The New Rhetoric is founded on the idea that since "argumentation aims at securing the adherence of those to whom it is addressed, it is, in its entirety, relative to the audience to be influenced," says Chaïm Perelman and L. Olbrechts-Tyteca, and they rely, in particular, for their theory of argumentation on the twin concepts of universal and particular audiences: while every argument is directed to a specific individual or group, the orator decides what information and what approaches will achieve (...) the greatest adherence according to an ideal audience. This ideal, Perelman explains, can be embodied, for example, in God, in all reasonable and competent men, in the man deliberating or in an elite." Like particular audiences, then, the universal audience is never fixed or absolute but depends on the orator, the content and goals of the argument, and the particular audience to whom the argument is addressed. These considerations determine what information constitutes facts and reasonableness and thus help to determine the universal audience that, in turn, shapes the orator's approach. The adherence of an audience is also determined by the orator's use of values, a further key concept of the New Rhetoric. Perelman's treatment of value and his view of epideictic rhetoric sets his approach apart from that of the ancients and of Aristotle in particular. Aristotle's division of rhetoric into three genres-forensic, deliberative, and epideictic-is largely motivated by the judgments required for each: forensic or legal arguments require verdicts on past action, deliberative or political rhetoric seeks judgment on future action, and epideictic or ceremonial rhetoric concerns values associated with praise or blame and seeks no specific decisions. For Aristotle, the epideictic genre was of limited importance in the civic realm since it did not concern facts or policies. Perelman, in contrast, believes not only that epideictic rhetoric warrants more attention, but that the values normally limited to that genre are in fact central to all argumentation. Epideictic oratory, Perelman argues, has significant and important argumentation for strengthening the disposition toward action by increasing adherence to the values it lauds." These values are central to the persuasiveness of arguments in all rhetorical genres since the orator always attempts to establish a sense of communion centered around particular values recognized by the audience.". (shrink)

"In 'Justice', the result of many years' thoughtful exploration of that subject, Professor Perelman explains the conceptual origins of justice (both social and historical) and discusses the relationships between justice and justification, between justice and reason, and between reason and values. He considers the matter of a core of meaning, common to all, concerning the concept of justice, and raises essential questions such as why do people disagree about the problems of justice and whether a difference exists between a political (...) conception and a philosophical conception of justice."--Cover. (shrink)

La rhetorique n'est pas la discipline qui s'occupe essentiellement des figures de rhetorique: celles-ci ne sont plus qu'un outil parmi d'autres pour persuader et convaincre un auditoire. Dans toute sa generalite, elle constitue une theorie de l'argumentation, qui se sert de raisonnements qu'Aristote qualifiait de dialectiques. En ce sens la rhetorique, qui englobe la dialectique des Anciens, est le pendant de la logique formelle, car c'est l'instrument indispensable de toute pensee qui ne se reduit pas a un calcul. Toute deliberation, (...) toute discussion, toute controverse, toute presentation d'idees nouvelles qui fait appel a la raison, est obligee d'y recourir. La rhetorique est ainsi l'instrument indispensable de toute pensee et de toute philosophie critique. L'etude des techniques d'argumentation, et de leurs presupposes, longtemps negligee par le rationalisme classique, d'inspiration mathematique, est presentee dans ses perspectives historiques et philosophiques. (shrink)