Skepticism

Edited by Everett Fulmer (Loyola University, New Orleans)
About this topic
Summary Skepticism involves doubt, or at least a reluctance to commit. For example, some philosophers are moral skeptics, claiming that no one can know what is right or wrong. Skepticism about the "external world" is more general, denying that there is knowledge of the world “outside our minds.”  Even more generally, some skeptics claim that there is no knowledge at all.  Philosophers have long explored reasons for and against various skeptical positions and argued about the consequences of adopting various skeptical stances.   In the ancient world, skepticism was recommended as a way of life.  The general claim was that living with an attitude of skeptical doubt is superior (morally and/or practically) to living with an attitude of dogmatic certainty.  In the modern world (i.e., the 1600s through the 1800s), skepticism was more often treated as something to be avoided, and considerable philosophical energy was put into strategies for doing so.  In contemporary philosophy, skepticism is typically framed as a theoretical problem rather than a practical one. The concern is to closely consider the best arguments for skepticism and to explore how best to respond to them.  Attempts to answer skeptical arguments have inspired philosophers to adopt substantive positions in epistemology, but also in ontology, philosophy of mind, philosophy of language, and moral philosophy.  
Key works The Oxford Handbook of Skepticism provides a comprehensive introduction to skeptical arguments and responses to skepticism.  Influential volumes include Popkin 1960Unger 1975Stroud 1984; and Williams 1991.   
Introductions Useful introductory articles include DeRose 1995; Greco 2007Pritchard 2002.
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  1. Scepticism, evidential holism and the logic of demonic deception.Samir Okasha - 2024 - Noûs 58 (4):1032-1049.
    Sceptical arguments in epistemology typically employ sceptical hypotheses, which are rivals to our everyday beliefs so constructed that they fit exactly the evidence on which those beliefs are based. There are two ways of using a sceptical hypothesis to undermine an everyday belief, giving rise to two distinct sorts of sceptical argument: underdetermination‐based and closure‐based. However, both sorts of argument, as usually formulated in the literature, fall foul of evidential holism, for they ignore the crucial role of background beliefs. An (...)
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  2. Mind as a Figment of Yours, and, Reason to Pragmatism.Louis Birla - manuscript
  3. The Heritage Value of Culinary Items: A Rather Skeptical Tale.Patrik Engisch - 2023 - Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 81 (4):539-544.
    Can culinary items bear heritage value? That is, can culinary items bear the kind of universal value shared by, say, a paleolithic site and the Hiroshima P.
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  4. (1 other version)Skepticism.Annalisa Coliva - 2022 - New York, NY: Routledge. Edited by Duncan Pritchard.
    Skepticism is one of the perennial problems of philosophy: from antiquity, to the early modern period of Descartes and Hume, and right through to the present day. It remains a fundamental and widely studied topic and, as Annalisa Coliva and Duncan Pritchard show in this book, it presents us with a paradox with important ramifications not only for epistemology but also for many other core areas of philosophy. In this book they provide a thorough grounding in contemporary debates about skepticism, (...)
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  5. Turning the tables on Hume.Casper Storm Hansen - 2024 - Philosophical Studies 181 (10).
    Certain prior credence distributions concerning the future lead to inductivism, and others lead to inductive skepticism. I argue that it is difficult to consider the latter to be reasonable. I do not prove that they are not, but at the end of the paper, the tables are turned: in line with pre-philosophical intuitions, inductivism has retaken its place as the most reasonable default position, while the skeptic is called on to supply a novel argument for his. The reason is as (...)
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  6. Growing up godless: non-religious childhoods in contemporary England.Anna Strhan - 2025 - Princeton: Princeton University Press. Edited by Rachael Shillitoe.
    In Britain, as in many other countries across Europe, non-religion has now replaced Christianity as the cultural default, especially among younger age groups. There is for the first time a no-religion majority, and only around half the overall population now express belief in some kind of God. And while religion continues to feature prominently in children's education in countries like the UK, schools are, increasingly, making space in the classroom for nonreligious stances toward life. But as of yet, there has (...)
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  7. Oakeshott’s skepticism, politics and aesthetics. [REVIEW]Elizabeth Corey - 2024 - History of European Ideas 50 (6):1152-1153.
    When Michael Oakeshott died in 1990, there were only a handful of scholarly monographs about his thought. Twenty years later, in contrast, the burgeoning number of studies of his thought prompted o...
