It has been claimed that the recent wave of neuroscientific research into the physiological underpinnings of our moral intuitions has normative implications. In particular, it has been claimed that this research discredits our deontological intuitions about cases, without discrediting our consequentialist intuitions about cases. In this paper I demur. I argue that such attempts to extract normative conclusions from neuroscientific research face a fundamental dilemma: either they focus on the emotional or evolved nature of the psychological processes underlying deontological intuitions, (...) in which case the arguments rely on a blatantly fallacious inference, or they appeal to the (alleged) moral irrelevance of the factors to which deontological intuitions respond, in which case the neuroscientific results end up playing no role in the overall argument. (shrink)

Are there practical reasons for and against belief? For example, do the practical benefits to oneself or others of holding a certain belief count in favor of that belief? I argue "No." My argument involves considering how practical reasons for belief, if there were such things, would combine with other reasons for belief in order to determine all-things-considered verdicts, especially in cases involving equally balanced reasons of either a practical or an epistemic sort.

Suppose we grant that evolutionary forces have had a profound effect on the contours of our normative judgments and intuitions. Can we conclude anything from this about the correct metaethical theory? I argue that, for the most part, we cannot. Focusing my attention on Sharon Street’s justly famous argument that the evolutionary origins of our normative judgments and intuitions cause insuperable epistemological difficulties for a metaethical view she calls "normative realism," I argue that there are two largely independent lines of (...) argument in Street’s work which need to be teased apart. The first of these involves a genuine appeal to evolutionary considerations, but it can fairly easily be met by her opponents. The second line of argument is more troubling; it raises a significant problem, one of the most difficult in all of philosophy, namely how to justify our reliance on our most basic cognitive faculties without relying on those same faculties in a question-begging manner. However, evolutionary considerations add little to this old problem, and rejecting normative realism is not a way to solve it. (shrink)

The linchpin of Williamson (2000)'s radically externalist epistemological program is an argument for the claim that no non-trivial condition is luminous—that no non-trivial condition is such that whenever it obtains, one is in a position to know that it obtains. I argue that Williamson's anti-luminosity argument succeeds only if one assumes that, even in the limit of ideal reflection, the obtaining of the condition in question and one's beliefs about that condition can be radically disjoint from one another. However, no (...) self-respecting defender of the luminosity of the mental would ever make such an assumption. Thus Williamson can only secure his controversial claims in epistemology by taking for granted certain equally controversial claims in the philosophy of mind. What emerges is that the best bet for defending an internalist epistemology against Williamson's attack is to take there to be a tight, intimate connection between (to take one example) our experiences and our beliefs upon reflection about the obtaining of those experiences, or between (to take another example) the rationality of our beliefs and our beliefs upon reflection about the rationality of those beliefs. (shrink)

I argue—contra moderate grounding pluralists such as Kit Fine and more extreme grounding pluralists such as Jessica Wilson—that there is fundamentally only one grounding/in-virtue-of relation. I also argue that this single relation is indispensable for normative theorizing—that we can’t make sense of, for example, the debate over consequentialism without it. It follows from what I argue that there is no metaethically-pure normative ethics.

When it comes to epistemic normativity, should we take the good to be prior to the right? That is, should we ground facts about what we ought and ought not believe on a given occasion in facts about the value of being in certain cognitive states (such as, for example, the value of having true beliefs)? The overwhelming answer among contemporary epistemologists is “Yes, we should.” This essay argues to the contrary. Just as taking the good to be prior to (...) the right in ethics often leads one to sanction implausible trade-offs when determining what an agent should do, so too, this essay argues, taking the good to be prior to the right in epistemology leads one to sanction implausible trade-offs when determining what a subject should believe. Epistemic value—and, by extension, epistemic goals—are not the explanatory foundation upon which all other normative notions in epistemology rest. (shrink)

