Among the phenomena that make up the mind, cognitive psychologists and philosophers have postulated a puzzling one that they have called ?epistemic feelings.? This paper aims to (1) characterize these experiences according to their intentional content and phenomenal character, and (2) describe the nature of these mental states as nonconceptual in the cases of animals and infants, and as conceptual mental states in the case of adult human beings. Finally, (3) the paper will contrast three accounts of the causes and (...) mechanisms of epistemic feelings: the doxastic account; the mental scanner account; and the heuristic mechanism account. The paper will argue in favor of the heuristic mechanism account. (shrink)

Recent debates on mental extension and distributed cognition have taught us that environmental resources play an important and often indispensable role in supporting cognitive capacities. In order to clarify how interactions between the mind –particularly memory– and the world take place, this paper presents the “selection problem” and the “endorsement problem” as structural problems arising from such interactions in cases of mental scaffolding. On the one hand, the selection problem arises each time an agent is confronted with a cognitive problem, (...) since she has to choose whether to solve it internally or externally. How does she choose? On the other hand, when confronted with the internally or externally retrieved solution to a cognitive task, the subject has to decide whether to endorse the information. How does the subject decide whether to endorse it or not? The last section proposes a solution to each problem in terms of metamemory and metacognitive feelings. Metamemory evaluates memory each time the subject is confronted with a memory task and elicits either a positive or negative metacognitive feeling that guides the decision. (shrink)

Philosophers of mind and epistemologists are increasingly making room in their theories for epistemic emotions (E-emotions) and, drawing on metacognition research in psychology, epistemic – or noetic or metacognitive – feelings (E-feelings). Since philoso- phers have only recently begun to draw on empirical research on E-feelings, in particular, we begin by providing a general characterization of E-feelings (section 1) and reviewing some highlights of relevant research (section 2). We then turn to philosophical work on E-feelings and E-emotions, situating the contributions (...) to the focus section (two articles devoted to E-feelings and two devoted to E-emotions) with respect to both the existing literature and each other (section 3). We conclude by brie y describing some promising avenues for further philosophical research on E-feelings and E-emotions (section 4). (shrink)

Two main theories about metacognition are reviewed, each of which claims to provide a better explanation of this phenomenon, while discrediting the other theory as inappropriate. The paper claims that in order to do justice to the complex phenomenon of metacognition, we must distinguish two levels of this capacity—each having a different structure, a different content and a different function within the cognitive architecture. It will be shown that each of the reviewed theories has been trying to explain only one (...) of the two levels and that, consequently, the conflict between them can be dissolved. The paper characterizes the high-level as a rationalizing level where the subject uses concepts and theories to interpret her own behavior and the low-level as a controlling level where the subject exploits epistemic feelings to adjust her cognitive activities. Finally, the paper explores three kinds of interaction between the levels. (shrink)

The cognitive phenomenology thesis claims that “there is something it is like” to have cognitive states such as believ- ing, desiring, hoping, attending, and so on. In support of this idea, Goldman claimed that the tip-of-the-tongue phe- nomenon can be considered as a clear-cut instance of non- sensory cognitive phenomenology. This paper reviews Goldman's proposal and assesses whether the tip-of-the- tongue and other metacognitive feelings actually constitute an instance of cognitive phenomenology. The paper will show that psychological data cast doubt (...) on the idea that the tip-of-the-tongue and other metacognitive feelings are clear-cut instances of cognitive phenomenology. (shrink)

Ouraiminthischapteristodelineatetheformofsharedagencythatwe take to be manifested in collective memory. We argue for two theses. First, we argue that, given a relatively weak conception of episodicity, certain small-scale groups display a form of emergent (i.e., genuinely collective) episodic memory, while large-scale groups, in contrast, do not display emergent episodic memory. Second, we argue that this form of emergent memory presupposes (high-level and possibly low-level) metamemorial capacities, capacities that are, however, not themselves emergent group-level features but rather strictly individual-level features. The form of (...) shared agency that we delineate is thus revealed as being minimal in three senses. First, the relevant groups are themselves minimal in terms of their size. Second, the form of memory in question is minimally episodic. And finally, the cognitive capac- ities attributed to the relevant groups are minimal, in the sense that they need not themselves be capable of metacognition. (shrink)

Mind-wandering seems to be paradigmatically unintentional. However, experimental findings have yielded the paradoxical result that mind-wandering can also be intentional. In this paper, we first present the paradox of intentional mind-wandering and then explain intentional mind-wandering as the intentional omission to control one’s own thoughts. Finally, we present the surrealist method for artistic production to illustrate how intentional omission of control over thoughts can be deployed towards creative endeavors.

