Intensionality and Epistemic Justification

Philosophia 41 (2):463-475 (2013)

Authors
Patrick Bondy
Wichita State University
Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to raise a new objection to externalist process reliabilism about epistemic justification. The objection is that epistemic justification is intensional—it does not permit the substitution of co-referring expressions—and reliabilism cannot accommodate that
Keywords Epistemic Justification  Reliabilism  Externalism  Intensionality
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DOI 10.1007/s11406-012-9386-1
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References found in this work BETA

Epistemology and Cognition.Alvin I. Goldman - 1986 - Harvard University Press.
Philosophical Explanations.Robert Nozick - 1981 - Harvard University Press.
What is Justified Belief.Alvin I. Goldman - 1979 - In George Pappas (ed.), Justification and Knowledge. Boston: D. Reidel. pp. 1-25.

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