Amartya Sen’s ethical theorizing helps feminists resolve the tensions between the claims of women’s particular perspectives and moral objectivity. His concept of ‘‘positional objectivity’’ highlights the epistemological significance of value judgments made from particular social positions, while holding that certain values may become widely shared. He shows how acknowledging positionality is consistent with affirming the universal value of democracy. This article builds on Sen’s work by proposing an analysis of democracy as a set of institutions that aims to intelligently utilize positional information for shared ends. This epistemological analysis of democracy offers a way to understand the rationale for reserving political offices for women. From a political point of view, gendered positions are better thought of as an epistemological resource than as a ground of identity politics – that is, of parochial identification and solidarity.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Identity, Commitment and Morality.Herlinde Pauer‐Studer - 2006 - Journal of Economic Methodology 13 (3):349-369.
The Government of the Peoples: On the Idea and Principles of Multilateral Democracy.Francis Cheneval - 2011 - Palgrave-Macmillan.
Democracy and Green Political Thought: Sustainability, Rights, and Citizenship.Brian Doherty & Marius de Geus (eds.) - 1996 - Routledge.
Social Choice and Individual Capabilities.Mozaffar Qizilbash - 2007 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 6 (2):169-192.
The Political Egalitarian's Dilemma.Fabienne Peter - 2007 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 10 (4):373 - 387.
Identity, Community, and Justice: Locating Amartya Sen's Work on Identity.Mozaffar Qizilbash - 2009 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 8 (3):251-266.
Gender, Discrimination, and Capability: Insights From Amartya Sen.Douglas A. Hicks - 2002 - Journal of Religious Ethics 30 (1):137 - 154.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads107 ( #45,026 of 2,153,860 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #398,005 of 2,153,860 )
How can I increase my downloads?