Many philosophers consider that memory is just a passive information retention and retrieval capacity. Some information and experiences are encoded, stored, and subsequently retrieved in a passive way, without any control or intervention on the subject’s part. In this paper, we will defend an active account of memory according to which remembering is a mental action and not merely a passive mental event. According to the reconstructive account, memory is an imaginative reconstruction of past experience. A key feature of the (...) reconstructive account is that given the imperfect character of memory outputs, some kind of control is needed. Metacognition is the control of mental processes and dispositions. Drawing from recent work on the normativity of automaticity and automatic control, we distinguish two kinds of metacognitive control: top-down, reflective control, on the one hand, and automatic, intuitive, feeling-based control on the other. Thus, we propose that whenever the mental process of remembering is controlled by means of intuitive or feeling-based metacognitive processes, it is an action. (shrink)

The main aim of this paper is to clarify the relation between epistemic feel- ings, mental action, and self-ascription. Acting mentally and/or thinking about one’s mental states are two possible outcomes of epistemic or metacognitive feelings. Our men- tal actions are often guided by our E-feelings, such as when we check what we just saw based on a feeling of visual uncertainty; but thought about our own perceptual states and capacities can also be triggered by the same E-feelings. The first (...) section of the pa- per presents Dokic’s argument for the insufficiency of the “ascent routine” to account for non-transparent cases of self-ascription, as well as his account of E-feelings. The second section then presents a two-level model of metacognition that builds on Dokic’s account and my own view of the issue. The two-level model links E-feelings to a min- dreading capacity in order to account for non-transparent self-ascriptions. Finally, the third section develops a deeper characterization of the relation among E-feelings, mental action, and self-ascription of mental states based on epistemic rules. In the context of self-knowledge, these remarks suggest the existence of means of forming self-ascriptions other than the ascent routine. (shrink)

La ilusión de profundidad explicativa (ipe) es uno de los fenómenos que ha despertado gran interés en la ciencia cognitiva en los últimos veinte años. Sucede cuando la persona cree poder explicar un fenómeno mejor de lo que realmente puede explicarlo. A continuación, se hará una reconstrucción histórica de los estudios de la IPE a lo largo de las últimas décadas, dando cuenta de su actualidad e importancia. Primero se presentarán los antecedentes y los estudios fundantes de este tema de (...) investigación. A continuación, se expondrán las investigaciones iniciales (años 2002-2015), y la manera como prosiguió la indagación con cuestionamientos y soluciones a la IPE (años 2016-2021). Finalmente, se analizará la relación entre la ipe, las fake news y el internet. (shrink)

Collaborative remembering, in which two or more individuals cooperate to remember together, is an ordinary occurrence. Ordinary though it may be, it challenges traditional understandings of remembering as a cognitive process unfolding within a single subject, as well as traditional understandings of memory knowledge as a justified memory belief held within the mind of a single subject. Collaborative memory has come to be a major area of research in psychology, but it has so far not been investigated in epistemology. In (...) this chapter, we attempt an initial exploration of the epistemological implications of collaborative memory research, taking as our starting point the “extended knowledge” debate which has resulted from the recent encounter between extracranialist theories of cognition and externalist theories of knowledge (Carter et al., 2014; Carter et al., forthcoming). Various forms of socially and technologically augmented memory have played important roles in the extended knowledge debate, but the debate has so far not taken collaborative memory, in particular, into account. We will argue that collaborative memory supports a novel externalist theory of knowledge: distributed reliabilism. Distributed reliabilism departs in two important respects from both traditional reliabilism (Goldman, 2012) and updated theories such as extended (Goldberg, 2010) and social reliabilism (Goldman, 2014). First, it acknowledges that belief-forming processes may extend extracranially to include processing performed both by other subjects and by technological artifacts. Second, it acknowledges that distributed sociotechnical systems themselves may be knowing subjects. Overall, then, the main aim of the chapter is to draw out the philosophical implications of psychological research on collaborative memory. But our argument will also suggest that it may be useful to broaden the standard conception of collaborative memory to include not only the sorts of direct interactions among subjects that have been the focus of psychological research so far but also a range of more indirect, technology-supported and -mediated interactions, and it thus has implications for psychology as well. (shrink)

