Conditionals and monotonic belief revisions: the success postulate

Studia Logica 49 (4):557-566 (1990)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

One of the main applications of the logic of theory change is to the epistemic analysis of conditionals via the so-called Ramsey test. In the first part of the present note this test is studied in the “limiting case” where the theory being revised is inconsistent, and it is shown that this case manifests an intrinsic incompatibility between the Ramsey test and the AGM postulate of “success”. The paper then analyses the use of the postulate of success, and a weakening of it, generating axioms of conditional logic via the test, and it is shown that for certain purposes both success and weak success are quite superfluous. This suggests the proposal of abandoning both success and weak success entirely, thus permitting retention of the postulate of “preservation” discarded by Gärdenfors

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 93,932

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Conditionals in reasoning.John Cantwell - 2009 - Synthese 171 (1):47 - 75.
Difference-making conditionals and the relevant Ramsey test.Hans Rott - 2022 - Review of Symbolic Logic 15 (1):133-164.
On the Ramsey Test without Triviality.Hannes Leitgeb - 2010 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 51 (1):21-54.
The Ramsey test revisited.Sten Lindström & Wlodek Rabinowicz - 1995 - In G. Crocco, Luis Fariñas del Cerro & Andreas Herzig (eds.), Conditionals: from philosophy to computer science. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 131-182.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
54 (#288,184)

6 months
10 (#382,620)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?