Quasi-realists aim to account for many of the trappings of metanormative realism within an expressivist framework. Chief among these is the realist way of responding to the Euthyphro dilemma: quasi-realists want to join realists in being able to say, "It’s not the case that kicking dogs is wrong because we disapprove of it. Rather, we disapprove of kicking dogs because it’s wrong." However, the standard quasi-realist way of explaining what we are up to when we assert the first of these (...) two sentences rests on a mistaken identification of metaphysical dependence (or grounding) with counterfactual covariation. This chapter proposes a better way for expressivists to understand such sentences, on which they serve to express complex states of mind in which an attitude bears a relation of psychological dependence (or basing) to another state of mind. It is argued that this proposal is a natural, versatile, and fruitful approach for expressivists to take that helps them secure the first half of the Euthyphro contrast—but at the cost of making it difficult to see how expressivists can make sense of that contrast’s second half. (shrink)

A quasi-sequel to "Epistemic Teleology and the Separateness of Propositions." Covers some of the same ground, but also extends the basic argument in an important way.

Moral properties are explained by other properties. And moral principles tell us about moral properties. How are these two ideas related? In particular, is the truth of a given moral principle part of what explains why a given action has a given moral property? I argue “No.” If moral principles are merely concerned with the extension of moral properties across all possible worlds, then they cannot be partial explainers of facts about the instantiation of those properties, since in general necessitation (...) does not suffice for explanation. And if moral principles are themselves about what explains the moral properties under their purview, then by their own lights they are not needed in order to explain those moral properties’ instantiation—unless, that is, the principles exhibit an objectionable form of metaphysical circularity. So moral principles cannot explain why individual actions have moral properties. Nor, I also argue, can they explain why certain other factors explain why those actions have the moral properties that they do, or in some other way govern or mediate such first-order explanations of particular moral facts. When it comes to the explanation of an individual action’s specific moral features, moral principles are explanatorily idle. (shrink)

Once upon a time, coherentism was the dominant response to the regress problem in epistemology, but in recent decades the view has fallen into disrepute: now almost everyone is a foundationalist (with a few infinitists sprinkled here and there). In this paper, I sketch a new way of thinking about coherentism, and show how it avoids many of the problems often thought fatal for the view, including the isolation objection, worries over circularity, and concerns that the concept of coherence is (...) too vague or metaphorical for serious theoretical use. The key to my approach is to take a familiar tool from discussions of the regress problem -- namely, directed graphs depicting the support relations between beliefs -- and to use that tool in a more sophisticated manner than it is standardly employed. (shrink)

Moral particularists argue that because reasons for action are irreducibly context-dependent, the traditional quest in ethics for true and exceptionless moral principles is hopelessly misguided. In making this claim, particularists assume a general framework according to which reasons are the ground floor normative units undergirding all other normative properties and relations. They then argue that there is no cashing out in finite terms either (i) when a given non-normative feature gives rise to a reason for or against action, or (ii) (...) how the reasons that are present in a given context play off each other to determine one’s overall duties. However, the conjunction of these two theses leaves particularists without a coherent notion of a reason for action: posit too much irreducible context-dependence in the behavior of reasons, and the reasons-based framework breaks down. One upshot is that the particularists’ challenge to principle-based approaches to ethics has not, at present, been successfully made out; another upshot is that perhaps the best way to formulate that challenge involves renouncing the reasons-based framework all together. (shrink)

I argue that Alvin Goldman has failed to save process reliabilism from my critique in earlier work of consequentialist or teleological epistemic theories. First, Goldman misconstrues the nature of my challenge: two of the cases he discusses I never claimed to be counterexamples to process reliabilism. Second, Goldman’s reply to the type of case I actually claimed to be a counterexample to process reliabilism is unsuccessful. He proposes a variety of responses, but all of them either feature an implausible restriction (...) on process types, or fail to rule out cases with the sort of structure that generates the worry, or both. (shrink)

After summarizing the essential details of Anil Gupta’s account of perceptual justification in his book _Empiricism and Experience_, I argue for three claims: (1) Gupta’s proposal is closer to rationalism than advertised; (2) there is a major lacuna in Gupta’s account of how convergence in light of experience yields absolute entitlements to form beliefs; and (3) Gupta has not adequately explained how ordinary courses of experience can lead to convergence on a commonsense view of the world.