The feeling of error (FOE) is the subjective experience that something went wrong during a reasoning or calculation task. The main goal of the present study was to assess the accuracy of the FOE in the context of mental mathematical calculation. We used the number bisection task (NBT) to evoke this metacognitive feeling and assessed it by asking participants if they felt they have committed an error after solving the task. In the NBT participants have to determine whether the number (...) presented in the middle of a triplet corresponds to the arithmetic mean of the two outer numbers (e.g., 07_16_25) with a Yes/No answer. Our results show that FOE reports were strongly correlated with arithmetic errors and numerical properties of the NBT, suggesting that the FOE accurately represents the error. This finding indicates that even very fast metacognitive feelings are reliable when it comes to evaluating one’s own mental performance. Moreover, our results suggest that the occurrence of FOEs is determined by the fluency with which each triplet was solved and the post-decision evaluation processes that occurred after the NBT was solved. Additionally, we asked participants to report their confidence in the given answer for the cases where they did not report FOEs. Participants reported less confidence for the (objectively) incorrect answers than for the (objectively) correct ones, suggesting that in cases where they did not have a conscious FOE they still were able to implicitly detect their errors. Remarkably, confidence was also determined by the fluency of the NBT. (shrink)

Libro reseñado: Dulces sueños. Obstáculos filosóficos para una ciencia de la conciencia. Autor: Daniel Dennett.

Los distintos intentos por aclarar el concepto de justificación epistémica han dado lugar a los más intrincados debates en la epistemología analítica contemporánea. Da cuenta de ello la controversia entre el internismo y el externismo de la justificación, y las discusiones que han surgido allí entre el fiabilismo y la epistemología de la virtud. Estas disputas han tomado un nuevo aire tras el surgimiento de la tesis de la mente extendida propuesta por Clark y Chalmers (1998), que sugiere la posibilidad (...) de conocimiento extendido más allá de la mente o el cerebro individual del sujeto. El objetivo de este capítulo es mostrar y evaluar cómo un debate que en su origen fue epistemológico ha recibido influencia de una tesis metafísica, proveniente de la filosofía de la mente. En la primera parte de este capítulo identificaremos las principales corrientes que surgieron en el marco del debate sobre el internismo y el externismo de la justificación, esto es, grosso modo, el debate acerca de si la justificación de una creencia debe estar al alcance del sujeto (internismo) o si esa justificación se determina independientemente de tal alcance (externismo). Seguidamente, abordaremos este debate desde el punto de vista del fiabilismo y la epistemología de la virtud, y finalmente presentaremos las tesis de la mente extendida y la cognición distribuida para mostrar cómo estas tesis pueden ser influyentes en las discusiones epistemológicas entre posturas internistas y externistas. (shrink)

Philosophical Psychology, Volume 0, Issue 0, Page 1-4, Ahead of Print.

The recent development of specialized research fields in philosophy of memory and philosophy of perception invites a dialogue about the relationship between these mental capacities. Following a brief review of some of the key issues that can be raised at the interface of memory and perception, this introduction provides an overview of the contributions to the special issue, and outlines possible directions for further research.

The recent development of specialized research fields in philosophy of memory and philosophy of perception invites a dialogue about the relationship between these mental capacities. Following a brief review of some of the key issues that can be raised at the interface of memory and perception, this introduction provides an overview of the contributions to the special issue, and outlines possible directions for further research.

