Informal Logic 26 (1):91-101 (2006)

Authors
John Biro
University of Florida
Abstract
In this paper we defend a particular version of the epistemic approach to argumentation. We advance some general considerations in favor of the approach and then examine the ways in which different versions of it play out with respect to the theory of fallacies, which we see as central to an understanding of argumentation. Epistemic theories divide into objective and subjective versions. We argue in favor of the objective version, showing that it provides a better account than its subjectivist rival of the central fallacy of begging the question. We suggest that the strengths of the objective epistemic theory of fallacies provide support for the epistemic approach to argumentation more generally
Keywords Arguing, argument, argumentation, begging the question, epistemic theories, fallacies, objective epistemic theories, persuasion, subjective, subjective epistemic theories
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References found in this work BETA

Knowledge in a Social World.Alvin I. Goldman - 1999 - Oxford University Press.
Truth.Paul Horwich - 1998 - Clarendon Press.
Paul Slovic, and Amos Tversky, Eds.Daniel Kahneman - 1982 - In Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic & Amos Tversky (eds.), Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases. Cambridge University Press.
Begging the Question.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 1999 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 77 (2):174 – 191.

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