In Philosophy of Science, Carnap, Hume, Descartes, Pascal, Popper, Kuhn and many others (none was irrelevant at all), are some kind of state-of-art. The last two cited above showed to us the most studied theories even they’re not totally correct. Popper with the hypothetical-deductive model, bring us the falsifiability as the way to proof the validity of a scientific theory and/or substitute others theories. Popperian system is in some ways used as pos-procedure in theoretical studies of publications when articles turn (...) public and scientists try to find conceptual errors or miscalculations. In practical science it’s more easy way, because its fallible if no one can reproduce it. Kuhn, in the other hand, says that science is made by revolutions, and the current model was a paradigm, where “normal science” was made and, once problems evolves inside the model, their solutions generates a new paradigm. This essay premise is to look Scientific-Fiction (that is always showed as merely histories) could influence directly or indirectly scientific development, if this influence could be in a popperian way, if this influence is in a kuhnian way, or if this influence are diggered by scientific community as propaganda as Feyerabend suggested. Could be historical enhancement with Fleck view of science, or sociological bias like David Bloor and Steven Shapin argued. (shrink)

Thomas Kuhn's philosophy brought a series of important ways of interpreting scientific practice, where history came to be understood as a significant part of this dynamic. In his 1962 “The Structure of Scientific Revolutions”, Kuhn provided us with some important concepts such as paradigm, normal science, anomalies and extraordinary science. From then on, science was no longer seen only as a logical structure related to discovery – but it was suggested that scientific changes occurred due to an increase in unresolved (...) problems that were sometimes ignored; contrary to what a science standardized by Popper's falsificationism could propose. Science in its normal period would be extremely traditionalist, remaining faithful to its paradigm and ignoring a series of problems – the paradigm being, among various ways of describing such a term, as a matrix of models. After many ignored and unresolved problems, a crisis can set in and from this process new paradigms can emerge: note that this dynamic can be related to a historical process within science. (shrink)