In this essay I argue that given Donnellan’s formulation of the attributive uses of definite descriptions, as well as Kripke’s [6] and Salmon’s [10] generalized accounts, most uses of definite descriptions that are taken to be attributive turn out not to be so. In building up to my main thesis, I first consider certain problematic cases of uses of definite descriptions that do not neatly fit into any category. I then argue that, in general, a complete definite description we use (...) is complex, in which there is an embedded singular term that is used referentially. From this I conclude that an attributive use of a definite description is an extremely rare linguistic phenomenon, much less frequent than what Donnellan, Kripke, and Salmon have presupposed; so much so that the standard examples given by Donnellan of the attributive use of definite descriptions do not qualify as attributive. (shrink)

In this essay I argue that given Donnellan’s formulation of the attributive uses of definite descriptions, as well as Kripke’s [6] and Salmon’s [10] generalized accounts, most uses of definite descriptions that are taken to be attributive turn out not to be so. In building up to my main thesis, I first consider certain problematic cases of uses of definite descriptions that do not neatly fit into any category. I then argue that, in general, a complete definite description we use (...) is complex, in which there is an embedded singular term that is used referentially. From this I conclude that an attributive use of a definite description is an extremely rare linguistic phenomenon, much less frequent than what Donnellan, Kripke, and Salmon have presupposed; so much so that the standard examples given by Donnellan of the attributive use of definite descriptions do not qualify as attributive. (shrink)

Despite the recent increase in interest in philosophy about ignorance, little attention has been paid to the question of what makes it possible for a being to become aware of their own ignorance. In this paper, I try to provide such an account by arguing that, for a being to become aware of their own ignorance, they must have the mental capacity to represent something as being unknown to them. For normal adult humans who have mastered a language, mental representation (...) of an unknown is enabled by forming linguistic expressions whose content is grasped, but whose referent is unknown. I provide a neo-Fregean, a neo-Russellian, and then a unified account of this. On that basis, I then argue further that the content of ignorance can always be captured by a question. I then distinguish between propositional ignorance and non-propositional ignorance and argue that propositional ignorance attributions can be of three types, that-ignorance, whether-ignorance, and fact-ignorance. I conclude by arguing that the acquisition of truths, even when it yields knowledge that is certain, does not always eliminate one’s ignorance and that there is a degree of ignorance in almost everything we claim to know. (shrink)

What does it mean for a general term to be rigid? It is argued by some that if we take general terms to designate their extensions, then almost no empirical general term will turn out to be rigid; and if we take them to designate some abstract entity, such as a kind, then it turns out that almost all general terms will be rigid. Various authors who pursue this line of reasoning have attempted to capture Kripke’s intent by defining a (...) rigid general term as one that applies to the objects in its extension essentially. I argue that this account is significantly mistaken for various reasons: it conflates a metaphysical notion (essentialism) with a semantic one (rigidity); it fails to countenance the fact that any term can be introduced into a language by stipulating that it be a rigid designator; it limits the extension of rigid terms so much that terms such as ‘meter’, ‘rectangle’, ‘truth’, etc. do not turn out to be rigid, when they obviously are; and it wrongly concentrates on the predicative use of a general term in applying a certain test offered by Kripke to determine whether a term is rigid. (shrink)

A lot has been said about how the notion of reference relates to the notion of knowledge; not much has been said, however, on how the notion of referencerelates to our ability to become aware of what we do not know that allows us to be curious. In this essay I attempt to spell out a certain type of reference I call ‘inostensible’ that I claim to be a fundamental linguistic tool which allows us to become curious of what we (...) do not know. In the first part, I try to explicate the notion of inostensible reference, both for singular and for general terms, as well as full declarative sentences, and in the second part, I argue that our capacity to enjoy conceptual curiosity is essentially based upon our aptitude for inostensible reference. (shrink)

In this paper I respond to and elaborate on some of the ideas put forth on my book The Philosophy of Curiosity (2012) as well as its follow-up “Curiosity and Ignorance” (2016) by Nenad Miščević, Erhan Demircioğlu, Mirela Fuš, Safi ye Yiğit, Danilo Šuster, Irem Günhan Altıparmak, and Aran Arslan.

In this paper I respond to and elaborate on some of the ideas put forth on my book The Philosophy of Curiosity (2012) as well as its follow-up “Curiosity and Ignorance” (2016) by Nenad Miščević, Erhan Demircioğlu, Mirela Fuš, Safi ye Yiğit, Danilo Šuster, Irem Günhan Altıparmak, and Aran Arslan.

I argue that Millianism has the very odd consequence that there are simple direct questions that Millians can grasp, but they cannot answer them in the positive or the negative, or in some other way, nor could they say that they do not know the answer.

In this paper I respond to the objections put forth by Kresimir Agbaba 22: 1-6) against my earlier paper 20: 7-13) in which I argue that given Donnellan's formulation|as well as Kripke's and Salmon's gen- eralized accounts|an attributive use of a denite description is a very rare linguistic phenomenon.

