Many philosophers hold that if an agent acts intentionally, she must know what she is doing. Although the scholarly consensus for many years was to reject the thesis in light of presumed counterexamples by Donald Davidson, several scholars have recently argued that attention to aspectual distinctions and the practical nature of this knowledge shows that these counterexamples fail. In this paper I defend a new objection against the thesis, one modelled after Timothy Williamson’s anti-luminosity argument. Since this argument relies on (...) general principles about the nature of knowledge rather than on intuitions about fringe cases, the recent responses that have been given to defuse the force of Davidson’s objection are silent against it. Moreover, the argument suggests that even weaker theses connecting practical entities with knowledge are also false. Recent defenders of the thesis that there is a necessary connection between knowledge and intentional action are motivated by the insight that this connection is non-accidental. I close with a positive proposal to account for the non-accidentality of this link without appeal to necessary connections by drawing an extended analogy between practical and perceptual knowledge. (shrink)

Much of our know-how is acquired through practice: we learn how to cook by cooking, how to write by writing, and how to dance by dancing. As Aristotle argues, however, this kind of learning is puzzling, since engaging in it seems to require possession of the very knowledge one seeks to obtain. After showing how a version of the puzzle arises from a set of attractive principles, I argue that the best solution is to hold that knowledge-how comes in degrees, (...) and through practice a person gradually learns how to do something. However, the two standard accounts of know-how in the literature, intellectualism and anti-intellectualism, cannot properly account for the distinctive way in which know-how is gradually acquired by practice, a process in which conceptual representations and practical abilities are intimately interwoven. Drawing on Gareth Evans's work, I outline an account that may do so, and use this account to distinguish between two forms of learning to explain why skill generally cannot be learnt through testimony, and requires practice. (shrink)

Review of Tamar Schapiro, 'Feeling Like It'.

This paper investigates ‘authoritative knowledge’, a neglected species of practical knowledge gained on the basis of exercising practical authority. I argue that, like perceptual knowledge, authoritative knowledge is non-inferential. I then present a broadly reliabilist account of the process by which authority yields knowledge, and use this account to address certain objections.

A central debate in philosophy of action concerns whether agential knowledge, the knowledge agents characteristically have of their own actions, is inferential. While inferentialists like Sarah Paul hold that it is inferential, others like Lucy O’Brien and Kieran Setiya argue that it is not. In this paper, I offer a novel argument for the view that agential knowledge is non-inferential, by posing a dilemma for inferentialists: on the first horn, inferentialism is committed to holding that agents have only alienated knowledge (...) of their own actions; on the second horn, inferentialism is caught in a vicious regress. Neither option is attractive, so inferentialism should be rejected. (shrink)

I present a reading of EE 5.12/NE 6.12 according to which Aristotle argues for an executive account of φρόνησις (practical wisdom) to show why it is useful to possess this virtue. On this account, the practically wise person's actions are expressive of his knowledge of the fine, a knowledge that only the practically wise person has. This is why he must not only be a good deliberator, but also cunning (δεινότης), able to execute his actions well. An important consequence of (...) this reading is that the debate about whether Aristotle holds a Humean account of practical reason presupposes assumptions about the scope of rationality that Aristotle rejects. (shrink)

Philosophers and psychologists sometimes categorize emotions like surprise and curiosity as specifically epistemic. Is there some reasonably unified and interesting class of emotions here? If so, what unifies it? This paper proposes and defends an evaluative account of epistemic emotions: what it is to be an epistemic emotion is to have fittingness conditions that distinctively involve some epistemic evaluation. We argue that this view has significant advantages over alternative proposals and is a promising way to identify a limited and interesting (...) class of emotions. (shrink)

