Classical Nyaya treatise on the concept of self (ātman) refuting the Buddhist exposition on the subject; critical edition with English translation.

Ātmatattvaviveka of Udayanācārya, classical Nyaya treatise, with Vivekārthaprakāśikā commentary, on the concept of self (ātman) refuting the Buddhist exposition on the subject.

On the fundamentals of Nyaya philosophy.

Atmatattvaviveka by Udayanacarya, with Translation, Explanation and Analytical-Critical Survey. N.S. Dravid. Indian Institute of Advanced Study, Simla 1995. 587 pp. ISBN 81-85952-28-0.

Vaiśeşikas are realist philosophers of classical India. They admit time (kāla) as a ubiquitous real substance. In this paper, our aim is to discuss such a determination of time following sixth century Vaiśeşika scholar Praśastapāda and a few of his interpreters, Vyomaśivācārya and Udayanācārya. This paper is an effort to state realist philosophers’ understanding of time and also to highlight how in classical Indian tradition, interpretations paved the way for proving the reality of time. The application of logical methods (...) by the Vaiśeşika interpreters is also worth studying. These methods show the internal development occurring in the system of Vaiśeşika. Praśastapāda stated different notions like priority etc. (paratvādi) as the linga or hetu of kāla. Vyomaśiva and Udayana have established this statement of Praśastapāda as the lakşaņa of kāla by virtue of different forms of inference. (shrink)

This paper intends to present a cognitive model of anuvyavasāya through causal and logical analysis of the moment examinations (kṣaṇavicāra), remaining consistent with the fundamental presuppositions of the Nyāya system. The Naiyāyikas hold that no cognition is self-revealing in nature. A subsequent mental perception, introspection or after-perception (anuvyavasāya) reveals the determinate cognition. In anuvyavasāya, along with the cognition and Self, the object of determinate cognition (vyavasāya) also is known. The vyavasāya itself, working as cognition-induced extraordinary sensory connection (jñānalakṣaṇa alaukika sannikarṣa), (...) connects its object to the mental sense-organ. We can formulate the moment examination of the after-perception ‘I know that it is a pitcher’ in the following way: (M1) sense-pitcher connection, (M2) indeterminate perception of pitcher, (M3) determinate perception of pitcher, (M4) indeterminate perception of the vyavasāya, (M5) determinate mental perception of vyavasāya, i.e. anuvyavasāya. But, according to the Naiyāyikas cognition exists only for two moments. So at M5, the vyavasāya is destroyed, which is the object or cause of anuvyavasāya. Gaṅgeśopādhyāya replies that a cause is only required to exist at the immediately previous moment of the effect. The paper analyses the moment examinations of anuvyavasāya offered by Udayanācārya and Vardhamānopādhyāya and tries to arrive at a consistent model of anuvyavasāya. The paper also discusses whether at all anuvyavasāya is an instance of jñānalakṣaṇa. Udayana’s account suggests that it is so, but Gadādhara does not admit it. On the other hand, Harirāma Tarkavāgīśa and Raghunātha Śiromaṇi hold that like vyavasāya all the internal states having contents (saviṣayaka) may work as jñānalakṣaṇa sannikarṣa. (shrink)