There are two sorts of singular terms for which we have difficulty applying Donnellan’s referential/attributive distinction: complex definite descriptions, and proper names. With respect to the uses of such terms in certain contexts we seem to have conflicting intuitions as to whether they should be classified as referential or attributive. The problem concerning how to apply Donnellan’s distinction to the uses of certain complex definite descriptions has never been debated in the literature. On the other hand there have been attempts (...) to extend Donnellan’s distinction to the uses of proper names, the most popular one being due to Kripke. However the argument Kripke gives to this end in his ‘Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference’ seems to be inconsistent with the position he takes in Naming and Necessity. I suggest that the reason we seem to have conflicting intuitions with respect to the uses of such terms, is because there is not one but two separate distinctions inherent in Donnellan’s examples; a pragmatic distinction based on the speaker’s intentions in using a term , and an epistemic one based on the notion of having an object in mind. In the light of this, I argue that the issue of whether there are attributive uses of proper names, in the latter sense, relates to the epistemic problem of whether a speaker can have de re attitudes toward an object that he does not have in mind. On this epistemic issue Kripke and Donnellan are on opposite sides as revealed by their debate over the issue of whether there are contingent a priori propositions. (shrink)

In this essay I argue that given Donnellan’s formulation of the attributive uses of definite descriptions, as well as Kripke’s [6] and Salmon’s [10] generalized accounts, most uses of definite descriptions that are taken to be attributive turn out not to be so. In building up to my main thesis, I first consider certain problematic cases of uses of definite descriptions that do not neatly fit into any category. I then argue that, in general, a complete definite description we use (...) is complex, in which there is an embedded singular term that is used referentially. From this I conclude that an attributive use of a definite description is an extremely rare linguistic phenomenon, much less frequent than what Donnellan, Kripke, and Salmon have presupposed; so much so that the standard examples given by Donnellan of the attributive use of definite descriptions do not qualify as attributive. (shrink)

One of the most important features of natural language is that it enables its users to talk about an object before having experienced the object, or talk about an object without knowing which object it is. We can talk about the smallest island on earth before experiencing it, or we can talk about the smallest perfect number without knowing which number it is. I call terms that are used to make this kind of reference "inostensible." In this essay I discuss (...) three popular distinctions in analytic philosophy in relation to the use of inostensible terms: knowledge by acquaintance/knowledge by description, de re/dicto, and the referential/attributive uses of terms. I try to explore how such reference is possible, what types of terms in a language can be used inostensibly, what types of propositions and knowledge can be expressed by the use of inostensible terms, and other important semantic and epistemological issues related to inostensible reference. (shrink)

The scope of this short paper is to show that the examples Ilhan Inan uses to undermine Donnellan's distinction (primarily, the attributive uses of definite descriptions in general) fall short on account of wrong interpretation those examples were provided with in his paper. Whilst Ilhan Inan showed how complex definite descriptions (having an embedded referential term) may cause doubts as to which category they should be put in, these referring terms only play a secondary role. I (...) argue that all of his three key examples are, in fact, sheer attributive uses of definite descriptions and have to be taken as such, which seriously diminishes the pedestal Inan places his argument on. (shrink)

This dissertation seeks to reactivate the Marxist transition debate, by conceptualising transition as a problem in its own right, moving away from a stagist vision of the development of modes of production. Part I outlines the historical materialist parameters of the ontology of transition, and traces the concept across classical and western Marxism. This section draws from Althusserian theory to sketch out a conception of historical time as a multiplicity of dislocated trajectories. This is followed by a critique of post-Marxism, (...) based on the disappearance of the concept of transition in the discursive turn. It is argued that transition should be retained as a sociologically rigorous concept, and that among various strands of Marxist theory there is evidence of its efficacy. Part II analyses contemporary left theory and politics through the dichotomy of melancholy and utopia, and argues that they exemplify temporal complexity and illuminate current impasses on the left. Part III applies the findings of the preceding parts to strategic questions of demands, agency and strategy. This is achieved through a substantive discussion of postwork theory as a new postcapitalist vision, embodying issues of temporality, transition and utopia. The thesis concludes that the neglected problem of transition and the notion of multiple temporalities are important theoretical tools for addressing questions of historical epistemology and left strategy. Understanding transition as an embedded societal tendency is valuable to critical social theory, and provides the means to theorise postcapitalist futures. (shrink)

