The attempt by the digital forces to ‘naturalize’ the digital and thus to make it one with our ontology raises a whole host of issues about how to identify the Self. The multi-pronged process of naturalization are driven by a particular dynamic: the ‘more’ of data. Data is not a static pile of information, but only works within strategies of accumulation. Businesses and academe have bought into this strategy – addicted to its potential for control – in ways that make (...) it impossible to see ‘an outside’. This ‘more’ is, however, hardly foolproof, and is in fact designed around a wide range of fallibilities – some visible, but most not - that are also now part of the new natural. The resultant dialectic is unstable and as it operates to re-engineer our sense of Self it faces its own destiny. (shrink)

Elections are generally considered the only way to create a democratic legislature where direct democracy is not an option. However, in recent years that assumption has been challenged by individuals who claim that lotteries are a democratic way of selecting people for office, elections are aristocratic or oligarchic, not democratic, and that elections as we know them are inadequate if true democracy is prioritized. In opposition to this wave, my paper argues that the assertions made to support the democratic merits (...) of lotteries are unpersuasive. Current evidence that sortition is either more egalitarian or produces epistemically better results than elections is poor. Instead, these assertions illuminate the importance of elections in enabling the constituents of a democracy to reconcile the personal and political dimensions of their lives and, therefore, better reflect citizens’ claims to privacy and equality. The paper begins by recapping the main arguments for treating sortition as a democratic way to select a legislature, outlines their deficiencies, and then turns to what these perceived failings actually suggest about the democratic value of elections. (shrink)

The War on Terror is an ambiguous term that has been used to circumvent the international laws of warfare. Instead of moving toward peace by way of limited warfare, and instead of preserving the independence of war and peace, War on Terror advances by masking itself in a fog of peace; it proliferates by overlapping the logic of “war-time” and “peace-time” operations. The fog of peace—as it shall herein be called—is a condition wherein the uncertainty qua “fog” of war,2 along (...) with its militarized logic, overlaps with and eventually replaces civilian peace-time-and-spaces. The War on Terror is thus not a limiting of war by way of the conventional modern mechanisms of international law and diplomacy; it is a continuation of war by other means, including the use covert, often black-boxed methods of information-capture and surveillance. Globally, states are expanding the powers of intelligence organs and deploying covert mass surveillance programs in the name of counter-terrorism. In this manner, counter-terrorism policies become instruments enabling states to become predatory, especially in relation to civilians. Under the banner of fighting terrorism, peace-time has unwittingly become colonized by the logic of war. (shrink)

The Supreme Court’s reversal of the right to abortion has significantly changed reproductive rights in the United States, and adversely affected the lives of potentially pregnant persons. The political fragility of the privacy right to abortion also raises questions about the practice and epistemic rules of American constitutionalism itself. In this essay, I situate the history of privacy under the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause in the tradition of legal reasoning. With Ludwig Wittgenstein’s On Certainty, I argue that the majority (...) in Dobbs v. Jackson (2022) departs from this tradition. The upshot of this departure is that we now have a new interpretive language game battling a long established language game of interpretation–battling, that is, a constitutional tradition–in a contest to redefine how disagreement is transacted among justices and between the people and their government. (shrink)

Over the last century and a half, appeals to “privacy” have become common in American law. The result is a rather chaotic mix of concepts, which philosophers might be able to help bring into some kind of order. But I want to discuss one kind of privacy that isn’t discussed much in the law literature, what I call “natural privacy.” I strongly suspect that unlike cricket or checkers or bridge with respect to our concept of game (Wittgenstein’s example) there is (...) something very basic about natural privacy that can illuminate, at least to a certain extent, part of the web of concepts for which we have come to use the term “privacy.” The basis of this hunch is that two aspects of natural privacy, imagination and contemplation, seem to be a very important part of what it is to be a human being. The privacy we seek by building houses, fences and private offices seems to bear a close kinship with the kind of privacy with which nature endows us. And so does the sort of privacy we seek to provide, often in vain, for things we do with the help of modern technology, from the printing press to the internet. (shrink)

This essay contends that Marx sought to destroy privacy, analyzes his conception of it, and explains why he thought privacy impedes the full development of human beings. Central to his argument is a critique of constitutional states and modern liberalism, which, he maintains, by protecting and justifying individual rights, fail to recognize citizens as species beings.

In this paper I explore privacy as a concept that becomes relevant and sometimes necessary under specific circumstances, but unnecessary in others. Privacy, I suggest, can be thought of as the right to be left alone and is integral to related concepts such as freedom, liberty, and independence. In light of the ongoing expansion of data-mining technologies, business models, and emerging modes of governance, I suggest that privacy is simultaneously more necessary and more at risk than ever. Privacy, in other (...) words, is fragile and must be appreciated, understood, and defended. At the same time, privacy is increasingly an obstacle for businesses, governments, and financial interests, all of whom are eager to extract our data, manage our expectations, and shape and control our desires. To achieve their objectives, I describe how these organizations have long used propaganda and persuasive techniques to shape and manage the opinions, values, and expectations of the public. These days, I argue, the meaning of privacy is being made to evolve in order to bolster these organizations’ interconnected efforts to expand their power and control and to pave the way for the imposition of digital IDs. I also reflect on the way propaganda is being used today, the ways it has been described in the past, and the ways it will evolve in the future—either in defense of freedom, liberty, and independence, or in service of organizations intent on expanding their power and control over managed populations. (shrink)

Mass surveillance involves the collection and storage of vast amounts of information, such as DNA samples from the general population, or location data from cell phones towers, aerial surveillance, and other sources, to then be used when a future crime occurs. For example, DNA from a crime scene could be checked against the database to identify a suspect; location data could identify suspects who were at the scene of a crime. Mass surveillance implicates important privacy interests, but it would surely (...) reduce crime and therefore has been defended by those who reject “privacy at all costs.” I also reject “privacy at all costs.” However, while agreeing that privacy is a value that must be balanced against competing values, I argue that requiring everyone to provide a sample of their DNA or keeping track of everyone’s movements would limit the autonomy of vast numbers of people who there is no reason to suspect will pose a threat, and though such policies would make society safer, that is not worth the cost to individual autonomy. After explaining why individuals can have a substantial interest in privacy even if they are not guilty of a crime, by linking that interest to the value of individual autonomy, and drawing on a political theory of liberal pluralism to restrict what counts as a legitimate public interest that might justify mass surveillance, I articulate a method of balancing these competing interests that is more feasible than a utilitarian approach. (shrink)