The Frankfurt School refers to a school of neo-Marxist interdisciplinary social theory particular established at the Institute for Social Research at the University of Frankfurt, Germany in 1923. Tarr's investigation focuses on three key issues. The first is the Frankfurt School's original program of providing a general theory of modern capitalist society. The second is the claim to represent a continuation of the original Marxian theory through the school's Critical Theory. The third is the scientific validity of Critical Theory in (...) light of the generally accepted canons of the natural and social sciences. Tarr proposes that in the last analysis, Critical Theory is simply another existentialist philosophy. As such, it is a specific expression of certain socio-historical conditions and of the situation of a particular social group, the marginal Jewish bourgeois intelligentsia of Central Europe. This European-Jewish contribution became apparent after the great metaphysical impulse of the pre-Socratic and Platonic-Aristotelian philosophies had run their respective courses. Both philosophies represented philosophical schools of ethics, and both wanted to help man take up a defense against the storms of passions and fate. It was from these ancient sources that the Frankfurt School emerged. The Frankfurt School derived its impetus in the twentieth century, in which Tarr claims a shift occurred from the ontological to the subjective realm. This in turn led to deep changes in philosophical theory and practice which led to a more psychologically oriented mode of social thought. This in-depth study covers the entire career of the Frankfurt School's Critical Theory from 1923 to 1974. It does so by applying the same standards of criticism to its primary doctrines as it turned on other theories, but with a keen sense of balance and fairness. (shrink)

Theodor Adorno's concept of 'natural history' [Naturgeschichte] was central for a number of Adorno's theoretical projects, but remains elusive. In this essay, I analyse different dimensions of the concept of natural history, distinguishing amongst (a) a reflection on the normative and methodological bases of philosophical anthropology and critical social science; (b) a conception of critical memory oriented toward the preservation of the memory of historical suffering; and (c) the notion of 'mindfulness of nature in the subject' provocatively asserted in Max (...) Horkheimer and Adorno's Dialectic of Enlightenment. These strands are united by the notion of transience and goal of developing a critical theory sensitive to the transient in history. The essay concludes by suggesting some implications of an expanded concept of natural history for issues in the discourse theory of Jürgen Habermas. (shrink)

Resumen: El artículo pretende realizar una confrontación entre el modelo fenomenológico de Merleau-Ponty y la propuesta deconstructiva de Derrida acerca del tema del lenguaje y de la problemática genética. En Merleau-Ponty, la cuestión genética se vincula a la noción de cuerpo y a la expresividad precategorial de los gestos, en los que el silencio describe una dimensión opaca e inalcanzable temáticamente, pero originaria y decisiva para la mirada fenomenológica. Por otra parte, Derrida es un crítico muy radical de todo uso (...) filosófico de un origen pleno, y por lo tanto también de la proyección de un silencio primitivo pretendida por Merleau-Ponty. Sin embargo, la noción de silencio de Merleau-Ponty no cumple cabalmente la función que Derrida le asigna, siendo siempre para Merleau-Ponty un espacio diacrónico y diferencial. El texto que sigue pretende mostrar los puntos de contactos y de distancias entre Merleau-Ponty y Derrida con respecto al tema del lenguaje en general, haciendo también hincapié sobre la cuestión de la literatura, a la que ambos filósofos se dedican ampliamente y a la que ambos pretenden extender las cuestiones evocadas, con el objeto de demostrar que en este ámbito los motivos de oposición entre los dos planteamientos se hacen efímeros.: This article aims to realize a confrontation between Merleau-Ponty's phenomenological model and Derrida's deconstructive proposal, with regard to the subject of language and the genetic problematic. In Merleau-Ponty, the genetic question is linked to the notion of the body and the pre-categorial expressiveness of gestures, in which silence describes a dimension that is opaque and thematically unattainable, but original and decisive for the phenomenological viewpoint. Derrida, in contrast, is a radical critic of the philosophical use of such origin, and therefore also of the projection to a primitive silence sought by Merleau-Ponty. However, the notion of silence in Merleau-Ponty does not fully meet fully the role assigned to it by Derrida, silence being always for Merleau-Ponty a diachronic and differential space. This article aims to show the points in common and the differences between Merleau-Ponty and Derrida on the issue of language in general. Also discussed is the topic of literature, with which both philosophers are widely engaged and to which both try to extend the issues under consideration in this paper. It is argued that in this area the motives behind the opposition between the two approaches become ephemeral. (shrink)

This book provides an intellectual biography of Max Horkheimer during the early and middle phases of his life and analyzes his model of early Critical Theory.