ZusammenfassungIn wertpluralen Gesellschaften begegnen uns in der medizinischen Versorgung zahlreiche Konflikte, bei denen die kulturellen und religiösen Wertvorstellungen und Einstellungen des Patienten eine wichtige Rolle spielen. Besonders komplex wird es, wenn die betroffene Person nicht mehr in der Lage ist, selbst über die medizinischen Maßnahmen zu entscheiden. Ob eine Patientenverfügung in solchen Konfliktsituationen einen entscheidenden Beitrag zu einer ethisch angemessenen Lösung leisten kann, bleibt eine berechtigte Frage. Im Folgenden werden die ethischen Aspekte im Umgang mit muslimischen Patienten und die Nutzung (...) einer kultursensiblen und kultursensitiven Patientenverfügung bei diesen Patienten differenziert behandelt.Die Vielfalt an Haltungen zu Entscheidungen am Lebensende innerhalb der islamischen Welt, der Einfluss der Familie und traditioneller sittlicher Einstellungen, heterogene Formen der Religiosität und das Gesundheitssystem des jeweiligen Landes erweisen sich als wichtige normative Anhaltspunkte für die Anwendung einer Patientenverfügung bei muslimischen Patienten. Trotz zahlreicher Schwierigkeiten kann eine kultursensible und kultursensitive Patientenverfügung einen wichtigen Beitrag zur Berücksichtigung und Umsetzung der Entscheidungen eines entscheidungsunfähig gewordenen muslimischen Patienten leisten. (shrink)

The purpose of this study is to understand student perceptions towards plagiarism and identify some factors influencing their plagiarist behaviour to be able to develop successful strategies to promote academic integrity and prevent plagiarism. Although academic dishonesty and plagiarism have been investigated by many researchers, psychometric qualities of these data collection instruments have generally been ignored, which has resulted in a shortage of standardized and validated questionnaires in the literature. Therefore, to address this issue the researcher ran a rigorous psychometric (...) analysis on a previously developed and psychometrically evaluated questionnaire. The modified instrument was conducted on 404 students studying in a private university in Kuwait in March 2022, representing the first administration of a psychometrically established plagiarism scale in the Kuwaiti context. The statistical analysis revealed that students’ perceptions are significantly different according to the high school type they graduated from, their reasons for studying at the university, and their post-graduation career plans, whereas gender, major and year of study do not cause statistically significant differences. (shrink)

ZusammenfassungIn wertpluralen Gesellschaften begegnen uns in der medizinischen Versorgung zahlreiche Konflikte, bei denen die kulturellen und religiösen Wertvorstellungen und Einstellungen des Patienten eine wichtige Rolle spielen. Besonders komplex wird es, wenn die betroffene Person nicht mehr in der Lage ist, selbst über die medizinischen Maßnahmen zu entscheiden. Ob eine Patientenverfügung in solchen Konfliktsituationen einen entscheidenden Beitrag zu einer ethisch angemessenen Lösung leisten kann, bleibt eine berechtigte Frage. Im Folgenden werden die ethischen Aspekte im Umgang mit muslimischen Patienten und die Nutzung (...) einer kultursensiblen und kultursensitiven Patientenverfügung bei diesen Patienten differenziert behandelt.Die Vielfalt an Haltungen zu Entscheidungen am Lebensende innerhalb der islamischen Welt, der Einfluss der Familie und traditioneller sittlicher Einstellungen, heterogene Formen der Religiosität und das Gesundheitssystem des jeweiligen Landes erweisen sich als wichtige normative Anhaltspunkte für die Anwendung einer Patientenverfügung bei muslimischen Patienten. Trotz zahlreicher Schwierigkeiten kann eine kultursensible und kultursensitive Patientenverfügung einen wichtigen Beitrag zur Berücksichtigung und Umsetzung der Entscheidungen eines entscheidungsunfähig gewordenen muslimischen Patienten leisten. (shrink)

Background: For an effective treatment of patients, quality-assured safe implementation of drug therapy is indispensable. Fasting during Ramadan, an essential religious practice for Muslims, affects Muslim diabetics’ drug use in a number of different ways. Objectives: Ethical problems arising from fasting during the month of Ramadan for practicing Muslim patients are being discussed on the basis of extant research literature. Relevant conflicts of interest originating in this situation are being analysed from an ethical perspective. Material and methods: A number of (...) databases have been searched systematically in view of the stated objectives to identify relevant studies. Starting point for this review are the following questions: What information is available regarding the fasting behaviour of Muslim diabetics during Ramadan? What kind of ethical problems can be identified in the context of this religious practice? Results: The present review established a number of problems concerning medication adherence and drug use of practising Muslim diabetics during Ramadan, notably insufficient compliance, reduced frequency of consultations with their doctor, and inadequate, not sufficiently goal-oriented doctor-patient conversations about fasting. Conclusions: Deficiencies in medical as well as religious knowledge about fasting in Ramadan and a lack of sensitivity have been found among Muslim patients as well as among doctors. Compliance management and drug use in this area can be improved by effective, goal-oriented action plans and projects through which linguistic and cultural barriers can be addressed. (shrink)

A critical look at the image of human nature that underlies the realist theory of international relations.

Since the 1980s, the discipline of International Relations has seen a series of disputes over its foundations. However, there has been one core concept that, although addressed in various guises, had never been explicitly and systematically engaged with in these debates: the human. This volume is the first to address comprehensively the topic of the human in world politics. It comprises cutting-edge accounts by leading scholars of how the human is theorized across the entire range of IR theories, old and (...) new. The authors provide a solid foundation for future debates about how, why, and to which ends the human has been or must be built into our theories, and systematically lay out the implications of such moves for how we come to see world politics and humanity's role within it. (shrink)