrayal of the intellectual idealist and its projection of the self-destructive ends of the new "religion" of industry. ;Mann's essays after 1925 and his Weiman trilogy warn of fascism and the next war, and focus on the need for a change in the collective societal spirit, from a pursuit of success and power to an ethical understanding of responsibility to future generations. The underlying moral imperative of Mutter Marie is "Lernt verantworten." The next two novels, Eugenie oder Die Bugerzeit and Die grosse Sache, focus on the spirit of speculation in society and pursuit of the "big chance," both of which are ultimately a pursuit of destruction. Together, Mann's works of the Weimar republic reveal an urgent appeal for an ethic of responsibility to preserve the future of humanity. ;To illuminate the concept of future-directed responsibility that underlies Mann's works of the Weimar period, this study turns to the work of the the current philosopher Hans Jonas: Das Prinzip Verantwortung. Jonas's insights into the dynamic of power and the imperative of responsibility in the technological age can be compared in significant ways to Mann's literary insights of the Weimar era. The ethic of responsibility in Mann's works of the Weimar Republic remains an urgent moral and political imperative for leaders and citizens in the modern industrial-technological age. (shrink)

Moral error theorists argue that moral thought and discourse are systematically in error, and that nothing is, or can ever be, morally permissible, required or forbidden. I begin by discussing how error theorists arrive at this conclusion. I then argue that if we accept a moral error theory, we cannot escape a pressing problem – what should we do next, metaethically speaking? I call this problem the ‘what now?’ problem, or WNP for short. I discuss the attempts others have made (...) to respond to the WNP, and in each case I show that the responses fail to be satisfying. I then propose a new response to the WNP, which I call revolutionary relativism. I define revolutionary relativism, explain why it is preferable to the existing responses to the WNP, and defend it against the most problematic objections I anticipate that opponents might raise. I conclude that revolutionary relativism succeeds where previous WNP responses fail, and that if we accept a moral error theory, we should become revolutionary relativists. (shrink)

Metaphor is a semantic phenomenon, in that it involves the assigning of distinctively metaphorical truth conditions to sentences and distinctively metaphorical semantic values to some of the words and phrases that figure in these sentences. It is also an aesthetic phenomenon, in that an intelligible metaphorical utterance always exhibits some degree of aptness, and an audience's efforts to understand such an utterance always involve efforts to make the best of it, finding it as apt as its words and circumstances permit (...) it to be. The key to understanding the connection between metaphorical truth and metaphorical aptness is to view the individual metaphorical utterance as a move in a game of make-believe, a move so structured that a competent audience can infer the game's rules from this single sample of legal play. Metaphor thereby exploits and helps to maintain a presumptively shared sense of fun that forms a key component in human cultural competence. (shrink)

In 1962, the philosopher Richard Taylor used six commonly accepted presuppositions to imply that human beings have no control over the future. David Foster Wallace not only took issue with Taylor's method, which, according to him, scrambled the relations of logic, language, and the physical world, but also noted a semantic trick at the heart of Taylor's argument. _Fate, Time, and Language_ presents Wallace's brilliant critique of Taylor's work. Written long before the publication of his fiction and essays, Wallace's (...) thesis reveals his great skepticism of abstract thinking made to function as a negation of something more genuine and real. He was especially suspicious of certain paradigms of thought-the cerebral aestheticism of modernism, the clever gimmickry of postmodernism-that abandoned "the very old traditional human verities that have to do with spirituality and emotion and community." As Wallace rises to meet the challenge to free will presented by Taylor, we witness the developing perspective of this major novelist, along with his struggle to establish solid logical ground for his convictions. This volume, edited by Steven M. Cahn and Maureen Eckert, reproduces Taylor's original article and other works on fatalism cited by Wallace. James Ryerson's introduction connects Wallace's early philosophical work to the themes and explorations of his later fiction, and Jay Garfield supplies a critical biographical epilogue. (shrink)

Buddhism, one increasingly hears, is an 'eco-friendly' religion. It is often said that this is because it promotes an 'ecological' view of things, one stressing the essential unity of human beings and the natural world. Buddhism, Virtue and Environment presents a different view. While agreeing that Buddhism is, in many important respects, in tune with environmental concerns, Cooper and James argue that what makes it 'green' is its view of human life. The true connection between the religion and environmental (...) thought is to be found in Buddhist accounts of the virtues - those traits, such as compassion, equanimity and humility, that characterise the life of a spiritually enlightened individual. Central chapters of this book examine these virtues and their implications for environmental attitudes and practice. Buddhism, Virtue and Environment will be of interest not only to students and teachers of Buddhism and environmental ethics, but to those more generally engaged with moral philosophy. Written in a clear and accessible style, this book presents an original conception of Buddhist environmental thought. The authors also contribute to the wider debate on the place of ethics in Buddhist teachings and practices, and to debates within 'virtue ethics' on the relations between human well-being and environmental concern. (shrink)