Subject-sensitive invariantism (SSI), the view that whether a subject knows depends on the practical stakes, has been charged with ‘knowledge laundering’: together with widely held knowledge-transmission principles, SSI appears to allow improper knowledge acquisition. I argue that this objection fails because it depends on faulty versions of transmission principles that would raise problems for any view. When transmission principles are properly understood, they are shown to be compatible with SSI because they do not give rise to improper knowledge acquisition. The (...) upshot is a better understanding of the nature and structure of these transmission principles. (shrink)

aristotle closes the second common book of his ethical treatises by considering a number of puzzles about wisdom and φρόνησις,1 devoting the bulk of his attention to a puzzle about the usefulness of the latter. Briefly, the puzzle is that if φρόνησις is useful insofar as it enables us to act virtuously, it will be useless both to the virtuous person, who naturally acts well without possessing it, and to the non-virtuous person, so long as someone else tells her how (...) to act. Either way, it would seem, possessing φρόνησις is useless. There is agreement among scholars that Aristotle’s reply depends on the following biconditional claim: Virtue-Φρόνησις... (shrink)

European Journal of Philosophy, EarlyView.

A Latin-American/Spanish edition of the medieval classic. Boethius' treatises on meditation and beauty are still valid to this very day.

The lysosome serves as a site for delivery of materials targeted for removal from the eukaryotic cell. The mechanisms underlying the biogenesis of this organelle are currently the subject of renewed interest due to advances in our understanding of the protein sorting machinery. Genetic model systems such as yeast and Drosophila have been instrumental in identifying both protein and lipid components of this machinery. Importantly, many of these components, as well as the processes in which they are involved, are proving (...) conserved in mammals. Other recently identified components, however, appear to be unique to higher eukaryotes. BioEssays 23:333–343, 2001. Published 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. (shrink)

The global market for biologics and biosimilar pharmaceutical products is experiencing rapid expansion, primarily driven by the continuous discovery of new molecules. However, information regarding Latin America’s biological market remains limited.

Die Suche nach historischen Quellen für die Leibniz’sche Philosophie scheint zunächst unerschöpflich. Durch alle in diesem Band versammelten Arbeiten wird der Einfluss der Philosophie des Aristoteles auf das Leibniz’sche Denken näher umrissen. Ein wesentliches Ziel ist es hierbei, einen Beitrag zur Analyse dieser philosophischen Beziehung zu leisten und zu zeigen, dass auch Aristoteles’ Philosophie nach Ansicht unserer Autoren entscheidend zum Verständnis des Leibniz’schen Denkens beiträgt. Die Texte befassen sich mit wesentlichen Themen der Leibniz’schen Logik und Metaphysik, z. B. mit den (...) Grundbegriffen „Monade“ (und deren „Körperhaftigkeit“), „Entelechie“, „Nous“, mit dem Problem der Individuation (Individuum, Atomismus, Einheit), mit den substanziellen Formen, mit der Wissenschaft im Allgemeinen und der Technik, mit der Transformation der Logik, mit den Prinzipien (nämlich denjenigen des zureichenden Grundes, der Individuation und der Notwendigkeit), mit Zukunft und Kontingenz sowie Vergänglichkeit, mit der Theorie der syllogistischen Folgerung, usw. Diese Themen werden stets in der Gegenüberstellung von Leibniz und Aristoteles behandelt – sie zeigen daher, wie Leibniz aristotelische Thesen übernahm, veränderte oder kritisierte. The search for the historical sources of Leibniz’s philosphy initially seems to be unending. All the essays in this volume outline more clearly the influence of Aristotle’s philosophy on Leibniz’s thought. In this context a fundamental aim is to contribute to the analysis of this philosophical relationship and to demonstrate that Aristotle’s philosophy, in the opinion of our authors, plays a decisive role in the understanding of Leibniz’s thought. The texts address fundamental themes of Leibniz’s logic and metaphysics, e.g. the basic concepts of ‘monads’ (and their ‘corporality’), ‘entelechy’ and ‘nous; the problem of individuation (individual, atomism, unity); substantial forms; knowledge in general, and technology; the transformation of logic; principles (namely those of sufficient grounds, of individuation and of necesssity); future and contingency and transientness; the theory of syllogistic deduction, etc. These themes are regularly considered in the comparison between Leibniz and Aristotle – they demonstrate how Leibniz took over, treated or criticised Aristotelian theses. (shrink)