Over the past thirty years much has been written about the critical theory of society that was produced by a small group of left-wing Hegelians in the Institute of Social Research in Frankfurt am Main, Germany and in the United States. This book seeks to make a contribution to the continued development of the critical theory of society and religion as it offers a corrective to the one-sided, positivistic development of the modern social sciences as well as to the increasing (...) social irrelevancy of the contemporary Christian church. (shrink)

Max Horkheimer: Outsider des Bürgertums und Unternehmer in Sachen Kritischer Theorie. Niemand steht so wie Max Horkheimer für das, was in den 1960er Jahren die Bezeichnung ”Frankfurter Schule“ erhielt. Der Sohn eines Textilfabrikanten übernahm 1930 die Leitung des marxistischen ”Instituts für Sozialforschung“ mit dem Ziel, der von Konkurrenz und Gewinnstreben bestimmten Welt seines Vaters die Alternative eines der Erkenntnis gewidmeten und von Solidarität geprägten Lebens gegenüberzustellen. Durch die Nazis ins Exil gezwungen, wurde das Institut zu einem Ort der Zusammenarbeit von (...) Intellektuellen verschiedener Disziplinen und prägte auch nach der Rückkehr nach Deutschland die geistige Entwicklung der Bundesrepublik. Die neue, aktuelle Darstellung von Horkheimers Leben und Werk bietet eine Einführung und eine Gesamtschau dieses zentralen Denkers des 20. Jahrhunderts. (shrink)

Introduction Max Horkheimer was born on February in Stuttgart. By the time he died, on 7 July in Nuremberg, he had played a decisive role in launching and ...

The author advances the thesis that Max Horkheimer’s philosophy is a social one, the constitutive element of which is historiosophy. Contrary to the interpretative stereotype, dominating the philosophical literature, the Author strives to prove that Max Horkheimer’s philosophical point of view—that he calls the critical theory—is distinguished by its uniformity, because albeit the critical theory evaluated under the influence of the 20th-century Europe turbulent history, left its identity intact. The Author thinks that the identity of the critical theory has two (...) major indicators: 1. a visible criticism of the founding father of the Frankfurt philosophical school throughout his intellectual development towards the socio-historical circumstances that deprives the intellectual unity of autonomy and suppresses an independent thought and 2. the inconsolable thirst of changing things into better ones. Three stages of the development of Horkheimer’s philosophical conception have been depicted and briefly characterized in the article: prewar (the forming of the evidence of the critical theory), wartime (thehistoriosophical conception depicting the auto destruction of enlightenment) and postwar (the prediction of “an administered world”). (shrink)

These are questions that have lost none of their relevance.... Horkheimer remains a figure to be reckoned with.

Das ursprüngliche Programm der Frankfurter Schule, das Horkheimer in seiner 1931 anläßlich der Institutsübernahme gehaltenen Antrittsvorlesung und in seinen Aufsätzen in der Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung bis 1935 formulierte, und seine Realisierung werden dargestellt. Zu diesem Zweck wird das Programm mit drei sozialphilosophischen (Traditionelle und Kritische Theorie, Dialektik der Aufklärung, Zur Kritik der instrumentellen Vernunft) und drei empirischen (Arbeiter- und Angestelltenerhebung, Autorität und Familie, Studies in Prejudice) Arbeiten verglichen. Ergebnis der Arbeit ist, daß Horkheimer den programmatischen Anspruch einer Verbindung von Sozialphilosophie (...) und empirischer Sozialforschung in den hier vorgestellten Arbeiten nicht realisieren kann. (shrink)

In 1930, in Anfänge der bürgerlichen Geschichtsphilosophie, Horkheimer analyzes utopia in bourgeois philosophy of history and identifies two aspects: the criticism of what is, and the representation of what should be. Utopia therefore plays a revolutionary role in history. In 1937, in Traditionelle und kritische Theorie, Horkheimer changes opinion. Utopia is criticized as misleading, acquiescent to reality. In later writings, in a pessimistic view, the Director of the Frankfurt School describes contemporary society as a dystopia.

