Year:

  1.  2
    Recensione di A. Chiera, Appesi a un filo. La comunicazione tra comprensione e fraintendimento.Ines Adornetti - 2016 - Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia 7 (3):393-395.
    No categories
    Translate
      Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  2. Il selfie: pensieri nascosti, fantasie di autocreazione, tratti di personalità.Gian Luca Barbieri - 2016 - Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia 7 (3):378-389.
    Riassunto : Gli autori di autoritratti fotografici possono esprimere diversi aspetti della loro personalità. In particolare, i selfie enfatizzano difficoltà nella connessione cervello-corpo, una fantasia di auto creazione e il bisogno di rimuovere qualsiasi mediazione nella creazione di un’immagine personale. Il fine della pubblicazione di un selfie non nasce dal bisogno di una relazione reale, ma deriva dalla necessità di un’auto-conferma narcisistica. Il pensiero che si produce quando una persona scatta e condivide un selfie esclude la mentalizzazione e non è (...)
    No categories
    Translate
      Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  3.  2
    La religione come tecnica difensiva dell'identità soggettiva.Sergio Fabio Berardini & Massimo Marraffa - 2016 - Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia 7 (3):365-377.
    Riassunto: In una prospettiva naturalistica, lo studio della religione presenta subito un punto problematico: se essa è così diffusa, tanto da apparire un tratto inscritto nella natura umana, ciò significa che la religione comporta dei vantaggi adattivi o, quantomeno, significa che essa non comporta svantaggi tali da ostacolare la sopravvivenza di chi la pratica. Nel primo caso, si tratta di individuare la possibile funzione della religione, ovvero una qualche utilità che ne giustificherebbe il suo permanere nella storia umana. Alla luce (...)
    No categories
    Translate
      Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  4. Recensione di R. Ariano, V. Azzoni, M. Maglio , Che cos'è un soggetto. Tra Comune e Singolare.Giovanni Coppolino Billè - 2016 - Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia 7 (3):390-392.
    No categories
    Translate
      Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  5. Experiencing the Other. How Expressivity and Value-Based Perception Provide a Non-Solipsistic Account of Empathy.Maria Chiara Bruttomesso - 2016 - Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia 7 (3):350-364.
    : The problem of intersubjectivity has undergone multifold discussions in the philosophical, neuroscientific and psychological fields. Currently, the predominant theories in this ongoing debate contend that simulation or explicit reasoning must ground other-understanding. Yet this contention confines the subject to solipsistic self-projection without actual communication. I will provide an analysis suggesting that the roots of the concept of “empathy” reveal not only a dualistic inner-outer distinction but also an emerging reference to the bodily dimension. I claim that, by examining the (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  6.  1
    The Phantasmatic "I". On Imagination-Based Uses of the First-Person Pronoun Across Fiction and Non-Fiction.Nevia Dolcini - 2016 - Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia 7 (3):321-337.
    : Traditional accounts regard the first-person pronoun as a special token-reflexive indexical whose referent, the utterer, is identified by the linguistic rule expressed by the term plus the context of utterance. This view falls short in accounting for all the I-uses in narrative practices, a domain broader than fiction including storytelling, pretense, direct speech reports, delayed communication, the historical present, and any other linguistic act in which the referent of the indexical is not perceptually accessible to the receiver. I propose (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  7.  4
    Indexical Duality: A Fregean Theory.Tomis Kapitan - 2016 - Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia 7 (3):303-320.
    : Frege’s remarks about the first-person pronoun in Der Gedanke have elicited numerous commentaries, but his insight has not been fully appreciated or developed. Commentators have overlooked Frege’s reasons for claiming that there are two distinct first-person senses, and failed to realize that his remarks easily generalize to all indexicals. I present a perspectival theory of indexicals inspired by Frege’s claim that all indexical types have a dual meaning which, in turn, leads to a duality of senses expressed by indexical (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  8. Linguistic Knowledge and Unconscious Computations.Luigi Rizzi - 2016 - Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia 7 (3):338-349.
