A Short Argument against Truthmaker Maximalism

Metaphysica 23 (1):27-36 (2022)
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Abstract

Mark Jago has introduced a short Fitch-style argument for truthmaker maximalism – the thesis that every truth has a truthmaker. In response to Jago, Trueman argues that the Fitch-style reasoning allows us to prove the opposite – no truth has a truthmaker. In the article, we consider the debates between Jago’s truthmaker maximalism and Trueman’s truthmaker nihilism. Also, we introduce a short Grim-style argument against Jago’s truthmaker maximalism.

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References found in this work

A World of States of Affairs.D. M. Armstrong - 1997 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
Truthmakers, entailment and necessity.Greg Restall - 1996 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (2):331 – 340.
Computability and Logic.George S. Boolos, John P. Burgess & Richard C. Jeffrey - 1974 - Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press. Edited by John P. Burgess & Richard C. Jeffrey.

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