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  8. Before the Caress: The Expansion of Intimacy in Suspension.Rachel Aumiller - 2024 - In Rebekka A. Klein & Calvin D. Ullrich (eds.), The Unthinkable Body: Challenges of Embodiment in Religion, Politics, and Ethics. Stuttgart: Mohr Siebeck. pp. 257-272.
    This chapter offers phenomenological ethics of intimacy for experiences of isolation, reduced haptic relations, and periods when we must hold each other at a distance. How can we practice an ethics of intimacy from a space of separation and suspended activities involving bodily proximity and touch? By drawing on Luce Irigaray’s identification of a “caress before the caress,” I locate a queer, feminist ethics of intimacy born from the experience of undetermined desire or “erotic suspension.” The reduction and disruption of (...)
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  9. Suspension of Judgment as a Doxastic Default.Mark Satta - 2024 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism:1-25.
    In Outlines of Skeptical-Dogmatism, Mark Walker argues for Skeptical-Dogmatism about philosophical views—i.e., he argues that we should disbelieve most philosophical views. Walker argues for Skeptical-Dogmatism over both Dogmatism and Skepticism. In response, I defend Skepticism—i.e., the view that we should neither believe nor disbelieve most philosophical views. I argue that Walker’s arguments overlook some of the most plausible forms of philosophical Skepticism where the Skeptic suspends judgment about most disputed philosophical views without assigning a credence of 0.5 to those views. (...)
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  10. (1 other version)Other minds.John Wisdom - 1952 - Oxford,: Blackwell.
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  11. Das palavras ao pacto: a linguagem como fundamento em Thomas Hobbes.Mariana Dias Pinheiro Santos - 2024 - Dissertation, Universidade Federal de Sergipe
    Defendo que a linguagem, em Thomas Hobbes, por ser o fundamento de sua filosofia, pode ser entendida, em última instância, como um pacto de entendimento e de vontades. Sendo assim, não apenas os nomes e a verdade decorrem da convenção linguística, mas todos os tipos de regras e princípios são fruto de um contrato linguístico que atende às necessidades, às convenções e às vontades dos humanos. Com o objetivo de provar esta hipótese, foi necessário provar, primeiro, como a linguagem ocupa (...)
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  12. Bias Defended.Thomas Kelly - 2024 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 14 (3):234-258.
    In this paper, I clarify and defend some of the central ideas of Bias in response to commentators, with a special focus on the theme of skepticism. In response to Michael Veber, I defend the project of offering a modest as opposed to an ambitious response to the skeptic. In response to Jonathan Matheson, I defend my account of the way in which bias attributions function in contexts of interpersonal disagreement, as well as the claim that an unbiased believer will (...)
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  13. Bias, Knowledge, Skepticism, and Disagreement: Précis of Part iii of Bias: A Philosophical Study.Thomas Kelly - 2024 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 14 (3):181-189.
    The third and final part of Bias: A Philosophical Study explores the connections between bias and some of the central topics of epistemology, including knowledge, skepticism, and disagreement. It defends the possibility of biased knowing: biased believers can sometimes know, even when they believe in accordance with their biases, and even if those biases guarantee that they would believe as they do even if the truth were otherwise. It argues that the possibility of biased knowing has significant implications for both (...)
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  14. Reason, Bias, and Inquiry: The Crossroads of Epistemology and Psychology, edited by Nathan Ballantyne and David Dunning.Christos Kyriacou - 2024 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 14 (3):263-268.
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  15. Biased Knowers, Biased Reasons, and Biased Philosophers.Michael Veber - 2024 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 14 (3):190-200.
    In Bias: A Philosophical Study, Thomas Kelly offers a response to epistemological skepticism grounded in his account of bias. According to Kelly, the classic argument for skepticism is best understood as an attempt to show that our commonsense beliefs are biased against the skeptic. Kelly grants that this is true but argues that biased beliefs can still be knowledge. I offer two objections. First, if we are applying Kelly’s theory of bias to skepticism, it is best to think of the (...)
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  16. The Skeptic and the Veridicalist: On the Difference Between Knowing What There Is and Knowing What Things Are, written by Yuval Avnur.Kevin McCain - 2024 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 14 (3):259-262.
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  17. (1 other version)Metodología de lo suprasensible.Alfonso López Quintás - 1963 - Madrid,: Editora Nacional.
