The difficulty of grasping the thought of Parmenides led interpreters already in antiquity to approach his philosophy according to later schemes of thought. This was the case of Aristotle, whose interpretation was inherited by his disciple Theophrastus and by his commentators, especially Simplicius. Simplicius, a Neoplatonist and Aristotelian at the same time, proposed an interpretation, strongly dualistic (dominated by the sensible/intelligible dichotomy), which is not found in the recovered quotations. The origin of this interpretation is an "error" of Aristotle, inherited (...) by Simplicius, who attributed to Parmenides himself the paternity of the "opinions of mortals". In 1795 G.G.Fülleborn, inspired by Simplicius, proposed a division of the Poem into two "parts", unanimously accepted today, and which must be urgently revised and rejected. (shrink)

In this paper, I attempt to explore a recent hypothesis about what the main mss. are for establishing the text of Aristotle’s Ethica Nicomachea (henceforth EN). This hypothesis was recently advanced on the basis of evidence coming from EN I-II. In exploring this hypothesis, I confine myself to the text of EN X.6-9 [=Bywater X.6-8], and, as a result, I propose a new text for EN X.6-9 [=Bywater X.6-8] based on a fresh collation of nine mss—four of which were not (...) taken into account in previous editions of the EN—and based on readings that can be gathered from the Arabic translation of the EN that was preserved in the Fez ms. The text proposed in this paper is accompanied by textual notes that justify my decisions regarding some difficult passages. (shrink)

In this paper, I aim to explore the structure of the exercise in the second part of the Parmenides. In analyzing the transitional section, I claim that in addition to diairesis, there is another method of division, namely, cross-division, which Porphyry terms chiasmus. On this basis, I explain how Plato uses chiasmus to divide the exercise into eight hypotheses, in which the subjects of the paired hypotheses (I–VI, II–V, III–VII, and IV–VIII) are the same and those of the nonpaired hypotheses (...) differ. In closing, I reconstruct the universal scheme of the exercise on the basis of Plato’s use of chiasmus. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to explain why Thrasymachus, upon first appearing in Republic I, prohibits Socrates from defining justice as what is good. I argue that Thrasymachus views such definitions as equivocal, since he conceives of the good as relative: what is good must be good for someone. This relative conception of the good makes Thrasymachus similar to the sight-lovers, who believe in good things, which are relatively good, but deny the existence of the good itself, which is (...) absolutely good. Understanding Thrasymachus as a sight-lover permits an illuminating reframing of his outlook and his significance for the larger project of the Republic. (shrink)

Lucian’s Hermotimus, despite its first appearances of being a merely skeptical, even sophistical discrediting of philosophy, is better read as a powerful protreptic defense of the endeavor, whose key ancient intertext is Plato's Republic. To make this case, the paper involves three parts. In part i, we examine the metaphilosophical framing of the Hermotimus’s exchange between the eponymous hero, aged about 60 (§48) and Lucian’s favored interlocutor, Lycinus. We show that Lucian accepts that philosophy is intended to be an elevated (...) way of life cultivating wisdom and virtue, at the same time as he is concerned at how readily this pursuit can devolve into a hybristic, sectarian endeavor, in which pupils identify uncritically with instructors who do not match their words with their deeds. In part ii., we address the central elenchus and the action of the Hermotimus, the patient work by Lycinus to undermine Hermotimus’ dogmatic self-conceit, by refuting the different solutions he offers to the paradox involved in his having chosen a particular philosophical orientation, Stoicism, as a novice without philosophical training. Part iii. excavates the positive vision of philosophy that the action of the dialogue shows, highlighting the five key places in Hermotimus wherein Lycinus offers us entirely unironic visions of what philosophy at it best could be, in contrast to what it has become in Hermotimus or his teachers: or, as Lycinus heralds it, a kind of Ariadne’s thread out of the maze of Hermotimus’ paradox (§68). (shrink)

This is an annotated translation of the first four chapters of the second book of Aristotle’s Prior Analytics. I aim to offer Portuguese-speaking readers a clear text with complementary materials to elucidate and contextualize Aristotle’s work, fulfilling a significant gap in the Lusophone bibliographical universe. To do this, I have taken Ross’s edition of the Aristotelian text as a basis – in which I have made some small changes – and compared my work with a series of existing translations and (...) commentaries on the text. (shrink)

When Cicero examines the varied versions of cradle arguments that appear in De finibus, he finds much to criticize. Though he rejects these attempts to discern our proper ethical ends from the earliest inclinations of newborn animals, he nevertheless accepts that human beings should adopt ends for themselves that are consistent with, and perfections of, human nature. I argue that Cicero uses two connected argumentative strategies to create an appeal to nature that overcomes some basic problems he has with the (...) cradle arguments used in Epicureanism, Stoicism, and the Old Academy. The first strategy criticizes the different cradle arguments directly, by which Cicero establishes two negative criteria for any appeal to nature. These criteria indicate what to avoid in arguing for a highest moral end or summum bonum. These criteria eliminate the Epicurean and Stoic cradle arguments, and more subtly criticizes the Antiochian one. As a result, it may seem plausible that Cicero either adopts the Antiochian position himself or that he at least considers it to be a strong position that is worthy of further consideration, particularly in contrast with his categorical rejection of the other schools. Cicero’s second strategy, however, leads us away from accepting any established cradle argument, including the Antiochian one. This strategy develops a rich theme of education over the course of the text and emphasizes an appeal to the telic sense of “nature” that ultimately meets the two criteria set out by his first strategy. He does not seek ethical direction in some biological origin and given nature as cradle arguments do. Cicero appeals instead to human nature and its summum bonum as it appears during philosophical education. Though he finds cradle arguments rely too much on given nature and too little on telic nature, Cicero’s own own emphasis on education and telic nature amounts to a new appeal to “nature” that, in avoiding the “cradle”, is more sound than those of his philosophical rivals. (shrink)