Mind 115 (459):519-566 (2006)

Abstract
A conditional takes the form ‘If A, then C’. On the truth-conditional view of conditionals, conditional statements state things with truth-conditions. On the suppositional view, conditional statements involve the expression of a supposition. I develop and defend a view on which conditional statements both state things with truth-conditions and express suppositions. On this view, something is fundamentally right about standard truth-conditional and standard suppositional views. Considerations in favor of conditional contents lead us to attribute truth-conditional contents to conditional statements; considerations in favor of the suppositional view then lead us to an unexpected account of these contents. The resulting view has a number of benefits, including a unified treatment of conditional speech acts, a plausible account of our practice of ascribing truth-values to conditional statements, a simple explanation of the apparent equivalence between probabilities of conditionals and conditional probabilities, an intuitive treatment of ‘Gibbardian stand-offs’, a plausible logic of conditionals, and an explanation of why theorizing about conditionals has proved so difficult
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DOI 10.1093/mind/fzl519
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References found in this work BETA

Philosophical Guide to Conditionals.Jonathan Bennett - 2003 - Oxford University Press UK.
A Philosophical Guide to Conditionals.Jonathan Bennett - 2003 - Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 10 (4):565-570.
Real Conditionals.William G. Lycan - 2001 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Embedding Epistemic Modals.Cian Dorr & John Hawthorne - 2013 - Mind 122 (488):867-914.
What 'If'?William B. Starr - 2014 - Philosophers' Imprint 14.
Suppose Yalcin is Wrong About Epistemic Modals.Joshua D. Crabill - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 162 (3):625-635.

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