    : The open-ended character of natural languages calls for the hypothesis that humans are endowed with a recursive procedure generating sentences which are hierarchically organized. Structural relations such as c-command, expressed on hierarchical sentential representations, determine all sorts of formal and interpretive properties of sentences. The relevant computational principles are well beyond the reach of conscious introspection, so that studying such properties requires the formulation of precise formal hypotheses, and empirically testing them. This article illustrates all these aspects of linguistic (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  9.  6
    The Several Factors of Consciousness.David Woodruff Smith - 2016 - Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia 7 (3):291-302.
    : In prior essays I have sketched a “modal model” of consciousness. That model “factors” out several distinct forms of awareness in the phenomenological structure of a typical act of consciousness. Here we consider implications of the model à propos of contemporary theories of consciousness. In particular, we distinguish phenomenality from other features of awareness in a conscious experience: “what it is like” to have an experience involves several different factors. Further, we should see these factors as typical of consciousness, (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  10. Guest Editor's Preface.Giuseppe Mario Antonio Varnier - 2016 - Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia 7 (3):290.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  11.  3
    Recensione di F. Domaneschi, C. Penco, Come Non Detto. Usi E Abusi Dei Sottintesi.Monica Consolandi - 2016 - Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia 7 (2):288-289.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  12.  8
    Book Review of M. Tomasello, A Natural History of Human Morality. [REVIEW]Alessio Gerola - 2016 - Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia 7 (2):286-288.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  13.  6
    Conscious Primitives and Their Reality.Simone Gozzano - 2016 - Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia 7 (2):247-255.
    : In The Varieties of Consciousness, Kriegel argues that it is possible to devise a method to sort out the irreducible primitive phenomenologies that exist. In this paper I argue that his neutrality notwithstanding, Kriegel assumes a form of realism that leaves unresolved many of the conundrums that characterize the debate on consciousness. These problems are evident in the centrality he assigns to introspection and his characterization of cognitive phenomenology. Keywords : Consciousness; Introspection; Realism; Type-identity; Dispositional Properties I primitivi della (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  14.  12
    Imaginative Phenomenology and Existential Status.Amy Kind - 2016 - Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia 7 (2):273-278.
    __: In this essay I explore the account of imaginative phenomenology developed by Uriah Kriegel in _The Varieties of Consciousness_. On his view, the difference between perceptual phenomenology and imaginative phenomenology arises from the way that they present the existential status of their object: While perceptual experience presents its object as existent, imaginative experience presents its object as non-existent. While I agree with Kriegel that it’s likely that the difference between imaginative phenomenology and perceptual phenomenology is one not just of (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  15. Precis of The Varieties of Consciousness.Uriah Kriegel - 2016 - Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia 7 (2):240-246.
  16.  8
    Reply to Symposiasts.Uriah Kriegel - 2016 - Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia 7 (2):279-285.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  17.  3
    Francesco Bonatelli: A Critical Approach to Consciousness and Human Subject Between Spiritualism and Positivism.Davide Poggi - 2016 - Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia 7 (2):202-211.
    : In the context of nineteenth-century philosophical reflection, Francesco Bonatelli set himself the following goal: to defend the pillars of Spiritualism and ontology through an careful examination of psychic contents and consciousness, while closely contesting both the psychology and the psychophysiology of Positivism and Spiritualism itself, La coscienza e il meccanesimo interiore and Percezione e pensiero Bonatelli puts forward his “critical experience-grounded philosophy” and proposes an original solution to the problem of the nature of the subject, consciousness and its unity, (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  18.  3
    Emil Lask. Soggettività e Ricettività.Roberto Redaelli - 2016 - Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia 7 (2):212-224.