I respond to six objections, raised by Selim Berker and Karl Schafer, against the theory offered in my Empiricism and Experience: (1) that the theory needs a problematic notion of subjective character of experience; (2) that the transition from the hypothetical to the categorical fails because of a logical difficulty; (3) that the constraints imposed on admissible views are too weak; (4) that the theory does not deserve the label 'empiricism'; (5) that the motivations provided for the Reliability (...) constraint are insufficient; and (6) that convergence is bound to fail since epistemic entitlements are permissions. (shrink)

In a recent paper, Selim Berker develops an abductive argument against practical reasons for belief that exploits an alleged difference between epistemic and practical reasons. According to Berker, epistemic reasons for belief balance to suspension. If I have equally strong epistemic reasons to believe and disbelieve some proposition, I lack sufficient reason either to believe or disbelieve it. Rather, I have decisive reason to suspend judgment. In contrast, practical reasons balance to permission. If I have equally strong (...) practical reasons to φ or ψ, I have sufficient reason to do either. Given this difference, Berker argues that defenders of practical reasons for belief cannot offer a plausible explanation of how practical and epistemic reasons interact in order to yield all-things-considered normative verdicts. In this essay, I defend a non-interactionist “pure” form of pragmatism against Berker’s objection. I outline a pure pragmatist theory, recapitulate why Berker thinks it also falls prey to his objection, and explain why the objection fails to undermine pure pragmatism. Finally, I consider an additional reason Berker’s argument might seem persuasive and show that it depends on conflating Berker’s objection and a separate challenge to pure pragmatism. Once these distinct challenges are disambiguated, it is easier to see why Berker’s objection is not a significant concern for pure pragmatists. (shrink)

The concept of meaningful work has recently received increased attention in philosophy and other disciplines. However, the impact of the increasing robotization of the workplace on meaningful work has received very little attention so far. Doing work that is meaningful leads to higher job satisfaction and increased worker well-being, and some argue for a right to access to meaningful work. In this paper, we therefore address the impact of robotization on meaningful work. We do so by identifying five key aspects (...) of meaningful work: pursuing a purpose, social relationships, exercising skills and self-development, self-esteem and recognition, and autonomy. For each aspect, we analyze how the introduction of robots into the workplace may diminish or enhance the meaningfulness of work. We also identify a few ethical issues that emerge from our analysis. We conclude that robotization of the workplace can have both significant negative and positive effects on meaningful work. Our findings about ways in which robotization of the workplace can be a threat or opportunity for meaningful work can serve as the basis for ethical arguments for how to—and how not to—implement robots into workplaces. (shrink)

Guilt and fear today have developed an unexpected quality: they contribute powerfully to the survival of humanity. The feeling of guilt proceeds from an elementary awareness: although the unequaled progress of science and technology in the twentieth century has undoubtedly ameliorated the conditions of human life, it also has given rise to an infernal logic of genocide and crimes against humanity, in which almost all nations, directly or indirectly, have participated and participate still. This awareness is joined to another, which (...) is itself accompanied by a primordial fear: for the first time in history, science and technology have endowed humanity with the power to destroy itself and the planet, without furnishing humans with the means of escaping their destined role as sorcerer's apprentice, for no science can tell us what to do with science. It is this double feeling of guilt and fear that pushes contemporary man to search feverishly for ethical foundations capable of furnishing discreet regulatory principles to underpin decisions and actions. From the point of view of contemporary humanity, ethics must be able to confer meaning and perspective on an existence which apparently has neither: “Now,” writes Hans Jonas, “we shiver in the nakedness of nihilism in which near-omnipotence is paired with near-emptiness, greatest capacity with knowing least for what ends to use it.”. (shrink)

