Utilitas 32 (2):236-252 (2020)

Authors
Gwen Bradford
Rice University
Abstract
Why is pain bad? The most straightforward theory of pain's badness, dolorism, appeals to the phenomenal quality of displeasure. In spite of its explanatory appeal, the view is too straightforward to capture two central puzzles, namely pain that is enjoyed and pain that is not painful. These cases can be captured by conditionalism, which makes the badness of displeasure conditional on an agent's attitude. But conditionalism fails where dolorism succeeds with explanatory appeal. A new approach is proposed, reverse conditionalism, which maintains the explanatory appeal of dolorism, but gives attitudes a value-defeating role. It is argued that this view does best in fulfilling the desiderata and capturing the cases.
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DOI 10.1017/s0953820819000475
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References found in this work BETA

What Makes Pains Unpleasant?David Bain - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 166 (1):69-89.
Welfare, Happiness, and Ethics.Bruce Brower & L. W. Sumner - 1998 - Philosophical Review 107 (2):309.
The Distinctive Feeling Theory of Pleasure.Ben Bramble - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 162 (2):201-217.
Pains That Don't Hurt.David Bain - 2014 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 92 (2):305-320.
Against Welfare Subjectivism.Eden Lin - 2017 - Noûs 51 (2):354-377.

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