    Riassunto : Il presente articolo intende lumeggiare l’esito tanto fecondo quanto problematico a cui conduce l’originale opera laskiana di risemantizzazione del concetto di soggettività. Al centro di tale opera si staglia la progressiva elaborazione di ciò che il filosofo rubrica, al termine del suo Denkweg, sotto il titolo di soggetto ricettivo. Con tale concetto, a cui è intimamente legato quello di “dedizione”, Lask individua in una mera ricettività intuitiva il momento sorgivo e originario di ogni processo cognitivo; il solo momento (...)
    No categories
    Translate
      Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  19.  9
    Another Argument for Cognitive Phenomenology.Elisabetta Sacchi & Alberto Voltolini - 2016 - Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia 7 (2):256-263.
    __: In this paper, we want to support Kriegel’s argument in favor of the thesis that there is a cognitive form of phenomenology that is both irreducible to and independent of any sensory form of phenomenology by providing another argument in favor of the same thesis. Indeed, this new argument is also intended to show that the thought experiment Kriegel’s argument relies on does describe a genuine metaphysical possibility. In our view, Kriegel has not entirely succeeded in showing that his (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  20.  29
    Kriegel on the Phenomenology of Action.Joshua Shepherd - 2016 - Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia 7 (2):264-272.
    : I focus on Uriah Kriegel’s account of conative phenomenology. I agree with Kriegel’s argument that some conative phenomenology is primitive in that some conative phenomenal properties cannot be reduced to another kind of property. I disagree, however, with Kriegel’s specific characterization of the properties in question. Kriegel argues that the experience of deciding-and-then-trying is the core of conative phenomenology. I argue, however, that the experiences of trying and acting better occupy this place. Further, I suggest that the attitudinal component (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  21.  4
    Pain and Consciousness in Humans. Or Why Pain Subserves the Identity and Self-Representation.Irene Venturella & Michela Balconi - 2016 - Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia 7 (2):166-179.
    : Traditional definitions of pain assume that an individual learns about pain through verbal usages related to the experience of injury in early life. This emphasis on the verbal correlates of pain restricts our understanding of pain to the context of adult human consciousness. In this paper we instead support the idea that our understanding of pain originates in neonatal experience and is not merely a verbally determined phenomenon. We also challenge the definition of pain as a merely sensory message (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  22.  3
    L’agenda ontologica della neuroscienza cognitiva: le neuroscienze come “arbitro” delle categorie psicologiche.Marco Viola - 2016 - Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia 7 (2):144-165.
    Riassunto : Questo articolo ambisce a fornire una ricostruzione razionale dell’ontologia della neuroscienza cognitiva. Questa dovrebbe soddisfare tre desiderata : un’ontologia delle funzioni cognitive che descriva tutte le operazioni della mente; un’ontologia delle strutture neurali che descriva tutte le parti del cervello; una corrispondenza biunivoca tra ogni funzione cognitiva e una corrispettiva struttura neurale. Saranno brevemente esaminati i presupposti che stanno alla base di questi desiderata, nonché alcune critiche mosse dagli scettici. Dopo aver vagliato alcune possibili contro-obiezioni agli argomenti scettici, (...)
    No categories
    Translate
      Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  23.  2
    Une signification nouvelle. Le riflessioni sull'animalità del "primo" Merleau-Ponty.Lucia Zaietta - 2016 - Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia 7 (2):225-239.
    Riassunto : L’obiettivo di questo lavoro è di analizzare le prime riflessioni di Merleau-Ponty sul tema dell'animalità, in riferimento particolare alla sua prima opera, La struttura del comportamento. L'articolo – attraverso un’ampia introduzione sulla rielaborazione merleau-pontyana delle nozioni di “comportamento” e di “gestalt”, seguita da un’analisi specifica della tripartizione delle forme di comportamento animale – farà emergere la ricchezza e insieme l’ambiguità del primo lavoro di Merleau-Ponty: se da una parte il fenomenologo francese rintraccia fin da subito una continuità ontologica (...)