En el presente artículo se pretende hacer un recorrido por aquellas herramientas metodológicas utilizadas por Foucault para el estudio de la institución educativa disciplinaria y su posible aplicación al nuevo panorama educativo en las sociedades de control. Foucault analiza los discursos y prácticas como formas de poder en la sociedad disciplinaria, los cuales configuran una individualidad determinada: el cuerpo dócil. Tras la Segunda Guerra Mundial, nuevas modalidades de poder dan lugar a la sociedad de control, conformando una individualidad autogobernada. En (...) la educación secundaria actual aparecen tanto formas del régimen disciplinario como del régimen de control. (shrink)

Patients with strokes to the Anterior Communicating Artery pose an important challenge to rehabilitation teams due to a particular mix of cognitive and behavioral impairments. These deficits often compromise engagement with rehabilitation, learning and generalization. The goal of this article is to describe the long-term presentation of a patient with an ACoA stroke as well as her rehabilitation needs and the many challenges experienced by the rehabilitation team when attempting to facilitate functional, vocational and psychosocial recovery. Based on this case, (...) and the existing literature, a neuropsychological rehabilitation framework to understand and address the specific problems and needs of this population is proposed. This framework demands rehabilitation teams to consider: the slow pattern of recovery of this population, the interaction between cognitive and behavioral impairments, the relevance of physical and social environments, the value of personal projects and the need to include psychological and relational interventions. (shrink)

Sobre el libro de Santiago González-Varas, España no es diferente, prologado por Gustavo Bueno, Tecnos, Madrid 2002.

La lectura del libro de Arturo Klenner La reconquista del amor al mundo. Hannah Arendt y el límite de la modernidad, publicado por esta casa de estudios, me sorprendió gratamente. La sorpresa se funda en la capacidad filosófica que demuestra su autor, ante un texto complicado e intrincado como es La condición humana (1958) de Hannah Arendt. La alegría, en que un amigo logra publicar, como libro, su esfuerzo y dedicación intelectual.Siendo Arturo Klenner, hoy por hoy, un abogado que trabaja (...) en.. (shrink)

Attitudes toward physician-assisted death among medical students differ between populations. The aim of this study was to explore attitudes towards euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide among Spanish university students. A cross-sectional survey was conducted by asking undergraduate students of the University of Santiago de Compostela to complete an anonymous 17-item questionnaire. Most participants exhibited a positive attitude towards physician-assisted suicide and euthanasia, as well as towards their legalization. Attitudes were consistent with the underlying ethical reasoning, with no differences in terms (...) of age, gender or academic degree. In addition, consistency was found between attitudes and willingness to participate in physician-assisted suicide and euthanasia, should they be legal. The results showed that the attitudes of medical students towards euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide were positive and similar to non-medical students. (shrink)

Resumen: Ante las críticas insistentes a la distinción entre el empirismo y el racionalismo, se han propuesto alternativas para comprender de manera más adecuada el quehacer de los filósofos modernos. Entre ellas está la distinción entre filosofía especulativa y experimental. Intentaré evaluar la validez de esta distinción para la filosofía moral experimental del siglo XVIII y, en particular, para la propuesta de Hume. Mostraré que si la distinción se entiende en términos excluyentes, resulta inapropiada porque el mismo Hume plantea que (...) la especulación es lo que define a la filosofía. Además, antes que considerarlas como excluyentes, el filósofo escocés propone una conciliación entre la práctica de la experimentación y la teorización. Por último, sostendré que aquello que Hume considera como “falsa filosofía” no puede entenderse como sinónimo de filosofía especulativa.: A persistent criticism of the distinction between empiricism and ra-tionalism has provoked the emergence of new distinctions in order to under-stand modern philosophy in a more adequate way. One of those distinctions is that between speculative and experimental philosophy. My aim is to evalu-ate the validity of this distinction for eighteenth-century experimental moral philosophy in general and for Hume’s thought in particular. I will show that if this distinction is understood in exclusive terms, then it cannot be adequate because Hume himself states that speculation is what defines philoso-phy. Hume also proposes a reconciliation between experimental practice and theoretical activity instead of considering that they are mutually exclusive. Finally, I will make clear that what Hume condemns as “false philosophy” is not a synonym for speculative philosophy. (shrink)

Vicente Muñoz Delgado and Angel Amor Ruibal. With this work I pretend to introduce the readers to Vicente Muñoz Delgado like a studious and spreader of Angel Amor Ruibal's philosophy. To achieve this objective I'm going to take into account the most interesting five Writings by the professor Muñoz which deal with the exceptional philosopher from Santiago de Compostela.