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  18. After Critique: Cynicism, Scepticism and the Politics of Laughter.Benedikt Korf - 2024 - Theory, Culture and Society 41 (4):95-110.
    In 1983, two philosophers, Michel Foucault and Peter Sloterdijk, engaged with ancient Cynicism and the outspokenness and laughter of Diogenes as a critical practice. Foucault and Sloterdijk did so to position themselves ‘after’ critique: ‘after’ a period of and ‘beyond’ a certain style of dogmatism and theoretical deadlocks that troubled left thinking in the early 1980s (and continue to do so today). I show how Foucault and Sloterdijk, while differing in their critical politics, both read Diogenes’ politics of truth as (...)
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  19. The Indefensibility of the Scientific Concept of Probability.A. Braynen - manuscript
    Whereas many philosophers accept the validity of 'probability' and confine themselves to interpreting it, this paper challenges its conceptual coherence by critically examining its use in the empirical world. While measure theory provides a rigorous mathematical framework for manipulating probability functions, we argue that applying precise probability measures to empirically uncertain outcomes introduces a fundamental contradiction. Probability measures claim to quantify uncertainty while simultaneously implying a degree of understanding about events that we do not fully possess. This inconsistency undermines the (...)
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  20. (1 other version)Other minds.John Wisdom - 1966 - Oxford,: Blackwell.
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  21. In Defense of an Account of Degrees of Epistemic Responsibility.Kazi A. S. M. Nurul Huda - 2023 - Philosophy and Progress 73 (1-2):95-112.
    This article explores the concept of degrees of epistemic responsibility by examining the debate between Michael Bishop and Katherine Puddifoot on the internalist perspective on epistemic responsibility. While Bishop’s empirical evidence challenges internalism, Puddifoot argues it can be supportive. The author presents an account of degrees of epistemic responsibility, drawing inspiration from Martin Montminy’s idea of moral responsibility. The central argument suggests that an agent is epistemically responsible only if her reasoning strategy aligns with her epistemic abilities, a concept referred (...)
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  22. “Did Descartes Read Sextus’s Outlines of Pyrrhonism?” A “Sceptical” Response.Paul O’Mahoney - 2024 - The European Legacy 29 (6):614-622.
    This article has been invited by The European Legacy editors as a response to Ayumu Tamura’s “Did Descartes Read Sextus’s Outlines of Pyrrhonism?” which continues the promising lines of enquiry he...
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  23. Ethics of atomism – Democritus, Vasubandhu, and the skepticism that wasn’t.Amber D. Carpenter - 2023 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 32 (4):840-864.
    Democritus’ atomism aims to respond to threats of Parmenidean monism. In so doing, it deploys a familiar epistemological distinction between what is known by the senses and what is known by the mind. This turns out to be a risky strategy, however, leading to inadvertent skepticism with only diffuse and contrary ethical implications. Vasubandhu’s more explicitly metaphysical atomism, by contrast, relies on a different principle to get to its results, and aims to address different concerns. It leaves us with a (...)
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  24. Problem granic poznania z hipersystemowego punktu widzenia.Krzysztof Mudyń - 1992 - Kraków: Nakł. Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego.
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  25. Unfamiliarity in Logic? How to Unravel McSweeney’s Dilemma for Logical Realism.Matteo Baggio - 2024 - Acta Analytica 39 (3):439-465.
    Logical realism is the metaphysical view asserting that the facts of logic exist and are mind-and-language independent. McSweeney argues that if logical realism is true, we encounter a dilemma. Either we cannot determine which of the two logically equivalent theories holds a fundamental status, or neither theory can be considered fundamental. These two conclusions together constitute what is known as the _Unfamiliarity Dilemma_, which poses significant challenges to our understanding of the epistemological and metaphysical features of logic. In this article, (...)
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  26. Psychological Reflections in the Philosopher’s Mirror: Comments on Thomas Kelly’s Bias: A Philosophical Study.Jared B. Celniker & Nathan Ballantyne - 2024 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 14 (3):229-233.
    In this brief commentary, we offer thoughts on Thomas Kelly’s Bias: A Philosophical Study. We focus on the book’s relevance to the study of cognitive biases, including Kelly’s discussion of naïve realism (in the psychologists’ sense). While we are largely enthusiastic about Kelly’s theorizing, we also provide some pushback against his notion of emergent biases. We hope that psychologists will engage with Kelly’s work and might consider how some philosophical refinements could improve the empirical study of biases.