    No categories
    Translate
      Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  24.  5
    Dreaming Consciousness: A Contribution From Phenomenology.Nicola Zippel - 2016 - Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia 7 (2):180-201.
    : The central aim of this paper is to offer a historical reconstruction of phenomenological studies on dreaming and to put forward a draft for a phenomenological theory of the dream state. Prominent phenomenologists have offered an extremely valuable interpretation of the dream as an intentional process, stressing its relevance in understanding the complexity of the mental life of subject, the continuous interplay between reality and unreality, and the possibility of building parallel spheres of experience influencing the development of personal (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  25.  3
    Recensione di D. Edmonds, Uccideresti l'uomo grasso?Giovanni Coppolino Billè - 2016 - Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia 7 (1):135-138.
    No categories
    Translate
      Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  26.  4
    Dilemma della prima persona e fenomenologia dell’azione: quanto è minimale l’autocoscienza?Mariaflavia Cascelli - 2016 - Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia 7 (1):61-74.
    Riassunto : Negli ultimi anni sempre maggiore attenzione viene data alla possibilità che una forma minima, pre-riflessiva di auto-coscienza preceda l’auto-coscienza introspettiva. Diversi sono stati i tentativi fatti per sostenere che questa forma “sottile” di auto-coscienza sia un prerequisito necessario della coscienza. Dopo una breve considerazione dei problemi semantici ed epistemologici relativi all’uso del pronome di prima persona, questo articolo si concentrerà sulla letteratura che analizza le eccezioni al principio di immunità dall’errore per misidentificazione dalla prospettiva della fenomenologia dell’agentività. Il (...)
    Translate
      Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  27.  2
    Recensione di V. Bochicchio, Percezione.Andrea Cimino - 2016 - Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia 7 (1):139-143.
    No categories
    Translate
      Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  28.  7
    Aspects of Psychologism: Précis.Tim Crane - 2016 - Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia 7 (1):96-98.
  29.  4
    Aspects of Psychologism: Reply to Critics.Tim Crane - 2016 - Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia 7 (1):127-134.
  30.  2
    Neurocognitve Dimensions of Self-Consciousness.Dario Grossi & Mariachiara Longarzo - 2016 - Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia 7 (1):75-82.
    : Self-consciousness is considered in a framework comprising four dimensions which are theoretically defined and supported by clinical neuropsychological evidence. Self-monitoring is defined as the ability to reflect on one’s own behaviour, with supporting evidence for deficits in this capacity noted in anosognosia syndrome. Self-feeling is defined as the capacity to feel all sensations related to one’s own body, with supporting evidence from deficiencies occurring in alexithymia, psychosomatic states and Cotard’s delusion. Identity refers to the capacity to recognize an object (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  31.  5
    Experiences Are Objects. Towards a Mind-Object Identity Theory.Riccardo Manzotti - 2016 - Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia 7 (1):16-36.
    : Traditional mind-body identity theories maintain that consciousness is identical with neural activity. Consider an alternative identity theory – namely, a mind-object identity theory of consciousness. I suggest to take into consideration whether one’s consciousness might be identical with the external object. The hypothesis is that, when I perceive a yellow banana, the thing that is one and the same with my consciousness of the yellow banana is the very yellow banana one can grab and eat, rather than the neural (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  32.  23
    Revisiting Phenomenal Intentionality.Farid Masrour - 2016 - Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia 7 (1):99-107.
    : This essay has two goals. The goal of the first section is to raise a few clarificatory questions about the exact contour of Crane’s account of intentionality, its relation to phenomenology, and his motivation for it. The second section aims to describe a general worry about programs that combine a broadly anti-externalist outlook on intentionality with the idea that there is an intimate connection between phenomenology and intentionality. I argue that programs like this either suffer from a problem that (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  33.  3
    The Distribution of Consciousness: A Difficult Cartesian Chart.Marcello Massimini - 2016 - Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia 7 (1):3-15.