Ten years ago, an issue of the journal L'Homme et la Société was entitled “La Mode des identités.” Most of the articles were about cultural identity, but the basic thrust of the work was “a critique of the ‘fashion’ of identity calling into question the validity of a notion as striking as it is uncertain.” Recently, a special issue of the journal Sciences Humaines, entitled “Identité et identités,” dealt with personal, familial, social, professional identities and only spoke of cultural identity (...) marginally and in a roundabout way. Finally, in a manual of Sociologie politique published by the Presses Universitaires de France, the author takes to task the notion of ethnicity inherent to cultural identity and pushes the critique of the ethnic group to the point of negating its objective existence. Must we think then that the notion of cultural identity is henceforth obsolete, that it has lost all pertinence? (shrink)

Ce n’est pas en termes de séparation entre pouvoir spirituel et pouvoir temporel que se pose la question de la laïcité dans les pays musulmans, car il n’y a jamais eu dans l’Islam sunnite, tout au moins, de magistère spirituel sous forme d’Église ou de clergé ayant tenté de disputer le pouvoir aux autorités civiles. Le problème ici est que l’exercice du pouvoir étatique se déroule dans tous ces pays sous l’emprise de règles et d’impératifs qui ont leur source dans (...) des textes révélés, considérés comme sacrés et immuables. Cette emprise du reli-gieux sur l’ordre étatique a conduit certains de ces pays, comme l’Iran ou l’Arabie Saoudite, à se draper dans un système de type théocratique. Partant de là, les tentatives entreprises par deux pays musulmans, la Turquie et la Tunisie, pour instaurer la laïcité sont peu fiables et res-tent inachevées. En fait, plutôt que par la laïcité, l’ouverture des pays musulmans à la moder-nité doit d’abord commencer par l’adoption sans nulle restriction du principe de liberté et son extension à tous les domaines de la vie publique. (shrink)

Establishing linkage among data of diverse domains (e.g. biological, environmental, socio-economical, and geographical) is critical to address complex multidimensional issues such as food security or sustainable agriculture. The complexity of this challenge increases with the level of heterogeneity of the data but also with the social context of production of datasets, a dimension usually less considered. Building on the experience of a transdisciplinary project on the diversity of crop diversity management systems in West Africa (CoEx), this chapter reflects on the (...) importance to better account for agency for more meaningful, responsible and efficient plant data linkage. The chapter addresses sequentially the cognitive and political challenges related to data work and the way they could be addressed simultaneously within the same social unit. To do this, we rely on the concept of community of practice (CoP) which gained enormous popularity in relation to data and knowledge management. More than simply a social mechanism for community knowledge management, we show in this contribution that CoP needs to be approached as a social experiment and a terrain of collective situated learning in order to address each challenge and their linkages with respect to data work. (shrink)

Specific moral facts seem to be grounded in relevant natural facts, together with relevant moral principles. This picture—according to which moral principles play a role in grounding specific moral facts—is a very natural one, and it may be especially attractive to non-naturalist, robust realists. A recent challenge from Selim Berker threatens this picture, though. Moral principles themselves seem to incorporate grounding claims, and it’s not clear that this can be reconciled with according the principles a grounding role. This (...) chapter responds to Berker’s Challenge, utilizing a grounding pluralism. In particular, it argues that distinguishing between normative and metaphysical grounding is the key to saving the natural picture. It also shows how such a distinction is one that you have a reason to endorse independently of this challenge, as it does important work elsewhere in moral philosophy. (shrink)

Michel Callon, Pierre Lascoumes and Yannick Barthe, Acting in an Uncertain World: An Essay on Technical Democracy Content Type Journal Article Category Book Review Pages 509-511 DOI 10.1007/s11024-011-9186-y Authors Thomas Berker, Department of Interdisciplinary Studies of Culture, Centre for Technology and Society, Norwegian University of Science and Technology, 7491 Trondheim, Norway Journal Minerva Online ISSN 1573-1871 Print ISSN 0026-4695 Journal Volume Volume 49 Journal Issue Volume 49, Number 4.