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  27. Remarks on Ángel Pinillos’ Treatment of Global Skepticism in Why We Doubt.Mark Walker - 2024 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism:1-15.
    Ángel Pinillos’ Why We Doubt offers an error theory for at least some versions of global skepticism: skeptical doubts are based on a faulty heuristic. Once this heuristic is replaced by a more apt principle inspired by Bayesian approaches to epistemology, the skeptical doubts are shown not to be motivated. I argue contra Pinillos that skeptical doubts may remain even if we grant the main line of Pinillos’ argument. Skeptical doubts might be generated by disagreement even when we accept Pinillos’ (...)
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  28. Biased Suspension of Judgment.Brett Sherman - 2024 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 14 (3):218-228.
    According to Thomas Kelly, traditional skeptical arguments can be conceived in terms of bias. The main aim of this paper is not to challenge Kelly’s conclusions, but rather to draw some interesting consequences from them. Specifically, in addition to cases of biased judgments, which draw the ire of the skeptic, there are also cases of biased suspension of judgment. By examining cases of racially biased suspension of judgment and comparing them to cases of skepticism, I argue that we can help (...)
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  29. The Curious Case of the Disappearance of Pyrrhonism from Continental Philosophy.Robb Dunphy - 2024 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism:1-27.
    In this article, evidence is briefly presented for three facts that together point to something puzzling. (1) That major continental philosophers of the nineteenth century tended to engage in some detail, as part of a broader preoccupation with ancient Greek thought, with Pyrrhonian scepticism. (2) That major continental philosophers of the twentieth century tended to engage in some depth with their nineteenth-century forebears and maintained their tendency to engage significantly with ancient Greek thought. (3) That twentieth-century continental philosophers demonstrate little (...)
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  30. (1 other version)Can We Defend Normative Error Theory?Joshua Taccolini - 2024 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 20 (1):131-154.
    Normative error theorists aim to defend an error theory which says that normative judgments ascribe normative properties, and such properties, including reasons for belief, are never instantiated. Many philosophers have raised objections to defending a theory which entails that we cannot have reason to believe it. Spencer Case objects that error theorists simply cannot avoid self-defeat. Alternatively, Bart Streumer argues that we cannot believe normative error theory but that, surprisingly, this helps its advocates defend it against these objections. I think (...)
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  31. Der skeptizismus in der philosophie.Raoul Hermann Michael Richter - 1904 - Leipzig,: Verlag der Dürr'schen buchhandlung.
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  32. Evidence in a Non-Ideal World: How Social Distortion Creates Skeptical Potholes.Catharine Saint-Croix - 2025 - In Hilkje Charlotte Hänel & Johanna M. Müller (eds.), The Routledge handbook of non-ideal theory. New York, NY: Routledge.
    Our evidential environments are reflections of our social contexts. This is important because the evidence we encounter influences the beliefs we form. But, traditional epistemologists have paid little attention to the generation of this evidential environment, assuming that it is irrelevant to epistemic normativity. This assumption, I argue, is dangerous. Idealizing away the evidential environment obscures the ways that our social contexts distort its contents. Such social distortion can lead to evidential oppression, an epistemic injustice arising from the ubiquity of (...)
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  33. Nominalism and the Infinite Knowledge It Implies.Beppe Brivec - manuscript
    Being able to apply grue-like predicates would allow one to instantly solve an infinite number of mysteries (historical, scientific, etc.). In this paper I’ll give a couple of examples. It is still a mystery whether George Mallory and Andrew Irvine managed to reach the summit of Mount Everest in 1924. The predicate “greverest” applies to an object if either the object is green and Mount Everest was scaled in 1924, or the object is not green and Mount Everest was not (...)
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  34. Naturalizing skepticism.Marc Jiménez-Rolland - 2024 - Metaphilosophy 55 (3):301-315.
    Naturalism, construed as the idea that philosophy should be continuous with science, is a highly influential view. Its consequences for epistemology, however, are rather odd. Many believe that naturalized epistemology allows eschewing traditional skeptical challenges. This is often seen as an advantage; but it also calls into question its claim of belonging to the philosophical inquiry into knowledge. This paper argues that skeptical challenges can be stated to defy epistemic optimism within naturalized epistemology, and that there are distinctively naturalistic forms (...)