Robert Alexy has argued that the democratic objection to judicial review of legislation can be successfully addressed by assuming that judges exercise a special form of argumentative representation. In this article we argue that Alexy does not explain (as he should) under what circumstances judicial review tends to produce better decisions than parliamentary procedure, nor does he explain how judicial review can have a greater intrinsic value than parliamentary procedure. Subsequently, we argue that the intrinsic value of argumentative representation depends (...) on the promotion of citizen deliberation, whereas its instrumental value depends on judges being committed to the rights of discrete and insular minorities in the face of hostile majorities. (shrink)

CONTENIDO: Vestigios protodemocráticos en la Edad Media tardía: Marsilio de Papua, Nicolás de Cusa / Matthias Vollet / - La concepción normativa de la democracia: un aporte neokantiano / Rodolfo Arango / - El concepto de lo político y la razón pública en Schmit y Rawls / Miguel Vatter / - Democracia y liberación pública / Cristina Lafont / - La democracia desde la teoría de las emociones / Viviana Quintero / - Ontología y democracia en spinoza y Negri (...) / Amalia Rey / - Reconocimiento y redistribución: el rol de un teoría crítica de la democracia / Nicolás Espejo / - La contribución de Haberman a la crítica de la tecnocratización de la democracia / Luis Javier Orjuela / - Libertad, derecho y democracia: aspectos teóricos y pragmáticos, con énfasis en la competencia / Joachim Lege / - Democracia representativa y democracia deliberativa: reflexiones a partir de la situación peruana reciente / David Sobrevilla. (shrink)

Macrocephaly is present in about 2–5% of the general population. It can be found as an isolated benign trait or as part of a syndromic condition. Brain overgrowth has been associated with neurodevelopmental disorders such as autism during the first year of life, however, evidence remains inconclusive. Furthermore, most of the studies have involved pathological or high-risk populations, but little is known about the effects of brain overgrowth on neurodevelopment in otherwise neurotypical infants. We investigated the impact of brain overgrowth (...) on basic perceptual learning processes during the first year of life. We recorded high density electroencephalograms in 116 full-term healthy infants aged between 3 and 11 months, 35 macrocephalic and 81 normocephalic classified according to the WHO head circumference norms. We used an adapted oddball paradigm, time-frequency analyses, and auditory event-related brain potentials to investigate differences between groups. We show that brain overgrowth has a significant impact on repetition effects and change detection response in the 10–20 Hz frequency band, and in N450 latency, suggesting that these correlates of sensorial learning processes are sensitive to brain overgrowth during the first year of life. (shrink)

RESUMEN Se hace un breve recuento sobre la mujer en la filosofia y la crítica a la visión patriarcal predominante en la filosofía, en particular se resalta a la filósofa María Zambrano como filósofa del siglo XX y su pensamiento político, como un giro en la mirada de lo que hasta el momento se ha destacado en su obra. Se desarrolla el contenido a partir de una introducción y cuatro apartados, en los que se aborda una reflexión sobre el género (...) como constructo cultural, cargado de sentidos de lo masculino y femenino, y se plantea asimismo la relación con el lugar de la mujer en la filosofía. Luego se centra la exposición en María Zambrano y su filosofía, en la búsqueda de la comprensión de su pensamiento, sosteniendo la importancia que tiene el reconocimiento de su vida y obra a partir de su contexto histórico. En las conclusiones se muestran los matices en la filosofía zambraniana, la multiplicidad de lecturas e interpretaciones que pueden hacerse de la misma. ABSTRACT This paper presents a brief historical account of woman in philosophy and the critique to the patriarchal vision predominant in philosophy. Maria Zambrano is highlighted as a twentieth-century philosopher as well as her political thought, marking a change of direction in the look at what so far has been highlighted in her work. The content, an introduction and four sections, addresses gender as a cultural construct plenty of masculine and feminine meanings and its relationship to women's role in philosophy. Then, the paper focuses on Maria Zambrano and her philosophy, looking for understanding her thought, keeping in mind the importance of recognizing her life and work from its historical context. In the conclusions the nuances in the Zambranian philosophy and the multiplicity of readings and interpretations that can be made of it are shown. (shrink)

Moral philosophy is often said to be about what we owe to each other. Do we owe anything to ourselves?