Artificial intelligence-driven technology increasingly shapes work practices and, accordingly, employees’ opportunities for meaningful work (MW). In our paper, we identify five dimensions of MW: pursuing a purpose, social relationships, exercising skills and self-development, autonomy, self-esteem and recognition. Because MW is an important good, lacking opportunities for MW is a serious disadvantage. Therefore, we need to know to what extent employers have a duty to provide this good to their employees. We hold that employers have a duty of beneficence to design (...) for opportunities for MW when implementing AI-technology in the workplace. We argue that this duty of beneficence is supported by the three major ethical theories, namely, Kantian ethics, consequentialism, and virtue ethics. We defend this duty against two objections, including the view that it is incompatible with the shareholder theory of the firm. We then employ the five dimensions of MW as our analytical lens to investigate how AI-based technological innovation in logistic warehouses has an impact, both positively and negatively, on MW, and illustrate that design for MW is feasible. We further support this practical feasibility with the help of insights from organizational psychology. We end by discussing how AI-based technology has an impact both on meaningful work (often seen as an aspirational goal) and decent work (generally seen as a matter of justice). Accordingly, ethical reflection on meaningful and decent work should become more integrated to do justice to how AI-technology inevitably shapes both simultaneously. (shrink)

La philosophie de Souriau a pour objet ce qu’il appelle les existences virtuelles, un mode d’existence fragile et précaire qui concerne tout processus d’instauration. Ces virtualités sont en état d’abaliété, elles existent « en et par autre chose », de manière relationnelle et indéterminée. Ces particularités ontologiques posent un problème de connaissance : celui de connaître de telles singularités, aussi appelées « âmes ». De nouveaux outils, issus de l’esthétique, accompagnent la connaissance. La fiction et la dramatisation viennent jouer un (...) rôle épistémique. Les êtres de fiction, qui existent selon un mode spécifique d’existence, font naître un sentiment esthétique, qui devient la base créatrice de la philosophie et de la connaissance. (shrink)

