The Appearance of Skepticism: Possibility, Conceivability and Infinite Ascent

Canadian Journal of Philosophy 51 (2):94-107 (2021)
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Abstract

The paper articulates a novel strategy against external world skepticism. It shows that a modal assumption of the skeptical argument cannot be justified.

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Sorin Bangu
University of Bergen

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References found in this work

The skeptic and the dogmatist.James Pryor - 2000 - Noûs 34 (4):517–549.
On referring.Peter F. Strawson - 1950 - Mind 59 (235):320-344.
Is conceivability a guide to possibility?Stephen Yablo - 1993 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (1):1-42.
Knowledge and Presuppositions.Michael Blome-Tillmann - 2014 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.

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