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  35. Awareness By Degree.Paul Silva Jr & Robert Weston Siscoe - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    Do factive mental states come in degrees? If so, what is their underlying structure, and what is their theoretical significance? Many have observed that ‘knows that’ is not a gradable verb and have taken this to be strong evidence that propositional knowledge does not come in degrees. This paper demonstrates that the adjective ‘aware that’ passes all the standard tests of gradability, and thus strongly motivates the idea that it refers to a factive mental state that comes in degrees. We (...)
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  36. All'n'None, The First and only Theory for formulating Existence.Amir Naseri - forthcoming - Xxv World Congress of Philosophy.
    All’n’None theory [1] is the first scientific theory about “Existence”, “On”, or “Being”. Based on Ontology it completely explains Epistemology and Theology. It studies the essence of “existence” and proves the essence of existence is independent of the beings; all beings share the same structure ontologically in order to get some amount of existence; and the amount of existence in each being is mathematically measurable. In that respect the whole existence form up a measurable cognizable spectrum or hierarchy from the (...)
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  37. The Factualist Interpretation of the Skeptical Solution and Semantic Primitivism.Michał Wieczorkowski - forthcoming - Philosophia:1-14.
    According to the factualist interpretation, the skeptical solution to the skeptic’s problem hinges on rejecting inflationary accounts of semantic facts, advocating instead for the adoption of minimal factualism. However, according to Alexander Miller, this account is unsound. Miller argues that minimal factualism represents a form of semantic primitivism, a position expressly rejected by Kripke’s Wittgenstein. Furthermore, Miller states that minimal factualism presupposes the conformity of meaning ascriptions with rules of discipline and syntax. However, he contends that this maneuver is also (...)
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  38. (1 other version)Objective Bayesianism and the Abductivist Response to Scepticism.Darren Bradley - 2024 - Episteme 21 (1):64-78.
    An important line of response to scepticism appeals to the best explanation. But anti-sceptics have not engaged much with work on explanation in the philosophy of science. I plan to investigate whether plausible assumptions about best explanations really do favour anti-scepticism. I will argue that there are ways of constructing sceptical hypotheses in which the assumptions do favour anti-scepticism, but the size of the support for anti-scepticism is small.
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  39. Greek Schools, Roman Heirs, and Unhappy Consciousness in Cicero's Academica.George Saad - 2021 - Borderless Philosophy 4:244-263.
    Cicero’s "Academica" offers a particularly rich demonstration of how the unhappy dialectic between stoicism and skepticism engages Roman historical self-consciousness. The Hegelian thesis of philosophy as mediated through historical development is given a clear articulation in the “derivative” Romans, precisely through their reception of a tradition, their experience of philosophy as inseparable from the self-consciousness of historical relation. The dispute happening in the "Academica" between a dogmatic stoicism and academic skepticism thus directly echoes the problems of contemporary 21st century philosophy (...)
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  40. Why We Should Reject Semiretributivism and Be Skeptics about Basic Desert Moral Responsibility.Gregg D. Caruso - 2023 - The Harvard Review of Philosophy 30:63-93.
    John Martin Fischer has recently critiqued the skeptical view that no one is ever morally responsible for their actions in the basic desert sense and has defended a view he calls semiretributivism. This paper responds to Fischer’s concerns about the skeptical perspective, especially those regarding victims’ rights, and further explains why we should reject his semiretributivism. After briefly summarizing the Pereboom/Caruso view and Fischer’s objections to it, the paper argues that Fischer’s defense of basic desert moral responsibility is too weak (...)
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  41. Moral Responsibility Skepticism and Semiretributivism.John Martin Fischer - 2023 - The Harvard Review of Philosophy 30:37-62.
    Moral responsibility skepticism has traditionally been dismissed as a nonstarter, but because of the important work of Derk Pereboom, Gregg Caruso, and others, it has become increasingly influential. I lay out this doctrine, and I subject it to critical scrutiny. I argue that the metaphysical arguments about free will do not yield the result that we do not deserve (in a “basic” sense) the attitudes and actions definitive of moral responsibility. Further, I argue that skepticism leaves out crucial components of (...)
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  42. Epistemic Infinite Regress and the Limits of Metaphysical Knowledge.Wilfrid Wulf - forthcoming - Oxford Studies in Epistemology.