Bu araştırmanın amacı, küreselleşme olgusuyla birlikte farklılaşmaya uğrayan milliyetçi söylemin farklılaşma noktalarını ulus devlet olgusuyla bağıntısını göz önünde bulundurarak ortaya koymaktır. “Farklılaşma”, anlamı gereği bir süreci ifade etmekte, doğal olarak bir tarihselliği içermektedir. Buna göre geçmişten günümüze ulus-devlet ve milliyetçiliğin oluşumuna etki eden temel faktörler ve günümüz dünyasını ifade eden total bir kavram olan küreselleşmenin, ulus devlet ve milliyetçiliğin anlam dünyası ve söylemi üzerinde yaptığı etkilerle, bu etkilerin ne tür “farklılaşmalara” neden olduğunun ortaya çıkarılması bu çalışmanın amacını oluşturmaktadır.Ulus-devlet ve milliyetçiliğin (...) tarihsel gelişimi içerisinde birbirleriyle olan bağı, kültürel, siyasi, ekonomik, birçok yönü olan bir analizi gerektirmektedir. Bu bağlamda, bu olguların, insanların anlam dünyaları, davranışları, kısacası kültürleri ile ilgili önemli bir boyutu vardır. Bu kültürü yaratan araçların en önemlisi, yazılı kültürün gelişmesine ve kitleselleşmesine olanak tanıyan ve bu suretle farklı mekânlarda yaşayan insanlar arasında ortak bir iletişim alanı yaratarak bu alanda kitlesel bir ideoloji oluşumuna aracılık eden matbaa olmuştur. Bu noktada, Anderson’un açıklamaları oldukça kapsayıcıdır ve bu araca atfettiği önem güçlü bir haklılık payı taşımaktadır. Öte yandan, bireylerin zihin yapılarındaki değişiminde hangi toplumsal kesimler neden ve nasıl diğerlerine göre daha ağırlıklı bir etkiye sahiptirler ki, kitleler bu “azınlık” kabul edilebilecek kesimin yarattığı değerler sistemine tâbi olmuşlardır biçimindeki bir soruya verilecek yanıtta Gramsci’nin görüşleri açıklayıcı özelliktedir. Konunun daha ziyade sosyo-politik yönünü aydınlatmada Gramsci’nin, başta “aydınlar”la ilgili olmak üzere çözümlemeleri konuyla ilgili önemli açılımlar sunmaktadır. Bunun yanı sıra, ulus-devletin ortaya çıkışı, ekonomik etkinliğin her şeyden daha çok “önem” kazandığı bir tarihsel döneme denk gelmektedir. Bu ekonomi, yapısı itibarı ile baştan beri tüm dünya ölçeğinde bir yayılma özelliği taşımaktadır ve günümüzdeki küreselleşme tartışmaları göz önünde bulundurulacak olursa yayıldığı da iddia edilebilir. Bu anlamda, Wallerstein’in görüşleri konunun bu veçhesine ışık tutmaktadır. Bu çalışmada, birbirinden farklı bakış açılarının ele alınmasından ziyade, ulus devlet ve milliyetçilik konusu, yukarıda ifade edilen isimlerin görüşleri çerçevesinde ele alınmaktadır.The aim of this study is to outline the differing points of the nationalistic discourse that has undergone differentiation through the phenomenon of globalization, taking into account its connection with the concept of the nation state. “Differentiation”, by its definition, signifies a process and naturally occupies a place in history. In accordance with this, the main factors that have affected the formation of the nation-state and of nationalism throughout history and the effects that globalization as a total concept has had on the world of meaning and on the discourse of the nation state and nationalism along with an attempt to uncover the types of differentiations these effects have caused form the bases of this study. The interrelationship between the nation state and nationalism in their historical development requires an analysis with many cultural, political and economic aspects. In this context, it has an important dimension related to people’s world of meanings, their behaviour and in short with their cultures. Probably the most important invention that has created this culture has been the printing press, which has enabled the development of a written culture to emerge and in this way created a common field of communication between people living in different settings , thus mediating the formation of a mass ideology in this regard. At this point, the significance that Anderson attributes to this medium is strongly justified. On the other hand, Gramsci’s views have the explanatory answers to the question of why and how certain social sectors have more effects on the change in the intellectual make-up of individuals compared with other social sectors so that the masses are subjected to a value system within this sector that could be regarded as a “minority”. In enlightening the socio-political aspect of the subject, the analyses by Gramsci bring forth important openings principally as regards “intellectuals”. Besides, the emergence of the nation-state coincides with a period of history in which economic activity gained more “significance” than anything else. This economy, by its very nature, has had a tendency to spread to the whole world from the very beginning, and should the present discussions of globalization be taken into consideration, it can be claimed to have actually spread. In this sense, Wallerstein’s views throw light on this aspect of the subject. In this study, rather than examining different viewpoints, the subject of the nation-state and nationalism is touched upon within the framework of the figures whose names are given above. (shrink)

We introduce crossed modules in cycloids, as a generalization of cycloids, which are algebraic logical structures arising in the context of the quantum Yang–Baxter equation. As a spacial case, we in particular focus on the crossed modules of $L-$algebras. These types of crossed modules are exceptional, since the category of $L-$algebras is not protomodular, nor Barr-exact, but it nevertheless has natural semidirect products that have not been described in category theoretic terms. We identify crossed ideals of crossed module in $L-$algebras, (...) and obtain some characteristics of these objects that are normally not encountered on crossed modules of groups or algebras. As a consequence, we characterize crossed self-similarity completely in terms of properties of $L-$algebras and the boundary map forming the crossed module. (shrink)

The work described in this report is motivated by the desire to test the expressive possibilities of action language C+. The Causal Calculator (CCalc) is a system that answers queries about action domains described in a fragment of that language. The Zoo World and the Traffic World have been proposed by Erik Sandewall in his Logic Modelling Workshop—an environment for communicating axiomatizations of action domains of nontrivial size. -/- The Zoo World consists of several cages and the exterior, gates between (...) them, and animals of several species, including humans. Actions in this domain include moving within and between cages, opening and closing gates, and mounting and riding animals. The Traffic World includes vehicles moving continuously between road crossings subject to a number of restrictions, such as speed limits and keeping a fixed safety distance away from other vehicles on the road. We show how to represent the two domains in the input language of CCalc, and how to use CCalc to test these representations. (shrink)