El registro de la personalidad de Pablo, su formación intelectual y su misión hacen de él un hombre de controversias y de originalidades en su discurso. Este artículo pretende describir: (a) la estructura argumentativa de la llamada 'carta a Filemón' (Fm), texto considerado de autoría paulina, y (b) las maniobras estratégicas que desarrolla el autor del documento para resolver la discusión crítica, específicamente a partir del uso de estrategias de cortesía verbal. En términos generales, desde un análisis dialéctico, la carta (...) nos presenta el pedido del prisionero para que Filemón reciba a Onésimo de regreso en su casa, así como los argumentos que favorecen esta postura. Al insertar las maniobras estratégicas, es decir, el elemento pragmático y retórico, se puede observar un cambio en el punto de vista y en el argumento. Las estrategias de cortesía verbal ayudan, por un lado, a que la comunidad acoja a Onésimo y, por otro lado, aprenda que los cristianos han sido generados por la fe en Cristo. Por tanto, no sólo se declara la petición, sino una nueva verdad de fe y una práctica de vida eclesial y social. Pablo salvaguarda la imagen negativa, apelando a un nuevo estilo de autoridad y a una renovada forma de vida comunitaria que va más allá del contexto específico en el que fue escrita la carta. Todo hombre y mujer de fe son miembros dignos de la comunidad porque son “mis entrañas” (Fm 12b). (shrink)

A lo largo del siglo XX hemos asistido al desplome de esa ciudadela interior (el sujeto) laboriosamente edificada desde el helenismo, cuya expresión filosófica más acabada es el cogito cartesiano. Consecuencia inevitable de tal desplome es la muerte de esa ilusión llamada «hombre». La antropología filosófica ha de partir de esa verdad: No hay hombre. Este volumen reúne trabajos sobre autores diversos que, desde Heidegger, han abierto vías para pensar hoy una ontología sin sujeto y una antropología sin hombre.

La transición del siglo XIX al XX supone una quiebra de paradigma que afecta al conjunto de los saberes. Desde la ciencia hasta la estética, pasando por la filosofía, el paradigma moderno se ve sometido a un proceso de erosión que desembocará en lo que algunos denominan Posmodernidad. La presente obra supone una aproximación al pensamiento contemporáneo, buscando las raíces de su especificidad en la profunda mutación discursiva con que se alumbra el siglo XX. Esta aproximación, lejos de ser una (...) mera descripción, se realiza desde una vocación crítica que subraya aquellos elementos del discurso actual que pueden convertirse en herramienta para la construcción de un pensamiento antagonista. (shrink)

Perspectivas: una aproximación al pensamiento ético y político contemporáneo recoge algunas de las conferencias pronunciadas en unas jornadas sobre pensamiento crítico, tituladas ¿Liquidar la Modernidad?, que tuvieron lugar en la Biblioteca María Moliner de la Facultad de Filosofía y Letras de la Universidad de Zaragoza en 2010. Y por otro lado, recopila las cuatro intervenciones que se produjeron en una jornada sobre pensamiento contemporáneo que, dirigida a profesorado de enseñanza secundaria, tuvo lugar en el Paraninfo de la Universidad de Zaragoza (...) el 26 de noviembre de 2011. El libro pretende también contribuir a establecer vínculos estrechos entre el Departamento de Filosofía y el profesorado de secundaria con el fin, entre otras cuestiones, de implicarse en la mejor preparación del alumnado de cara a la Prueba de Acceso a la Universidad y de facilitar la tarea docente del profesorado. En ese sentido, y puesto que actualizar el programa, dando cabida al siglo XX, parecía una cuestión necesaria, se ha configurado una aproximación a algunos autores y autoras contemporáneos, en la dimensión ética y/o política de su pensamiento, que también puede resultar útil para el profesorado de Filosofía en enseñanza secundaria. (shrink)