    I will explore the paradoxical nature of epistemic access. By critiquing the traditional conception of mental states that are labelled as ’knowledge’, I demonstrate the susceptibility of these states to an infinite regress, thus, challenging their existence and validity. I scrutinise the assumption that an epistemic agent can have complete epistemic access to all facts about a given object while simultaneously being ignorant of certain truths that impact the very knowledge claims about the object. I further analyse the implications of (...)
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  43. Taking Skepticism Seriously.Harold Langsam - 2024 - Erkenntnis 89 (5):1803-1821.
    Responses to skeptical arguments need to be _serious_: they need to explain not only why some premise of the argument is false, but also why the premise is _plausible_, despite being false. Moorean responses to skeptical arguments are inadequate because they are not serious: they do not explain the plausibility of false skeptical premises (Sects. 2–3). Skeptical arguments presuppose the truth of the following two claims: the requirements for epistemic justification are internalist, and these internalist requirements are never satisfied (with (...)
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  44. Non-Factualist Interpretation of the Skeptical Solution and the Self-Refutation Argument.Michał Wieczorkowski - 2024 - Acta Analytica 39 (2):295-311.
    The skeptical solution is based on two assumptions — the rejection of semantic facts and the denial of semantic nihilism. On the basis of the non-factualist interpretation of this solution, these two assumptions are reconciled by stating that meaning ascriptions possess non-descriptive function. Nonetheless, Alexander Miller argues that this position is self-refuting since, as despite its non-descriptivism, by rejecting any kind of semantic facts, it inevitably leads to semantic nihilism. In this text, I demonstrate that Miller’s argument is not sound. (...)
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  45. Motivating (Underdetermination) Scepticism.Guido Tana - 2024 - Acta Analytica 39 (2):243-272.
    The aim of this paper is to analyse and develop how scepticism becomes an intelligible question starting from requirements that epistemologists themselves aim to endorse. We argue for and defend the idea that the root of scepticism is the underdetermination principle by articulating its specificitya respectable epistemic principle and by defending it against objections in current literature. This engagement offers a novel understanding of underdetermination-based scepticism. While most anti-sceptical approaches challenge scepticism by understanding it as postulating uneliminated scenarios of mass (...)
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  46. (2 other versions)Knowledge and scepticism.R. Nozick - 1988 - In Jonathan Dancy (ed.), Perceptual knowledge. New York: Oxford University Press.
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  47. Bir Bilme Teorisi. [REVIEW]Musa Yanık - 2021 - Kutadgu Bilig Felsefe-Bilim Araştırmaları Dergisi 43 (1):247-251.
    Mehdiyev’in Bir Bilme Teorisi adını verdiği eser, içerisinde birçok kavram ve problemi barındırması açısından oldukça zengin ve ufuk açıcı bir teoridir. Onun, bilgi söz konusu olduğunda medeniyet, bilim, teoloji ve sanat gibi sosyal epistemoloji içerisindeki kavramlara atıfla karşılaştırmalar yapması ve inanç, kanı gibi kavramlar üzerinden değerlendirmelerde bulunması; mevcut literatür içindeki kavramlara dair gerek olumlu gerekse olumsuz yeni bakış açılarını bize sağlarken, ayrıca mevcut problemleri, hem çağdaş hem de klasik teoriler içinde ele alması, bize ufuk açıcı yorumlar da kazandırmaktadır.
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  48. Hume's Constitutivist Response to Scepticism.Taro Okamura - 2024 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 11.
    In the concluding section of the Book One of the Treatise, Hume confronts radical scepticism about the standards of correct reasoning. According to the naturalistic interpretations, Hume resolves this scepticism by appealing to some psychological facts. A common criticism of this interpretation is that the alleged naturalistic epistemic norm seems to be merely Hume’s report of his psychology, and it remains unclear why this seemingly mere psychological description can provide a principled reason to overcome his scepticism. In this paper, I (...)
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  49. The Skeptical Enlightenment: Doubt and Certainty in the Age of Reason.John Wright (ed.) - 2019 - Liverpool, UK:
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  50. Common knowledge and skepticism.Oswaldo Porchat Pereira - 2024 - Sententiae 43 (1):51-89.
    The first translation into Ukrainian and French of the article "Saber comum e ceticismo” (Common knowledge and skepticism) by Osvaldo Porchat Pereira (1933–2017), which became one of the classic sources of modern Brazilian Neopyrrhonism.
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