The use of ensemble learning, deep learning, and effective document representation methods is currently some of the most common trends to improve the overall accuracy of a text classification/categorization system. Ensemble learning is an approach to raise the overall accuracy of a classification system by utilizing multiple classifiers. Deep learning-based methods provide better results in many applications when compared with the other conventional machine learning algorithms. Word embeddings enable representation of words learned from a corpus as vectors that provide a (...) mapping of words with similar meaning to have similar representation. In this study, we use different document representations with the benefit of word embeddings and an ensemble of base classifiers for text classification. The ensemble of base classifiers includes traditional machine learning algorithms such as naïve Bayes, support vector machine, and random forest and a deep learning-based conventional network classifier. We analysed the classification accuracy of different document representations by employing an ensemble of classifiers on eight different datasets. Experimental results demonstrate that the usage of heterogeneous ensembles together with deep learning methods and word embeddings enhances the classification performance of texts. (shrink)

Kur’an-ı Kerim indirildiği günden bugüne hem muhtevası hem de üslubuyla gerek inananların gerekse inanmayanların hep ilgisini çekmiştir. Bu ilgi zamanla onun başka dillere tercümesini beraberinde getirmiştir. Bu tercüme faaliyetleri aynı şekilde hem Müslümanlar hem de Gayr-i Müslimler tarafından yapılmıştır. Kur’an-ı Kerim’in kendine has ve tarih boyunca benzerinin getirilemediği eşsiz bir üslubu vardır. Onun üslubunun eşsiz olması aynı zamanda başka dillere tercümesini de zorlaştırmaktadır. Ancak Kur’an hitabının tüm insanlara yönelik olması onun başka dillere tercümesini de zorunlu kılmıştır. Bugüne kadar farklı dillere (...) yapılmış Kur’an tercümelerinin sayısı yüzü aşmıştır. Bu tercümelerin her birinin Kur’an’ı doğru anlamaya katkı sunmak iddiası, tercümelerde takip edilen yöntemi de belirlemiştir. Bu yöntemlerden en çok tercih edileni hiç kuşkusuz anlamın tercümesi yöntemidir. Bu yöntemin yanı sıra harfi harfine tercüme de başvurulan yöntemlerden bir tanesidir. Merhum Muhammed Hamidullah’ın Fransızca’ya yaptığı Le Saint Coran adlı tercüme bir Müslüman âlim tarafından yapılmış ilk harfi harfine tercüme örneğidir. Muhammed Hamidullah’ın Doğu ve Batıyı bilen ve çok çeşitli alanlara hâkim bir ilim adamı olması yaptığı bu tercümeyi dikkate değer kılmıştır. Bunun yanı sıra daha başka özellikleri ile de dikkat çeken bu Fransızca çeviri Aziz Kur’an: Çeviri ve Açıklama şeklinde Türkçeye tercüme edilmiştir. Bu çalışmada, Türkiye’de hatırı sayılır derecede bir okuyucu kitlesine sahip olan Hamidullah’ın, Türkçeye aktarılmış bu tercümesi değerlendirilecektir. (shrink)

Depuis une vingtaine d’années, les statistiques dites « ethniques » font l’objet en France d’un débat récurrent. Si elles aident à faire apparaître des contradictions et des inégalités centrales dans la société, elles sont une arme à double tranchant dans la mesure où elles entraînent également un effet de stigmatisation par l’assignation à une appartenance supposée communautaire non nécessairement revendiquée subjectivement. C’est peut-être en observant ce que se fait et se dit hors de France qu’on pourra mieux mesurer les effets (...) comparés de ce dispositif profondément ambivalent. (shrink)