    : If we were asked to draw a graph to represent the distribution of consciousness in the world around us based on objective criteria, we would definitely be in trouble. The two objective parameters that have been traditionally considered as a guide – the complexity of behavior and brain size – lead to paradoxical conclusions and turn out to be unsatisfactory, to say the least. We need to find novel, reliable metrics. However, these can be identified, validated and calibrated only (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  34.  4
    An Open Letter to RIFP Readership.Sandro Nannini - 2016 - Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia 7 (1):1-2.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  35.  6
    Is Intentionality Real Enough?Alfredo Paternoster - 2016 - Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia 7 (1):108-116.
    : According to Crane intentionality is nothing less than the mark of the mental. Nonetheless, there are many issues raised by this concept, beginning with the problem of non-existent relata. In this comment-article I discuss the concept of intentionality in its generality, trying to state its ontological status and to assess its explanatory dispensability. In particular, I focus on the argument, addressed by Crane, whereby Wittgenstein eliminates intentionality, characterizing it as a grammatical fiction, a pseudo-entity created by the grammar of (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  36.  2
    The Psychologizing of the Psychological and the Return of Common Sense.Pietro Perconti - 2016 - Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia 7 (1):117-120.
    : According to Tim Crane, his version of psychologism is not based on the familiar opposition between conceptual analysis and empirical science. His point is not simply to consider phenomenological and empirical data in the science of the mind. Challenging the idea that investigation of the mind has to be understood “as an autonomous investigation solely into the concepts embodied in our psychological discourse”, Crane tries to argue for a more realistic picture of the mental. His rejection of “autonomous investigation”, (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  37.  2
    L’ipotesi della mente estesa: antropologia del cyborg naturale.Giulia Piredda - 2016 - Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia 7 (1):83-95.
    Riassunto : Tra le più recenti riflessioni sulla mente umana, il quadro teorico della “mente estesa” ci dipinge come dei cyborg naturali provvisti di menti “superdotate”, ottenute grazie alla capacità di sfruttare le risorse tecnologiche e ambientali in modo integrato a nostro vantaggio. In questo articolo si ripercorre la genesi teorica di questo modello a partire dalle critiche alla scienza cognitiva classica, basata sul modello delle computazioni su rappresentazioni, e in particolare all’individualismo metodologico. Successivamente, si analizza il principale argomento filosofico (...)
    No categories
    Translate
      Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  38.  9
    Conscious Belief.David Pitt - 2016 - Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia 7 (1):121-126.
    : Tim Crane maintains that beliefs cannot be conscious because they persist in the absence of consciousness. Conscious judgments can share their contents with beliefs, and their occurrence can be evidence for what one believes; but they cannot be beliefs, because they don’t persist. I challenge Crane’s premise that belief attributions to the temporarily unconscious are literally true. To say of an unconscious agent that she believes that p is like saying that she sings well. To say she sings well (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  39.  8
    The Agent as Her Self: How Taking Agency Seriously Leads to Emergent Dualism.Maria Joana Rigato - 2016 - Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia 7 (1):48-60.
    : To act is to be the author of an intentional bodily movement. I will show that, in order for that authorship to be assured, the agent must both amount to more than the mereological sum of her mental or neural states and events, and have an irreducible causal power over, at least, some of them. Hence, agent-causalism is the best position for any realist about action to assume. I will contend that, contrary to what many have claimed, agent-causalism is (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  40.  7
    Knowledge by Experience. Or Why Physicalism Should Not Be Our Default Position in Consciousness Studies.Alfredo Tomasetta - 2016 - Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia 7 (1):37-47.
    : Current philosophical and scientific approaches to consciousness are very often characterised by a strong background presupposition: whatever the precise details of a theory of consciousness may be, a physicalist – or materialist – view of consciousness itself must be correct. I believe, however, that this conviction, pervasive though it may be, is not really justified. In particular, I think that the arguments offered in favour of the materialist presupposition are weak and unconvincing, and that there is a very strong (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
 Previous issues
  
Next issues