«The world is about to get rid of morality, becoming total organization that is total destruction. Progress tends to culminate in a catastrophe». This few words sum up the fears of the late Horkheimer, who is increasingly worried about the effects of the dialectic of enlightenment. The fatal outcome of such dialectic has led the world to the brink of annihilation. According to Horkheimer, the root of the dialectic of enlightenment is an instrumental reason tending to the dominion (the dominion (...) of man over nature and the dominion of man over man). With his theoretical production, Horkheimer has tried to prevent the disastrous effects of this instrumental reason, ending up framing the longing for the Totally Other. In our opinion, the Totally Other plays an anti-dialectic function over enlightenment, having the triple meaning of transcendence as other than immanence; of utopia as an other society than the present one; and of an other reason than the instrumental reason, as a promise of a thought that is not anymore allied to the dominion. A new interpretation of the Totally Other would free its critical power, and it would be a “negative” attempt (in the sense of negative theology) to prevent the catastrophe towards which we all are pushed by what Horkheimer calls the immanent logic of history. (shrink)

The dissertation investigates the work of Max Horkheimer in the 1930s and 1940s when he directed the Frankfurt Institute for Social Research. I argue that Horkheimer's philosophical work in this period provided an insightful methodological framework for the interdisciplinary project of social research pursued by the Institute's many members. Horkheimer's work provides a philosophical justification of the interdisciplinary approach to social research, along with a non-dogmatic dialectical methodology that grounds a serious engagement with the dominant trends in philosophy and science (...) of the time. He also offers a foundation for the progressive values that inform his critical social theory through his practice of immanent critique. ;Horkheimer's work underwent some changes after his departure from Europe and the practical break-up of the Institute in the 1940s. The changes reflect the shift away from a serious interdisciplinary project of social research and towards more philosophically focused work. His work in the 1940s also privileges a discussion of the character of reason and the human relation to nature. Still, I claim that Horkheimer's work maintains a deep continuity of content and structure, and I argue that the changes in the 1940s signify more of an evolution than a break with his work in the 1930s. In the 1940s, Horkheimer gestures towards a reconstructed Enlightenment framework to ground his work in philosophy and social theory. This reconstructed Enlightenment project attempts to replace an instrumental relation with nature with a relation that acknowledges and respects the difference and integrity of nature. Horkheimer thus brings the human to nature relation within the realm of social and political theory. ;Finally, I use my account of Horkheimer's work to confront the work of Jurgen Habermas, a second generation member of the Frankfurt Institute. I argue that Habermas, while offering important contributions to the project of social theory initiated by Horkheimer, still fails to recognize the significance of Horkheimer's work in constructing a vision of Enlightenment social theory grounded in a non-instrumental relation to nature. (shrink)

Horkheimer/Adornos im kalifornischen Exil verfasste Dialektik der Aufklärung untersucht das Scheitern menschlicher Befreiung und die Errichtung neuer Herrschaftsformen. Obgleich ein Schlüsseltext der philosophischen Zeitdiagnose, gab es bislang keinen Kommentar zu ihr. Der hier vorgelegte kooperative Kommentar geht der Dialektik der Aufklärung in zwei Durchgängen nach. Ein erster Durchgang kommentiert die einzelnen Abschnitte des Buches; ein zweiter Durchgang verfolgt Koordinaten seines theoretischen Horizonts. Abschließend gelangt die Wirkungsgeschichte des Textes zur Darstellung. Ein Gravitationstext der kritischen Theorie unserer Zeit findet damit erstmals eine (...) kommentierende Auslegung. (shrink)

Horkheimer's work contains many passages concerning moral and morally relevant problems, but one searches in vain for a completely elaborated moral philosophy. The rudiments thereof may be found primarily in “Materialism and Ethics” (1933) and in various passages of the “Juliette” portion of the Dialectic of Enlightenment. These would be quickly summarized, but could not thereby be adequately elucidated. If the matter were to remain with the mere reproduction of these thoughts, one would have to reach the regrettable conclusion — (...) given the paucity of texts — that early critical theory had an ethics deficit. The attempt to read Horkheimer in such a way that the relevant passages open one's vision to an implicit moral philosophy — that is, one amenable to reconstruction—must rely upon other approaches. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Naharaim Jahrgang: 11 Heft: 1-2 Seiten: 25-46.