The most fundamental question in Husserl’s unceasing analyses of inner time-consciousness is the possibility of the experience of succession or movement. This question, determining Husserl’s analyses already from his analysis in winter semester of 1904/1905, is based on a thesis that actuality of one moment of a succession precludes the actuality of any other. But if it is true that there is always only one actual moment, how is it possible to be aware of a succession that requires at least (...) two moments? Husserl’s general answer to this problem is that the moments that are not actually given are nevertheless somehow present in The aim of this paper is to show that Husserl’s adherence to the aforementioned thesis in his analyses implies a problem that undermines all his endeavors to explain the possibility of inner time-consciousness. The problem is that all the other non-present moments notwithstanding in what way they are apprehended are still static, and it is impossible to arrive at a proper succession from a multiplicity of simultaneously given static moments. (shrink)

Pagājušais ir tas, kā vairs nav, bet nākošais - tas, kā vēl nav. Bet, ja to abu nav, vai tas nozīmē, ka ir tikai "tagad" un pagājušais un nākošais ir tikai par tik, cik tie ir apzināti tajā? Bet kā ir ar pašu "tagad"? Vilšanās, ko pavada centieni notvert un identificēt "tagad", var vedināt uz pārdomām, vai "tagad", kurā apzināmies pagājušo un nākošo, pats pastāv?